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#WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink: Negotiating Religious and National Identity on Twitter

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1 Introduction

Since the invention of the Internet, it has increasingly been recognized as a fertile field for research. Of particular interest for scholars interested in the humanities and social sciences is the digital space as it is embedded in everyday life. With the emergence of what scholars have called the "Web 2.0" or "social Web" (Zappavigna 2012, 2), online content does no longer merely provide information but enables Internet users to generate their own content in a myriad of forms. Thereby, platforms and services where users are allowed to create or develop online relationship or where content is not only shared but also debated and distributed, are termed social media (Zappavigna 2012, 2). In this paper, the focus lies on one specific social media platform, namely the microblogging service Twitter, which allows for microposts (tweets) of 140 characters or less to be sent, accessed, received, shared, and replied to via a variety of methods (Zappavigna 2012, 2). As a channel for public, global, and real-time communication, Twitter "provides a window on contemporary society" (Puschmann et al. 2014, 426). Thereby, discussions on Twitter are reflective of the participants' perspectives on on-going events and current societal issues (Bruns and Burgess 2011, 7). On Twitter, topics of potential interest to users are marked by hashtags, which foreground particular words by preceding them with the hash symbol "#" (Bruns and Moe 2014, 17). Tweets that contain a certain hashtag can be analyzed as discursive expressions of Twitter users that temporarily bond around topics of interest and shared values via hashtag-related affiliation (Zappavigna 2012). In this way, hashtags do not only work to concentrate discussions on a certain topic and designate individual tweets as part of it but are further understood as "social facilitative devices, employed by users to assert their collective identity" (Konnelly 2015, 1).

For my analysis, I concentrate on the way collective identity is discursively brought into being in Twitter activities. While most research on Twitter has been quantitative in nature, my approach is inspired by Parker et al. (2011), who call for increasing use of qualitative content analysis with regard to research on social media. In this way, the specific ways in which communication on Twitter functions and relates to other public spheres can be investigated. Moreover, online discourses and social media interactions have only recently emerged as a topic of interest when analyzing the ways social identity is negotiated and communicated digitally (Barbu-Kleitsch 2016, 160). While religious scholars, such as Lövheim (2013), have focused on the construction and negotiation of "religious" identity online, there is of yet little research on religious identity formation on Twitter in particular. Wills and Fectau's recent study (2016) on Twitter as a digital space for identity construction

by the digital British Muslim community can be seen as one example of such a research project. In this thesis, my aim is to contribute to research concerned with the discursive construction of identity online and to knowledge on the specific ways Twitter can be appropriated by its users in analyzing the Twitter discourse around the hashtag #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink.

The hashtag was introduced in April 2016 as a response to the Sunday Times Magazine with the Title "What Do British Muslims Really Think?" and the respective article called "An Inconvenient Truth". The primary argument in evidence in the Sunday Times publication is that British Muslims differ from British people in general and are thus at odds with the British nation. Thereby, homogenizing portrayals of Muslims and Islam that reduce complexity are instrumentalized and serve as the basis for excluding Muslims from British national identity[1]. Since the hashtag #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink was intended to be used by members of the British Muslim community to share their version of "what British Muslims really think" and thereby to contest the negative portrayal within the article, the hashtag discourse is analyzed as part of the discursive field in which the boundaries of national identities are negotiated.

Discourses on belonging and conceptions of national and religious identity are of particular relevance in light of the growing global mobility of people migrating and increasingly vigorous discourses with regard to belonging that are establishing (Yuval-Davis 2011, 39 ff.). In today's Europe, in which the boundaries of nations are increasingly secured by more or less overtly applying a logic characteristic of Islamophobia[2] and cultural racism (Weedon 2004, 157), the negotiation of Muslim identity and its intersection with the respective national identity category is of particular interest. Indeed, the specific identity formations as well as the ways boundaries of the nation are identified do not necessarily have to be agreed upon by all parties concerned. In the case of British Muslims, their exclusion from the British national body may be imposed upon them (De Fina, Schiffrin, and Bamberg

[1] The notion of national identity based on a shared essence of its members is seen as a social construction created and reinforced through on-going discursive action that constitutes processes of identification (Bucholtz and Hall 2004, 374). Thereby, national identity, same as religious identity and any social identity is conceptualized as the result of reiterating processes of identification.

[2] The term Islamophobia refers to unfounded hostility towards Islam. It refers also to the practical consequences of such hostility in unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and communities, and to the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream political and social affairs (Weedon 2004, 145).

2006, 273). However, the potential for subversion and resistance is inherent in all discursive fields (Weedon 2004, 10) and while there are nationalist discourses that deny the possibility for Muslims to be members of the national collectivity, it is possible to resist such identification.

Twitter activity, especially with regard to the use of topical hashtags that facilitate spreading and publicising a topic or concern, can potentially reach beyond Twitter itself and be taken up by other media entities. Used in such a ways, Twitter becomes a means available to every individual with access to the internet to participate in public discourses around major events and issues. Indeed, Twitter has increasingly been recognized for its potential to "talk back" and has been used to contest social discrimination and marginalization (Konnelly 2015, 1). Since the hashtag #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink was launched as a response to an exclusionary rhetoric, I argue that reading the Twitter data gathered as a discourse of resistance can possibly identify the specific strategies that are employed to negotiate and contest negative identification. At the same time Twitter may also provide marginalized members of society with a space for positive identification and unification (Wills and Fecteau 2016, 1 ff.). Therefore, the Twitter data gathered was further examined in order to analyze how Twitter users employ the hashtag in order to identify and unify as members of the digital British Muslim community and hence both construct and reinforce their collective identity.

Drawing on both the article and a corpus tweets containing the hashtag #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink, a mixed-method content analysis approach was employed in order to explore the following overall research question:

> *How is the identity of British Muslims as well as British national identity negotiated and constructed in the article "An Inconvenient Truth" and the hashtag discourse #WhatBrithsMuslimsReallyThink?*

Thereby, the analysis aims to explore not only the content elements that are mentioned but specifically those along which boundaries of identity categories are apprehended. Moreover, the specific way in which Twitter users respond to the article as well as construct their own portrayal of British Muslim identity will be analyzed. The potential discrepancy between the identity construction in the article on the one hand and the identification of British Muslims in the hashtag discourse on the other hand are investigated. Of further research interest is the specific manner in which the identity categories of 'national' and 'religious', or rather

'British' and 'Muslim', are constructed in relation to each other and with reference to other axes of difference, such as 'race' and 'gender'.

In the following sections, the background knowledge necessary for the understanding of the case study as well as the specific approach used for the analysis are outlined. First, Twitter is conceptualized as a field of research and as a specific communicative space. Since data was gathered with regard to a specific hashtag, the focus will further lie on the way scholars have conceptualized communication around hashtags. In Chapter 3, I discuss the theoretical background, including theories on the discursive construction of identity in general as well as national identity in particular. Furthermore, based on scholarly work on nationalism and the conceptualizations of the inter-relation between nationalism and religion therein, considerations of relevance for this thesis will be outlined. Moreover, by taking into account the historical context of representation of Islam in Europe and the more recent manner in which British media portray Muslims, the issues addressed and the strategies of belonging employed in the Twitter conversation can be embedded in a larger public discourse on British national identity and intra-national boundary making. In Chapter 4, the concrete and guiding research questions devised on the basis of those theoretical elaborations are stated. Chapter 5 will outline and discuss the method of data collection, the data sample, and methodological approach used for the analysis. Thereby, limitations with regard to the sampling technique used and the generalizability of the results will be problematized. Last but not least, the results of the analysis of both the article and the Twitter sample will be discussed in Chapter 7 and 8. In doing so, I wish to illustrate along what lines British national and British Muslim identity are constructed in the data and in what ways the hashtag discourse and its constructions can be seen as resisting negative identifications of British Muslims that aim at excluding them from the British nation.

2 Twitter as a Field of Research: Social Communication Online

With over 250 million active users each day, Twitter is one of the most influential social media platforms worldwide (Kumar, Morstatter, and Liu 2015, 21). Although there is no comprehensive demographic data[3] on the entirety of Twitter users, studies suggest that the platform is used most frequently by young people, with percentages varying from 66% up to more than 93% of users aged 35 and younger (Sloan et al. 2015, 14). Content on Twitter is user-generated in form of microposts (tweets) of 140 characters or less, which can be sent, accessed, received, shared, and replied to via a variety of methods (Zappavigna 2012, 2). The restriction in terms of character number has lead to the introduction of various URL shortening services, which allow Twitter users to include links to articles, websites, pictures, and other multimedia content in their tweets (Rogers 2014, x). All short messages published on Twitter are considered public unless users explicitly declare the tweet to be private (Kumar, Morstatter, and Liu 2015, 23). On the platform, tweets appear in real-time and in reverse chronological order, a genre characteristic of a blog, hence Twitter has been termed a microblogging service (Rogers 2014, xv).

2.1 Twitter as an Object of Study

Since its launch in 2006, Twitter has been refashioned both as a means of communication and as an object of study (Rogers 2014, ix ff.). Some scholars have focused on the concept of virtual communities on social media via personal networks (Gruzd, Wellman, and Takhteyev 2011, Loureiro-Koechlin and Butcher 2013) and have conceptualized Twitter and other social media platforms as spaces of "networked sociality" (Rogers 2014, xiv). Twitter's social networking mechanism is called "following" and allows users to see any content published by the user they followed (Kumar, Morstatter, and Liu 2015, 25). Those follower networks are asymmetric, as they do not have to be reciprocal. Indeed, it has been argued that Twitter users have audiences rather than social circles and do not follow an account on the basis of the person behind it but rather because of the content published (Rogers 2014, xv). Furthermore,

[3] Twitter data has been criticized as "data-light", due to the lack of demographic information available (Sloan et al. 2015, 2). However, as Sloan et al. (2015) have shown, it is possible to apply certain strategies to derive demographic information of a given data set, such as location, age, gender, or occupation, not only by screening user profiles but also by analysing other indicators present in the language used and the content published. Unfortunately, those approaches are themselves time and labour intensive and have thus not been applied in the analysis at hand.

scholars such as Huberman, Romero, et al. have found that network links between Twitter users do not necessarily imply interaction and can only be deemed social bonds with caution (2009, 2 ff.). This apparent lack of sociality has caused some to focus mainly on the contents that are tweeted and the different kinds of communicative activities that have developed.[4]

Due to the character limit of the individual tweets and the ease with which tweets can be gathered, Twitter has established itself as a productive field of study in a myriad ways. Indeed, the analysis of Twitter data is appealing to a variety of disciplines "allowing researchers to address fundamental questions about social identity, status, conflict, cooperation, collective action, and diffusion" (Golder and Macy 2015, 1). While the sheer volume of data is particularly suitable for quantitative analyses of "big data", recently, scholars have called for increasing studies using qualitative methods, such as Qualitative Content Analysis or Critical Discourse Analysis (Marwick 2014) and approaches that combine quantitative approaches and qualitative approaches to discourse analysis (Zappavigna 2012). In this thesis, such a qualitative approach to Twitter as a discursive field was chosen.

In terms of content, Twitter started as a tool for everyday "lifesharing" (Bruns 2011, 1) and day-to-day interpersonal communication. While some scholar have banalized Twitter use as "daily chatter" (Rogers 2014, xiii) without meaningful information and have dismissed attempts to establish it as an object of study, such a criticism ignores the potential for research in social science and humanities areas such as sociology, socio-linguistics, or psychology such naturally occurring data enables. Moreover, in addition to the highly personal updates of individual Twitter users, more journalistic and quasi-journalistic activities have emerged (Bruns 2011, 1). Increasingly, Twitter is used as an event-following tool and a source not only for real-time information but also a space for debates around specific topics, such as politics, news, or entertainment (Bruns 2011, 1, Weller et al. 2014, xxx). It has been argued that in order to support and perhaps encourage this "move from an ego to a reporting machine" (Rogers 2014, xvi), Twitter changed its tagline in 2009 and users, whose tweets have so far been guided by the question "What are you doing?", were now asked "What's happening?".

[4] While there are many interesting network-based approaches to Twitter that analyse the kind of sociality found in follower-networks, such as the analysis of how tweeting frequency and tweet contents relate to unfollowing (Bruns and Liang 2012, 3) or the in-depth investigation of "networks that matter" between followers and followees that „actually communicate through direct messages with each other" (Bruns and Liang 2012), there will be no further investigation of follower-based social networks in this paper.

In addition to tweets concerned with "massively shared experiences" (Rogers 2014, xvi) in form of (real-time) event reporting, Twitter is also used as a backchannel for on-going discussions of such events. Thereby, the event is not only reported but also shared, highlighted, commented on and evaluated, which results in a more comprehensive picture involving "what Twitter thinks" (Bruns and Burgess 2012, 802) about a certain event or issue. Indeed, as Bruns elaborates (Bruns 2011, 2), most tweets published in relation to events are representative of a broader commentary that reflects Twitter users' personal perspective and are thus suggestive not only of a journalistic but also, and maybe more importantly, of the personal, ego-related form of communication. Shifts from everyday, "mundane" Twitter use to event-related tweeting occur with breaking events and can be tracked by Twitter's own device that measures "trending topics"[5] both worldwide as well as regionally (Bruns 2011, 3). Increasingly, when noteworthy events occur, such as natural disasters, political campaigns, sports, or otherwise televised events, Twitter users will share and comment on the news (Weller et al. 2014, xxx). Thereby, both the immediate reporting of events as they are unfolding as well as Twitter users' social commentary is frequently covered and further distributed by other mass media (Weller et al. 2014, xxx).

2.2 Twitter as a Communicative Space

Scholars researching Twitter have conceptualized it as a particular kind of communicative space on which information is conversational, networked, and selected according to criteria of personal relevance (Schmidt 2014, 4). This communicative space is facilitated by specific structural and organizational features central to the understanding of any social interaction on Twitter. An understanding of these features is thus a prerequisite for any scientific inquiry using Twitter as an object of research. On a structural level, the feature used to filter information, and arguably the most fundamental one, is the *follower network* mentioned above (Bruns and Moe 2014, 16 f., Kumar, Morstatter, and Liu 2015, 25, Schmidt 2014, 5). This network relies on what can be called "sender-audience" relationships, with followers subscribing to updates of a particular user (Schmidt 2014, 5). Bruns and Moe distinguish between three layers of communication on Twitter; Firstly, the *meso* layer, which is characterized by the follower-followee network (Bruns and Moe 2014, 16). Secondly, the *macro* layer of communication characterized by the use of specific syntax, most importantly the hashtag, to extend the reach of a given tweet beyond the *meso* layer to potentially all users

[5] With the emergence of topical hashtags, further elaborated below, "trending topics" tend to form around such easily searchable hashtags.

on Twitter (Bruns and Moe 2014, 17). Third, the *micro layer* on which communication is specifically highlighted to individual users (Bruns and Moe 2014, 16 f.).

As the *meso* layer, and hence the follower-followee network, is seen as the default layer of communication on Twitter, followees are the primary intended audience of any user (Bruns and Moe 2014, 16 f.). It can be argued that tweeting to this imagined audience is "similar to making a public statement to a known group of friends and acquaintances" (Bruns and Moe 2014, 17) However, depending on the size of one's follower-network, it may well be that the audience is more likely to be a large group of mostly unknown people who do not necessarily react or pay attention to statements made when publishing a tweet (Bruns and Moe 2014, 17). Hence, it has been argued that the forms of mediated communication on Twitter "tend to constitute new models which do not have clear offline equivalents" (Bruns and Moe 2014, 17). In addition to the follower-network, there are textual references within the published tweets that mark specific communicative practices supported by Twitter's software (Schmidt 2014, 5). There are three such features that are especially important: a) the @mention/@reply, b) the hashtag, and c) the retweet.

a) @mention/@reply

The first textual marker is the use of so called @mentions or @replies. An @mention or @reply consists of the @ character succeeded by the name of the individual user mentioned, who will be notified of any tweets directly mentioning them (Bruns and Moe 2014, 19 f, Kumar, Morstatter, and Liu 2015, 36). In this way, an @mention can possibly take communication from the *meso* layer of the follower-network to the *micro* layer of personal conversation between two users that do not have to be in the same follower-network (Bruns and Moe 2014, 19 f.). There are cases in which celebrity users, brands, or institutions are mentioned, which may be simple references instead of an attempt to start a conversation. However, as the mentioned account will be notified of an incoming message, even those mentions might be interpreted as an interpellation, thus further blurring such a distinction (Bruns and Moe 2014, 20). If the @mentions are reciprocated by the recipients, exchanges may develop, in which tweets are preceded by @replies (@username) (Bruns and Moe 2014, 19). If the @mention or @reply is the first word in the tweet, Twitter's infrastructure supports the indicated intention to specifically address one or more specific Twitter users in that the messages become visible only for the users interacting and are not publicly readable anymore (Bruns and Moe 2014, 19). Those conversations can be seen as analogous to an offline conversation (Bruns and Moe 2014, 19). If, however, such an exchange is intended to be fully

public, Twitter users have introduced the .@-syntax, in which an @mention is preceded by a ".", thereby taking the message from the micro back to the meso (and possibly the macro) level (Bruns and Moe 2014, 19).

b) # Hashtag

Hashtags are keywords that are preceded by the hash symbol "#". If such a hashtag is included anywhere in the tweet, it marks the tweet "as being relevant to a specific topic and make[s] it more easily discoverable to other users" (Bruns and Moe 2014, 17). This can be interpreted as signaling "a wish to take part in a wider communicative process, potentially with anyone interested in the same topic" (Bruns and Moe 2014, 17). Thereby, a tweet that includes a topical hashtag can reach an audience beyond a user's follower-network and is "a means of coordinating a distributed discussion between more or less large groups of users, who do not need to be connected through existing "follower" networks" (Bruns and Burgess 2011, 1). Such tweets constitute the *macro* layer of Twitter conversation, while tweets with non-topical hashtags, mostly used for emphasis or emotional markers, such as #sad, #win, or #facepalm, are unlikely to be deliberately searched for by users and thus do not reach beyond the meso layer (Bruns and Burgess 2011, 5, Bruns and Moe 2014, 18). Topical hashtags are created by Twitter users simultaneous to, in the aftermath of, or even prior to events, with often more than one hashtag emerging for the same event or a single hashtag used for more than one topic (Bruns and Burgess 2011, 3). This phenomenon is usually regulated by Twitter users themselves in order "to keep 'their' hashtag free of unwanted or irrelevant distractions, and to maximize the reach of the preferred hashtag to all users" (Bruns and Burgess 2011, 3). Users can subscribe to hashtags, which allows them to track all posts that include the hashtag of interest, however, it cannot be assumed that users participating in a hashtag discourse[6] follow all hashtagged tweets themselves (Bruns and Moe 2014, 17 f.). Furthermore, not all tweets that are potentially part of the particular discussion carry the hashtag (Bruns and Burgess 2011, 4), as replies to hashtagged tweets, for example, do not have to include the hashtag themselves and would hence not be included in a data archive focusing on a particular

[6] The term "discourse", although a common term in research since the 1970s, has been used in a variety of considerably different ways, which necessitates researchers applying the term to specify the way they understand it (Wodak and Meyer 2009, 2 f.). Here, all tweets that are published in relation to the topic of the hashtag and are marked as such by including the hashtag, e.g. all tweets that contain #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink, are seen as part of the same discursive field. The concept of discourse as it is used in this paper will be elaborated in Chapter 3.1.

hashtag. However, as @replies (without the .@-syntax) are commonly a shift to the micro layer of Twitter communication, it is unclear whether such a tweet can necessarily be seen as part of the same macro discourse.

c) Retweet

Last but not least, the third textual marker frequently used on Twitter is the retweet, in which a tweet consists of the syntax "RT@username [original message]" (Bruns and Moe 2014, 22). Thereby, retweeting has been called the key mechanism for information diffusion on Twitter that allows for transitioning between the layers of communication (Bruns and Moe 2014, 22). It is inherently designed to move tweets from one follower-network to another and from one layer of communication to another, especially from the hashtag level to the attention of a user's own followers (Bruns and Moe 2014, 22, Kumar, Morstatter, and Liu 2015, 35, Suh et al. 2010, 1). In form of a retweet button, the Twitter interface allows tweets to be redistributed while at the same time authorship to the author of the original tweet remains indicated (Starbird and Palen 2010, 3). In this way, retweets can be identified by the letters „RT" at the beginning of the resulting tweets, followed by an @ and the username of the user that posted the original post (Starbird and Palen 2010, 3). However, if retweeted manually, retweets may also be forwarded to specific users (with the @mention), thus taking the original tweet to the micro layer of communication described above (Bruns and Moe 2014, 22).

Furthermore, while retweets usually only redistribute tweets as they are, it is possible for additional information to be added in a manual retweet, hence the addition of a topical hashtag in a retweet could indicate the intention to redistribute a tweet vertically, to the macro layer of a broader, hashtag specific audience (Bruns and Moe 2014, 22). Similar to other functions on Twitter, such as favoring[7], retweeting is indicative of popular tweets that are considered worthy of a user's attention and even of spreading (Wills and Fecteau 2016, 2). Furthermore, Suh, Hong et al (2010) have shown that in addition to tweet type (e.g. image tweet), the content of a given tweet plays a key role to how often it is retweeted. Therefore, the number of times certain tweets are retweeted can be interpreted of a sign of contents that are considered important by Twitter users and it has been suggested that "focusing on retweets may help to reduce noise during data collection and real-time analysis of

[7] Twitter users can favour individual tweets, which stores them for later retrieval. It has been suggested that favouring and retweeting of tweets are correlated (Huberman, Romero, and Wu 2009, 5). However, favoured tweets have not been captured with the method of data retrieval used for this paper, outlined in Chapter 5, hence favouring will not be analysed further.

tweets“ (Starbird and Palen 2010, 9).

2.3 Hashtag Discourse

As this thesis is concerned with the analysis of tweets containing a specific topical hashtag, it is not only crucial to understand the way hashtags function on Twitter but also how such discourses can be interpreted. Bruns and Burgess see the rapid emergence of what they call *ad hoc publics,* or *hashtag communities* around topical hashtags (2011). In these cases “hashtags are used to bundle together tweets on a unified, common topic, and […] the senders of these messages are directly engaging with one another, and/or with a shared text outside of *Twitter* itself“ (Bruns and Burgess 2011, 5, original emphasis) . Even though the participants in such a hashtag discourse may not interact with each other directly or follow what others are saying, they are, as Bruns and Burgess argue, still part of the same active process of “audiencing” and reacting, as “members of the community of interest” of such an event (2011, 5). Bruns and Burgess’ concept of a community is further connected to the extend in which participants of a hashtag discourse interact with each other directly through sending each other publicly visible .@replies and retweeting each others tweets, with the number of such responses directly linked to the extend they comprehend a hashtag community “to act *as* a community” (2011, 6).

Another prominent approach to Twitter is Zappavigna’s (2011, 2012), who conceptualizes community on Twitter differently, “with the organizing principle of affiliation being an emergent bonding around searchable topics *rather than direct interaction*” (Zappavigna 2012, 191, my emphasis). With this approach, tweets that contain a certain hashtag can be analyzed as discursive expressions of an ambient audience that forms an impermanent ad hoc community by bonding around topics of interest and shared values via hashtag-related affiliation (Zappavigna 2012, 90 ff.). In this way, hashtags are understood as devices that allow Twitter users to communicate and (re)assure their mutually shared affiliation and identity position (Konnelly 2015, 11). Thereby, the action of microblogging is deemed an “on-going performance of identity” (Zappavigna 2012). Those two approaches to community differ most strikingly in their inclusion of direct interaction, with Bruns and Burgess’ concept of community going beyond participants that share specific interests, and including mutual awareness and deliberate engagement with one another (2011, 5 ff.).

While their approaches to community might differ, the view of microblogging as an act of discursive performance can be seen in both Zappavigna’s as well as Bruns’ elaborations. Thereby, the interaction around a given hashtag is understood as a discursive

field in which users actively engage, if not necessarily with one another than at least, with topics and events. As discourse is seen as a social practice that is both "socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned – it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people" (Wodak and Meyer 2009, 6), a discourse around a hashtag may well produce and reproduce a shared, collective identity of its participants, which could be interpreted as the communal identity of what Bruns and Burgess (2011) call a "hashtag community". The next Chapter outlines how this view of discourse in combination with the concept of identities as social processes is understood and applied in this thesis.

3 Theoretical Background

3.1 Discourse and Identity

In addition to the theoretical approach to Twitter as a specific communicative space, the concepts of *discourse* and *identity* are central to the analysis of the way collective identity is negotiated in the hashtag discourse in question. Scholarly interest in the study of identity has increased in anthropology and sociology, especially in sociocultural linguistics, as well as in humanities and the social sciences in general (Bucholtz and Hall 2003, 373). However, many approaches to the study of identity have been harshly criticized (Bucholtz and Hall 2003, 374). One of the most fundamental criticisms on former concepts of identity has been the use of *essentialism;* In an essentialist concept of identity it is believed that identity categories are based on an inherent essence and "that those who occupy an identity category (such as women, Asians, the working class) are both fundamentally similar to one another and fundamentally different from members of other groups" (Bucholtz and Hall 2003, 374). Such notions of identity categories are often claimed to be based on natural or biological essences or rooted in a static concept of culture (Bucholtz and Hall 2003, 374). Today, however, identity categories as fixed and naturalized entities have been rebutted and there is what Diaz-Bone calls "a constructivist consensus" (2006, 255 my translation) in scholarship on identity, in which the social is seen as "constructed". Hence, identity is no longer seen as inevitable and natural, but rather as fluid and socially constructed in discourse (Bucholtz and Hall 2003, 374 ff.).

This movement to a non-essentialist view of identity is the result of criticism on the humanist notion that identity is inherent in the individual, autonomous subject (De Fina 2011, 265). Part of this criticism has come from feminist and gender scholars, most prominently voiced by Butler in her well-known work *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (1990). In this work, Butler deconstructs identity categories via a genealogical critique and shows that such categories are naturalized as "the *origin* and *cause* [rather than] the *effects* of institutions, practices, discourses with multiple and diffuse points of origin" (1990, 9, original emphasis). Moreover, she emphasizes that identity is not something that an individual possesses, a "false trail" the focus on identity has led many scholars on (Anthias 2008, 7), but rather something one "does", or "'performs'[8] and recreates through concrete

[8] The term "perform" does not refer to "performance" in terms of a deliberate act but rather to Butler's concept of *performativity*, with which she means the "reiterative and citational

exchanges, discourses and interactions" (De Fina 2011, 265). In other words, this approach to the study of identity sees identity as inherent "in actions, not in people" (Bucholtz and Hall 2003, 376). Hence, as "the product of situated social action" (Bucholtz and Hall 2003, 376), identities are constantly forming and re-forming, dynamic and never fixed. Indeed, as Bucholtz and Hall argue, research is not concerned with identity as a "set of fixed categories but [with] identification as an on-going social and political process" (2003, 376). This poststructuralist view of identity as "an effect of culture" (Weedon 2004, 155) or "the emergent product rather than the pre-existing source of linguistic and other semiotic practices and therefore fundamentally a social and cultural phenomenon" (Bucholtz and Hall 2005, 588) is a basic principle of the study of identity.

In this paper, identity is viewed as an on-going process situated in discourse. Since scholars have used the term "discourse" in a myriad of ways, it is necessary that I specify what I mean by the term in this paper. Originally and most broadly, "discourse" refers to a linguistic concept, which simply means oral or written language use (Hall 2001, 72, Wodak et al. 2009, 9). However, Foucault, an influential scholar in the development of the term, has expanded the meaning of "discourse" (Hall 2001, 72). In his view, discourses are not purely linguistic phenomena, but in them, language is seen as social practice (Wodak and Meyer 2009, 5). In this paper, the term discourse is applied in its Foucaultian meaning of "a group of statements which provide a language for talking about – a way of representing the knowledge about – a particular topic at a particular historical moment" (Hall 2001, 72). This provision of "a language for talking about" determines what can be meaningfully said, as, although things and actions exist outside discourse, they only ever become meaningful within (Diaz-Bone 2006, 252, Hall 2001, 73). As such, discourses define and at the same time produce the objects of knowledge (Hall 2001, 72) and are thus termed productive (Diaz-Bone 2006, 252, Hall 2001, 73). Indeed, in his genealogy of sexuality, Foucault shows that it is the effect of the discourse on "perversion" not to suppress perversions in that they are analyzed and made visible but really to create such a mode of classification and hence possibility for identification in the first place (Foucault 1977, 59).

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practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names" (Butler quoted in Weedon 2004, 7). In this process, modes of identity or subjectivity are repeatedly manifested in, for example, the way someone dresses, walks, behaves, and can, by way of repeatedly performing discourses of identity, be internalized by individuals (Weedon 2004, 7).

Moreover, discursive practices are always historically and locally specific and can never be understood without their specific context (Hall 2001, 74). Indeed, what can be deemed as "true" is meaningful only within a definite discursive formation[9] (Hall 2001, 74). This is further valid with regard to the range of subject-positions that are available within a specific local and historically embedded discourse, and with which individuals can identify (Hall 2001, 80). It is this identification with particular subject-positions, this process of positioning, that shapes identity (Bucholtz and Hall 2005, 591), whereas „non-recognition and non-identification leaves the individual in an abject state of non-subjectivity and lack of agency" (Weedon 2004, 7). However, while available identity positions may be produced and certain social status quo be reproduced and perpetuated in discourse, discursive acts can also dismantle and deconstruct the status quo and the identities related to it (De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak 1999, 157). In this view, discursive formations always consist of competing discourses that, although related to one another through hierarchical power relations, potentially allow for resistance and subversion (Weedon 2004, 18). Indeed, for Foucualt, power is never only repressive but also enabling and thus, although "there is no place beyond discourses and the power relations that govern them, resistance and change are possible from within" (Weedon 2004, 10). In this thesis, both the hashtag #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink and the article it responds to can be seen as discursive events that share the same object of reference (Hall 2011, 73), namely the identity group of British Muslims. Therefore, they are both part of the same discursive formation.

Last but not least, identities are not only socially constructed within specific historical discourses, but also never one-dimensional, but rather always formed along several dimensions. An influential scholarly concept with regard to the way identity categories are formed simultaneously and in relation to each other, both as macro-level categories and as multifaceted subject-positions of individuals, is *intersectionality*[10]. Identities are thereby thought of as being constructed along axes of social divisions, such as, most famously, race,

[9] According to Foucault, discursive formations are constituted by various discursive events, or rather individual representations or utterances that make up a meaningful unit, which, at the very least, share the same object of reference (Hall 2011, 73).

[10] In her famous article on the intersection between gender and race in the experience of black women, Crenshaw (1989) shows that identities are constructed not along a single-axis but rather along multiple, overlapping axes of difference. Based on these elaborations, she argues for an intersectional approach to identities in anti-discrimination politics (1989, 72 f.). Thus, the term intersectionality was initially coined in reference to a specific historic and political discourse on discrimination, however, it has evolved into a broader theoretical and methodological concept "applicable to any grouping of people, advantaged as well as disadvantaged" (Yuval-Davis 2006, 201).

class, and gender[11] (Knapp 2005, 249). I agree with scholars such as Knapp, which argue that the frame of intersectionality can not only be used to demonstrate how categories are always constructed in relation to each other (Knapp 2005, 259) but also help to identify axes of differences that are, in a specific local and historical situation, of particular relevance and interrelated in such a matter that they cannot be approached separately (Yuval-Davis 2006, 202 f.). Such an approach is especially relevant with regard to the way "national" and "religious" identity are constructed and designed in relation to each other, whether one is thought to figure as the basis of the other or they are conceptualized as mutually exclusive. Furthermore, the way they are interdependent and co-constructed in relation to each other and other possible axes of differentiation will be analyzed. First, however, the scholarly conceptualizations of the category of national identity as well as the way the inter-relation between nationalism and religion has been framed by theorists of nation and nationalism is outlined in the next two sections.

3.2 Theories of Nation(alism)

The study of nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon, which established itself throughout the late 20th century, with many of the key works published since the 1980s (Ozkirimli 2000, 15, Ichijo and Uzelac 2005, 1). As covering all work on nationalism would exceed the scope of this thesis, I will provide an overview of the principles and critiques important for the argument at hand and focus on Anderson as an example of a modernist[12]

[11] The most famous triad of differences in intersectionality, "race-class-gender", has also been used to critically analyse these categories as such (Knapp 2005, 258 f.). Knapp elaborates that the arrival of "race-class-gender" has been particularly challenging for the German speaking academic context, in which the use of the term "Klasse" seemingly positioned a scholar in the past of radical Marxist debates, while the mere mentioning of the term "Rasse" as the basis for identity, both in the general public as well as in scholarly work, has been tabooed ever since Nazi history (2005, 258). However, she further argues that in Europe outside the German speaking context, such as in the UK, racial categories are quite common and pointedly refers to the fact that in the German context "underlying the striking taboo connected to Rasse there is a uncanny continuity in the imaginary of an ethnically homogeneous nation", which she terms to be a "symptom of unresolved conflict with the past" (2005, 258). Hence, in my analysis, I will not shy away from the term "race" both because the study is set in the UK, where racial categories cannot be neglected, as well as because I strongly agree with Knapp who suggests not to neglect the category of racial differentiation in scholarly work.

[12] A basic distinction in scholars of nation is that between modernists and ethno-symbolists. Thereby, modernists see the nation as "essentially a modern construct" while ethno-symbolists "insist on the pre-modern, ethnic basis of the nation" (Edensor 2002, 10). In both groups there have been influential scholars who have contributed much to the study of

theorist of nationalism. In his influential work *Imagined Communities* (first published in 1983), Anderson dedicates himself to the scholarly debate around the terms nation and nationalism[13] (Anderson 2006(1983)). After emphasizing the inherent difficulty in defining those terms former theorists have identified (Anderson 2006(1983), 3 ff.), he offers his own considerations and defines nation as "an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (Anderson 2006(1983), 6). One central point in Anderson's definition, and indeed a point all modernist scholars of nationalism agree with (Ichijo and Uzelac 2005, 4), is that nations are *imagined.* As such nationalism is not an awakening of a community based on its real essence but the invention and creation of such an essence, which goes hand in hand with the construction of the nation itself (Anderson 2006(1983), 6 f.).

The second point he outlines is that nations are always constructed as *limited*, as they are always imagined within "finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations" (Anderson 2006(1983), 7). Scholars have further emphasized the importance of such boundaries in the construction of national identity, or of any identity for that matter[14]. The process of boundary making that operates within national identities has even been termed "the key element of the process of identification, […] ways of delineating who and who does not belong to the nation, for battles over exclusion and inclusion are always on-going" (Edensor 2002, 25). It is important to notice that those boundaries are both contested and shifting and do not necessarily have to be symmetrical (Yuval-Davis 2011, 17). Indeed, "inclusion or

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nationalism. However, both approaches have had its flaws, the most striking of which are the attempt to attribute nation to a pre-existing ethnic essence by ethno-symbolists and the mostly normative conception of "modernity" misconceived as contrary to tradition and religion as well as the biased focus on elite narratives by modernist scholars (Edensor 2010, 10 ff., Ozkirimli 2000, 64 ff.).

[13] While both terms have been used in different ways, I base the terminology used in this book on Anderson's key consideration of the nation as an "imagined community" and further draw on Ichijo and Uzelac's adaption of Smith's definition in order to understand the distinction between "nation" and "nationalism" (2005, 16-17). Therefore, the term "nation" is used for the entirety of the population considered to belong together, "occupying an historic territory and sharing common myths and memories, a public culture, and common laws and customs for all members" (Smith cited in Ichjio and Uzelac 2005, 16), whereas "nationalism" is seen as "a political movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of [this] population" (Ichjio and Uzelac 2005, 17). Yuval-Davis refers to nationalism in this political sense as "politics of belonging" (2011), a term that will be used in this thesis as well.

[14] According to scholars, such as Butler, the construction of identities depends not only on the construction of an essence of what one is but also on what one is not, on what is left outside (Wodak et al. 2009, 7, Wodak and Meyer 2009, 3 f.). In this view, identities are always relational and exclusive, as well as inclusive (Yuval-Davis 2011, 17).

exclusion is often not mutual, depending on the power positionality and normative values of the social actors […] constructions of self and identity can, in certain historical context, be forced on people" (Yuval-Davis 2011, 17). However, acknowledging the power relations at play in the process of identification does not mean that the space for alternative imaginings and hence for subversion of a dominant discourse is neglected, but rather that the contested nature of any construction of identity needs to be taken in account (Yuval-Davis 2011, 17).

Elements that determine inclusion or exclusion into national belonging vary greatly depending on the specific context and perspective boundaries are drawn in (Edensor 2002, 25, Yuval-Davis 2011, 20 f.). In order to identify some requisites often argued with in processes of national boundary making, Yuval-Davis draws on the topology of Smith, who differentiated between three dimensions of nation [15]; *Staatnation, Kulturnation,* and *Volksnation* (Yuval-Davis 1993, 624). The first nationalist dimension is the *Staatsnation*, which is based on the notion of *shared citizenship*. In this concept, the nation is constituted by a body of citizens that are either included or excluded from the national body (Yuval-Davis 1993, 624). However, as Yuval-Davis argues, citizenship is not always drawn in such a dualistic matter, but includes rights as well as duties that are often differentiated along axes of differences, such as gender or race (1993, 625). In this view, citizenship is seen as "full membership in a community", including not only civil, but also political and social rights and responsibilities (Yuval-Davis 1993, 626). It is important to notice that the nation is not congruent with the state (Yuval-Davis 1997, 12 f.), although the idea of the nation as *sovereign* and free in the form of a sovereign state (Anderson 2006(1983), 7) has been part of nationalist concepts and incorporated in many theories on nationalism.

The second dimension Smith identifies is *Kulturnation*, in which national belonging is based on the concept of a *shared culture*, religion or values (Yuval-Davis 1993, 624, 2011, 20). As "culture", just as "nation" and "religion", is a contested concept whose meaning is fluid, continually re-negotiated and context-dependent (Ozkirimli 2000, 191), the exact elements the imagined common culture consists of will vary according to region and time-period. Yuval-Davis effectively illustrates that in the rhetoric of nationalist political projects, woman often serve as cultural signifiers of national collectives and the "actual behavior of women can also signify ethnic and cultural boundaries" (1993, 627). Furthermore, in her critique of previous theories of nation, she indicates the neglect of gender relations in the phenomena of nations and nationalisms and outlines the specific ways women are central to

[15] It is important to keep in mind that those three dimensions are ideal types and in reality, discursive boundary-making processes of national identity may draw on elements from all these dimensions in different ways.

boundary making processes and the imagining of nations (Yuval-Davis 1997, 1 ff.).

The third dimension, the *Volksnation*, is based on the idea of a *shared (biological) origin*, in which nations are constructed around a specific ethnic origin, or race (Yuval-Davis 1993, 624). If, in this view, "membership in the national collectivity depends on one's being born into it (myth of common origin)[16], then those who do not share the myth of common origin are completely excluded" (Yuval-Davis 1993, 628). In the light of this line of argumentation based on the concept of a common biological origin, it seems peculiar that a scholarly focus on race and ethnicity as a factor inherent in many national boundary-making processes has only recently emerged (Ozkirimli 2000, 191). In fact, many influential scholars in the field have neglected the factor of race (Ozkirimli 2000, 191). In the case of Anderson, a Marxist by training, this omission was unconvincingly legitimized by way of attaching the nationalist rhetoric of "blood" to the class-based rhetoric of "blue-blood" and thereby fully excluding any other blood-line rhetoric that could be associated with racism (Anderson 2006(1983), 149). New approaches to nationalism, based for example on postcolonial studies, have since strongly criticized this neglect (Ozkirimli 2000, 191 ff.).

In addition to the omission of gender relations and race-based exclusion and inclusion mechanisms, theories of nationalism have been criticized to have solely focused on the level of top-down, elitist discourses in the reproduction of national identity (Ozkirimli 2000, 195). In his influential work called *Banal Nationalism* (1995), Billig argues that far from only being constructed in spectacular displays or in dominant discourses during crises, national identity is produced and reproduced in "everyday life" (Edensor 2002, 11, Skey 2009, 334). Indeed, it has even been argued that it is in mundane and routine reproduction that assumptions of belonging are grounded (Edensor 2002, 11) and in daily forms of life that the "more visible (and sometimes virulent) aspects of nationalism" (Skey 2009, 334) are reinforced. Billig's concept has been criticized for overlooking the dynamic nature of identity and for focusing only on media representations and not "attending to the ways in which ordinary social actors construct themselves as nationalized subjects" (Skey 2009, 337). However, it has still been influential in that a growing number of studies now focus on processes of identification at the level of daily life and no longer trivialize references to such things as popular culture, food and drinks, or sports (Skey 2009, 342, Edensor 2002, 175). Furthermore, it has not only lead to an increased focus on the complex role media representations play in the construction of national identity but has inspired scholars to go beyond Billig's concept and take the

[16] This, in turn, has led to the control of sexuality and especially the control of women as the biological border guards in the reproduction of the national body (Yuval-Davis 1993, 628 ff.).

discursive actions of ordinary people in everyday settings into serious account in order to comprehend national identity as a contested and multifaceted construct.

In conclusion, belonging to a national identity category "is always a dynamic process, not a reified fixity – the latter is only a naturalized construction of a particular hegemonic form of power relations" (Yuval-Davis 2011, 12). In this thesis, such processes of identification are seen as exercised on all levels of society, including in quotidian settings of everyday life and activities. Moreover, elements from all dimensions of nation, e.g. *Kultur-, Volk-* and *Staatnation*, can be implemented when conceptualizing a national identity. Before analyzing the specific elements referred to in the portrayal of British Muslim and British national identity in the data, the relationship between "nation" and "religion" as influential scholars of nationalism have conceptualized it is elaborated and problematized in the next section.

3.3 Nationalism and Religion

Religion has figured in many theories of nationalism, however, the interrelationship between nationalism and religion has been problematic in mainstream scholarship on nations and nationalism (Zubrzycki 2010, 606). Edensor has argued that national identity tends to be naturalized in discourse to such an extend that it has, until recently, been immune from critique of essentialist and fixed conceptualizations of identities prominent and increasingly voiced in recent sociological and cultural studies (2002, 24). Yet, even scholars who have introduced and developed the view of national identity as discursively constructed, as outlined above, have not been able to consequently apply this perspective to the concept of religion. According to Zubrzycki (2010), there are three typical and interrelated problems that have hindered a well-grounded understanding of the relationship between nationalism and religion, all three rooted in problematic conceptualizations of religion. In the following, I will outline the most prominent approaches to religion theorists of nation and nationalism have adopted and the three basic problems therein (Zubrzycki 2010, 606 ff.).

The first inter-relation between religion and nationalism well-known scholars of nationalism have theorized, is an evolutionary sequence, in which religion is followed by nationalism (Zubrzycki 2010, 606 ff.). Zubrzycki calls this view, which is heavily based on the theory of secularization, the *evolutionist causal trap* (Zubrzycki 2010, 606). The argument sees the demise of religion necessarily followed by a rise of nationalism (Zubrzycki 2010, 606 ff.). Several aspects of this argument are problematic; First, while secularization theorists have shown the decline of religion (read: Christian church) as a "sacred canopy", as well as a

dwindling in membership and practice in the Christian church, this does not necessarily indicate that religion *per se* is in decline but could also be suggestive of a change in the nature of religiosity[17] (Gorski 2003, 111 f.).

Secondly, secularization theory is one of the central axioms of modernization theory, which suggests that "as societies modernized, they became more complex, more rationalized, more individualistic – and less religious" (Gorski 2003, 111). However, empirical evidence does not support such a generalized claim, indeed, aspects that have been attributed to modernization, such as industrialization, urbanization, differentiation, and rationalization, do not necessarily go hand in hand with the demise in religious belief or participation, not even with regard to Christianity (Gorski 2003, 112 f.). Overall, theorists have argued that the idea of secularization depends on a notion of religion that is strongly based on Christianity and on a very specific, Eurocentric concept of the separation between religion and political citizenship (Braidotti 2008, 8). However, even if secularization could be accepted without reservations, an evolutionist argument would still mistake correlation for causation when arguing that because the rise of nationalism took place simultaneously to the decline of religion it is to be assumed "that the emergence of nationalism was *caused* by secularization" (Zubrzycki 2010, 607).

This evolutionist view is taken further by scholars who suggest that nationalism does not only necessarily follow religion but that it is a substitute for religion in modernity (Zubrzycki 2010, 608). This view is based on functionalist approaches to religion, which many influential scholars, such as Durkheim Malinowski, Radcliffe- Brown, Merton, and Parson, have applied (Turner and Maryanski 1979, vi). In general, functionalist scholars define "social phenomena in terms of their consequences for the broader society" (Turner 1979, vi). One of the functions in terms of which religion has been defined is the „immense integrative power" ascribed to it (Zubrzycki 2010, 608). When this functionalist approach is extended to nationalism, nationalism does not merely supersede religion, but substitute it and is hence conceptualized as a religion itself (Zubrzycki 2010, 608). Indeed, one of the earliest scholars of nationalism, Hayes, has termed nationalism a religion, which "fulfills deep human

[17] Such a change in the nature of religiosity has for instance been suggested by the scholars Lüddeckens and Walthert, who have outlined that although the increasing functional differentiation of societies has rendered religion to be „one manner of communication among others" (2010, 35, my translation), this does not only mean that former versions of belonging to religious communities and institutions lost in relevance but also that the variety of religious possibilities available increased (2010, 35). In this way, religiosity and religious belonging has not necessarily decreased but has become more individualized and founded in subjective and reciprocal authorisation between individuals (Lüddeckens and Walthert 2010, 35 ff.).

needs [and] the essential function of consolidating the group and its identity" (Zubrzycki 2010, 608).

However, functionalism, which terms social phenomena only observable and definable on the basis of the essential function they fulfill for society and its survival, has been heavily criticized on the basis of logical fallacies[18] (Turner and Maryanski 1979, 118 ff.). Indeed, when religion is seen as a function that exists as the natural and necessary consequence of the "deep human need […] to belong" (Zubrzycki 2010, 608) and is, at the same time, only observable and definable in that function, without reference to the process by which these needs are created and then fulfilled, then the argument is illegitimately teleological[19]. Furthermore, the concept of religion as having a fully distinguishable function relies on the assumption that religion is "at least theoretically separable from other institutional forces" (Cavanaugh 2007, 2), which, as Cavanaugh outlines, is a separation that has not been made "until the modern era and then, primarily in the West" (Cavanaugh 2007, 2). Indeed, the very category of "religion" has been criticized as Eurocentric (Cavanaugh 2007, 2) and it has been argued that there is no overall concept of "religion" that is not either too restrictive, by defining "religion" by their assumed content, or to vague, by defining "religion" based on its function within society. Hinnells even concludes that "there is no such thing as "religion", there are only the religions, i.e. those people who define themselves as members of a religious group" (Hinnells 2005, 6). Hence, the idea of nationalism and religion as functional equivalent is problematic, as it relies upon (A) a secularization narrative centered in the West and (B) on a questionable concept of religion, defined by its *essence*, both in terms of its religious (vs. secular) content as well as with regard to its particular function. Furthermore, religion is claimed to belong to a prior stage and to have been replaced by nationalism (Zubrzycki 2010, 609). Overall, this view has been demonstrated to be not only theoretically and logically flawed but also empirically wrong and based on a normative conceptualization of modernity (Zubrzycki 2010, 609).

The last of the three approaches to the relationship of nationalism and religion Zubrzycki identifies has very different prerequisites (2010, 609). Unlike the evolutionist and

[18] For a more into depth critique on the logical fallacies inherent in functionalism, see Hempel (1965), Cummins (1975), or Turner and Maryanski (1979).

[19] According to Yuval-Davis, „an illegitimate teleology exists when it is presumed that social processes and structures come into existence and operate to meet end states or goals, *without* being able to document the causal sequence whereby end states create and regulate these structures and processes involved in their attainment. As Durkheim warned, ‚social phenomena do not generally exist for the useful results they produce'" (Yuval-Davis 2011, 17).

the functionalist approach, the *perennialist* position is not based on the assumption that religion needs to disappear for nationalism to emerge but rather emphasizes continuity between the two (Zubrzycki 2010, 609). Scholars adhering to this view claim that "ancient religious communities provided the materials from which modern nations could later be built" (Zubrzycki 2010, 609). However, Zubrzycki convincingly argues that such scholars fail to dissociate themselves from the emic perspective prevailing within nationalist discourses and realize that "such continuity is retrospectively constructed and reinforced in nationalist discourse and narratives" (2010, 609). Her case study on the rise of Polish nationalism supports her argument, as it demonstrates that, although Catholicism has played a role in Poland even before the fall of the Soviet Union, it has not always been, as has been claimed by nationalists, the "backbone of the Polish nation" (Zubrzycki 2010, 610 ff.)

In conclusion, previous scholarship on nationalism and religion has been based on questionable concepts of religion. If, however, religion is seen not as a fixed, and stable entity (or function), but rather as a category that is fluid, multi-faceted, changeable, contested and permanently constructed and reconstructed in discourse[20], the relationship between nationalism and religion can be analyzed more fruitfully. In this way it is possible to analyze the specific ways in which nation and religion and their relationship are "(re)fashioned at key historical junctures not only in and through political ideologies and institutional re-arrangements, but also in popular rituals such as processions, parades, and protests [and] the debates they generate" (Zubrzycki 2010, 619). Furthermore, analyzing such discourses on nation and religion on multiple levels "is not only more complete, but also critical for accurately identifying mechanisms of social change and explaining the process of identity formation" (Zubrzycki 2010, 620). In this thesis, religious identity, just as national identity, is seen as a discursively constructed entity. In the case study at hand, it is of particular interest to scrutinize the way in which the construction of British national identity overlaps and inter-relates with the construction and representation of Muslim religious identity. In order to do that, a theoretical and methodological framework for analyzing the discursive construction of identity, particularly of national identity, is outlined in the next section.

[20] Such a view is supported by Asad (2009(1986)), who suggested a way to understand Islam as a tradition. A tradition, he argues further, is not as it is today often portrayed, "a reaction to the forces of modernity [and] in the Muslim world [...] a weapon, a ruse, a defence, designed to confront a threatening world" (Asad 2009(1986), 15), but should rather be seen as consisting of changeable and heterogeneous discourses. In other words, a religious tradition can be understood as a discursive field in which meaning manifests itself in particular local and temporal situations.

3.4 Discursive Construction of National Identity

Based on a concept of nations as discursive constructs of imagined sameness De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak (1999), and Wodak et al. (2009) have used a Critical Discourse Analysis approach in order to analyze the specific ways in which „national identities – conceived as specific forms of social identities – are *discursively*, by means of language and other semiotic systems, *produced, reproduced, transformed* and *destructed*" (De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak 1999, 153, original emphasis). In this section, I will present their model of discursive construction of national identity and complement it with Bucholtz and Hall's (2003, 2005) elaborations on the mechanisms and strategies of identification in order to establish a concept of the discursive construction of identity, with focus on national identity, on which the analysis of the data collected for this thesis will be based.

In their study of the discursive formation of Austrian national identity, De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak analyze data containing both written and spoken forms of "discourse", which range from qualitative interviews and group discussions to posters, slogans and newspaper articles (1999, 152). In this way, it is possible to illustrate that the construction of national identities is not only at work in discursive acts of powerful political and social elites but also in the reception, re-production, and potential inversion of such concepts in the language of other domains of society, such as the everyday lifeworld (Wodak et al. 2009, 3), just as critics that advocate Banal Nationalism have suggested. In their analysis, the researchers focus on three interwoven dimensions: (A) *contents/topics*, (B) *strategies*, and (C) *linguistic means and forms of realization* (De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak 1999, 157).

(A) Contents/topics

The first concern in the analysis of discourses on national identity is identifying the *contents/topics*, hence the thematic elements important in the construction of both intra-national sameness and inter-national difference (Wodak et al. 2009, 30). Although De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak's study identifies contents related to the specific discursive construction of Austrian national identity, the five macro-areas of topics they distinguish (1999, 158) might be, when adapted accordingly, relevant to other local and historic settings as well. As the contents are, however, specific to the context in question, I chose an inductive approach to the analysis of the contents relevant in the data in question, which will be outlined further in Chapter 5. Moreover, the outcome of my content analysis will not be directly compared to the

subject areas identified by De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak (1999) and Wodak et al. (2009) but rather analyzed with regard to the notions of a national identity based on the dimensions of *Kulturnation, Volksnation,* and *Staatsnation.*

The first category, *Kulturnation*, thereby includes both what De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak (1999) and Wodak et al. (2009) identify as a *common culture,* along the lines of concepts such as a common language, religion, arts, and everyday life, as well as the sense of „emotional attachment to [the nation]“, which also implies a „supposed national behavioral disposition“ (Wodak et al. 2009, 31). The dimension of *Volksnation*, which is based on a shared ethnic origin, is only referred to in the narrative of a *common (political) past* in the analysis of De Cillia, Reisigl, ad Wodak (1999, 158). And the third and final dimension, *Staatsnation*, is analyzed as including references to the construction of a *collective political presence and future* as well as the discursive construction of a *national body*, concerned with the local, geographical and physical dimensions of the national territory (De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak 1999, 159 f., Wodak et al. 2009, 31). In the data gathered, elements from all three dimensions are referred to in the negotiation of a shared identity, however, when the construction of shared and recognized sameness is attempted, most tweets refer to concepts related to a common culture.

(B) Strategies

The issues investigated are the *strategies* applied in the discursive construction of national identity. Wodak et al. understand the term “strategy” according to Bourdieu and emphasize that “strategic action is oriented towards a goal but not necessarily planned to the last detail or strictly instrumentalist; strategies can also be applied automatically” (2009, 32). Hence, they state that the degree of intentionality may vary greatly in the analyzed data, depending on what has caused the discourse and where it has originated (De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak 1999, 160). Overall, four strategies applied on a macro-level are identified, which, in concrete discourses, can occur simultaneously and in multiple and interrelated ways within concrete discursive acts (De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak 1999, 160 f., Wodak et al. 2009, 33);

(1) *Constructive strategies* function in a way as to build and “establish a certain national identity by promoting unification, identification and solidarity, as well as differentiation” (Wodak et al. 2009, 33). This is often accomplished through the construction of a “we”-group that invites identification and solidarity (De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak 1999, 160).

(2) *Strategies of perpetuation and justification* aim at maintaining a certain national identity by way of continuously reproducing it and accentuating the need for continuity. Frequently, these goals are achieved by both the justification of the current status quo and the representation of "immigrants as a threat to national identity" (De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak 1999, 161).

(3) *Strategies of transformation* are meant to transform an established national identity as such or aspects of it into something new without always completely dismissing the former (De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak 1999, 161, Wodak et al. 2009, 33).

(4) *Dismantling or destructive strategies* dismantle or demolish a given national identity or its elements without promoting a new model to replace the abandoned one with (De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak 1999, 161, Wodak et al. 2009, 33).

In addition to these four strategies, De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak (1999, 161 ff.), and Wodak et al. (2009, 33 ff.) identify various sub strategies that serve these macro-level strategies. As, however, there are a myriad of sub-strategies, they only elaborate on the two most frequently used, "namely the strategies of emphasis or presupposition of sameness (*strategies of assimilation*) and the strategies of emphasis or presupposition of difference (*strategies of dissimilation*)" (Wodak et al. 2009, 33, my emphasis). In this view, identity is relationally constructed in the creation of imagined "temporal, interpersonal or spatial (territorial) similarity [or difference respectively] and homogeneity in reference to the various thematic dimensions" (Wodak et al. 2009, 33) outlined above.

In their work on *Identity and Interaction,* Bucholtz and Hall outline similar strategies within what they call "the relationality principle" (2005, 598). With this principle, they too emphasize that identities "always acquire social meaning in relation to other available identity positions" (2005, 598) and describe strategies, or in their words "tactics", with which such meaning can be achieved. The first two strategies they outline are based on the identity relations most thoroughly scrutinized within the study of identity, namely sameness and difference, hence in the words of Wodak et al. (2009) the strategies of *assimilation and dissimilation*, or what Bucholtz and Hall call the tactic of *adequation* and *distinction*[21] (2005, 599). Thereby, the term *adequation* refers to "the pursuit of socially recognized sameness" (Bucholtz and Hall 2003, 383), thus, to strategies that downplay inter-group differences and

[21] In the following I will use the terms adequation and distinction.

emphasize what is viewed as salient similarities in order for a group to be represented as sufficiently alike to be a understood as a cohesive entity (Bucholtz and Hall 2005, 599 f.). As the counterpart of the strategy of adequation, the second tactic, *distinction,* refers to the identity relation of differentiation, which emphasizes and constructs rather than erases difference (Bucholtz and Hall 2005, 600, 2003, 384). Frequently, distinction works by "establishing dichotomy between social identities constructed as oppositional [and] has a tendency to reduce complex social variability to a single dimension: us versus them" (Bucholtz and Hall 2003, 384). It is important to note that in the approach to identity assumed in this paper, both similarity and difference are not seen as something that pre-exists its discursive construction through such a strategy, but something that is socially achieved (Bucholtz and Hall 2003, 384).

Unlike De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak (1999), and Wodak et al. (2009), Bucholtz and Hall outline two more pairs in addition to this first pair of strategies. Those additional tactics can, I argue, serve as sub-strategies in the sense of Wodak et al. (2009)[22] and will therefore be included in my analysis. The second pair of strategies Bucholtz and Hall identify are *authentication* and *denaturalization,* which are concerned with the claim of realness and artifice (2003, 385, 2005, 601). Thereby, authenticity, which "has been tied to essentialism through the notion that some identities are more "real" than others" (Bucholtz and Hall 2003, 385), is seen not as a given but something that is discursively claimed in the process of *authentication* in order to verify and legitimize certain identities in activating "essentialist readings in the articulation of identity" (Bucholtz and Hall 2003, 386). The tactic of *denaturalization*, on the other hand, serves to subvert and dismantle those exact essentialist claims of an "inherent rightness of identity" (Bucholtz and Hall 2005, 602), for example by emphasizing the problematic, fragmented, and socially constructed nature of identity or by violating certain expectations essentialist views of identity are linked to.

The third pair of strategies involve *authorization*, or "the affirmation or imposition of an identity through structures of institutionalized power and ideology" (Bucholtz and Hall 2005, 603), on the one hand, and *illegitimation,* which "addresses the ways in which identities are dismissed, censored, or simply ignored by these same structures" (Bucholtz and Hall 2005, 603), on the other. However, *authorization* is not limited to those in power, same as *illegitimation* may be a form of resistance to the hegemonic authority but may as well support it (Bucholtz and Hall 2003, 387). Indeed, there are various ways in which an authoritative

[22] This supposition is further supported by the fact that some of the sample of sub-strategies listed by Wodak et al. (2009) directly correspond to Bucholtz and Hall's tactics, such as the "strategy of justification" (Wodak et al. 2009, 33).

identity may be constructed, depending on the kind of authority tried to be achieved. Hence, when an authoritative identity is constructed for example "through the strategic use of linguistic markers of expertise, such as formal language and specialized jargon" (Bucholtz and Hall 2003, 386), the jargon in question depends on the form of expertise intended to convey, for example medical expertise, but also notions such as being "a man/woman of the people". In this paper, all three of those pairs of tactics, *adequation* and *distinction, authentication* and *denaturalization,* and *authorization* and *illegitimation,* are understood as sub-strategies serving the four macro-level strategies outlined above and will, as such, serve as the basis for investigating the strategies of identification identifiable in the data analyzed in this thesis.

(C) Linguistic means and forms of realization

The third dimension important to the analysis of the discursive construction of national identity are the specific *linguistic means and forms of realization* (Wodak et al. 2009, 35 ff., De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak 1999, 163 ff.). In their analysis, De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak (1999) and Wodak et al. (2009) focus on lexical units, schemes of argumentation, and syntactical means which serve to express „unity, sameness, difference, singularity, continuity, change, autonomy, heteronomy, etc." (De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak 1999, 163) of a collective identity. As such, a variety of means are identified, of which they outline the most frequent ones, namely the personal pronoun "We", other personal, spatial, or temporal references, and the tropes of metonymy, synecdoche, and personification (Wodak et al. 2009, 35 ff., De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak 1999, 163 ff.).

In this paper, I will focus and elaborate on these specific means of realizations if and when they arise in my data. However, in order to gain a more into depth understanding of the mechanism involved at all those levels of language use when identity is constituted, I will primarily draw on Bucholtz and Hall's third principle of identification, *indexicality*[23]. Indexicality, they argue, "is fundamental to the way in which linguistic forms are used to construct identity positions" (2005, 593 f.). Thereby, an index is defined as a linguistic form whose meaning is always dependent on its interactional context (Bucholtz and Hall 2005,

[23]Overall, indexicality as well as the means identified by Wodak et al. (2009) serve as the basis for the understanding of the strategies applied. As such, they will be elaborated prior to the strategies in this thesis. Furthermore, this elaboration will serve to exemplify the strategies applied in the data analysed but specific means of realisation will not be systematically analysed in terms of frequencies.

594), for instance the personal-pronoun "we" Wodak et al. (2009) identify as a means frequently used in the construction of national identity. As such, in the process of indexicality, semiotic links are created between linguistic forms and the associated social meanings. Thereby, the following points are of relevance with regard to the construction of identity:

> Identity relations emerge in interaction through several related indexical processes, including: (a) overt mention of identity categories and labels; (b) implicatures and presuppositions regarding one's own or other's identity position; (c) displayed evaluative and epistemic orientations to on-going talk, as well as interactional footings and participant roles; and (d) the use of linguistic structures and systems that are ideologically associated with specific personas and groups.
> (Bucholtz and Hall 2005, 594)

In the analysis of the case study in question in this paper, the overt mentioning of identity categories is the first and most obvious level on which identities are introduced into discourse, a level that indeed has been "a primary method that nonlinguistic researchers have used to approach the question of identity" (Bucholtz and Hall 2005, 594). However, if such labeling and categorizing is understood as social action, then the analysis of this level and of the way such categories circulate within discourse and the way their meaning is constructed in explicit or implicit juxtaposition to each other can be fruitful for research (Bucholtz and Hall 2005, 594). Hence, not only the (a) overt introduction of identity categories but also the (b) implicit reference to identity categories, which often require inferential work and a knowledge of the specific context and discourses in place in order to be understood, will be analyzed in this paper. Here, (d) the use of linguistic structures, such as words and syntax specific to certain dialects or even the use of another language altogether, can be identified as implicit references to certain identity groups.

Last but not least, such references, both explicit and implicit, always carry ideological associations and the identity categories, and their aspects, are always objects of evaluations (Bucholtz and Hall 2005, 595). Indeed, such (c) display of evaluative or affective orientations in discourse, has been called the action of stance, in which through evaluating something, speakers always at the same time position themselves and align or dis-align with an identity position or aspects of it (Bucholtz and Hall 2005, 595). Moreover, these actions of aligning oneself with topics and values shared in discourse and associated with certain identity

categories can be identified in the most fleeting interactional situations, however, they can also transform into larger identity categories (Bucholtz and Hall 2005, 595). In her concept of impermanent ad hoc communities that emerge on Twitter when users bond around topics of interest and shared values via hashtag-related affiliation, Zappavigna refers to such action of positioning (2012, 191).

In this process, indexical association for particular social groups are created in a bottom-up fashion, however, in what has been called *indexical inversion*, such associations may also be "imposed from the top down by cultural authorities such as intellectuals or the media" (Bucholtz and Hall 2005, 596). Indeed, while identities as processes of identification and positioning can be ascribed, rejected and assumed in constant negotiation, there are always power relations involved "that may allow some to have a voice while denying this basic right to others" (De Fina 2011, 273). In this way, people and groups, especially marginalized members of society, can be positioned into roles and identity concepts, for instance by means of media representation, that they cannot easily change or refute (De Fina 2011, 273). Such cases demonstrate the significance of having a voice, or, as Weedon calls it, the importance of "talking back", which "enables people who find themselves subject to racist, sexist, colonial and homophobic power relations to resist negative definitions of what and who they are, to rewrite their history, to explore existing identities and to create new ones" (Weedon 2004, 154). Voice is, Weedon further argues, fundamental for positive forms of identity (2004, 50). Hence, while it is essential to include questions of power relations and voice in any analysis of the discursive construction of identity, it is especially salient to scrutinize such relations with regard to the case study at hand and in the context of discourses on identity and belonging in today's Europe as sites of a rising cultural racism and Islamophobia (Weedon 2004, 157).

3.5 Context: Islam and National Identity in Britain

In this section, important contextual aspects of the current discourse on British national identity and the location of Muslims therein will be outlined. First, drawing on the influential post-colonial scholar, Stoler (1995), I will elaborate the way the emergence of Europe as a nation has been intrinsically tied to colonialism and has been based not only on discourses on sexuality but also on racial differentiation. Based on these elaborations, Fassin's concept of "sexual democracies", which he understands in close relation to what he calls a "new racialization of Europe" (2012, 288), will be introduced. Third, the history of "Britishness", or rather specific political projects of belonging to the UK that have been applied and the way

those projects can be seen as a specific example of European narratives will be discussed. And last but not least, I will focus on the long history of representation of Islam and Muslims in Europe and specifically in Britain and the current forms this representation tends to take.

3.5.1 Nation and Nationalism in Europe

Based on her critical examination of Foucault's "History of Sexuality", Stoler argues that Europe as a "nation", or rather specific political forms of inclusion and exclusion of the "nationalist discourse" and narratives on "what it meant to be truly European" (1995, 8), has emerged within the 18th and 19th century colonial discourse that differentiated colonizers from colonized. She further emphasizes that, while Foucault delineates the emergence of a European identity only along the lines of discourses on sexuality located purely in Europe, such discourses have done more than "define the distinctions of the bourgeouis self; […] they have mapped the moral parameters of European nations" (Stoler 1995, 7). These moral parameters, indeed the "invisible properties" of what has been thought to be the "inner essence" of European identity and culture, were frontiers "secured through – and sometimes in collision with – the boundaries of race" (Stoler 1995, 7 f.). Indeed, strategies of exclusion that differentiated the true European from "'fictive Frenchmen, 'fabricated' Dutchmen, anglicised but not 'true' British citizens who threatened to traverse both the colonial and metropolitan 'interior frontiers' of nation states" (Stoler 1995, 11), often operated via racial, class, and sexual "othering". Stoler situates Foucault's nearly complete silence with regard to the topic of "race" in a European political discourse, in which it has been largely, but not rightfully, disregarded (1995, 19 ff.). Furthermore, she argues that since the 1980s, and frequently in relation to immigration, Europe has increasingly experienced the appearance of what has been called "new racisms" (1995, 24).

In his work, the sociologist (Eric) Fassin is concerned with such "new racisms" (2010, 2012). While there have been explicit conceptualizations of national bodies in term of blood and the origin of the people, which would resonate with the concept of *Volksnation* outlined above, Fassin argues that increasingly more often, ideas of a nation and Europeanness are conceived with regard to cultural terminology (2010, 508 ff.). One of the major concepts to this effect is Huntington's "clash of civilizations", in which the vision is that of two colliding cultures with fundamentally different value systems (Fassin 2010, 509). According to Fassin and his work on sexual democracy (2010, 2012), those differing values frequently take form in explicit views towards sexuality and gender, and hence he suggests the notion of a "'sexual clash of civilization' concern[ed with] 'gender equality and sexual liberalization" (2010, 509).

As an example of a rhetoric based on this notion, Fassin quotes the French politician Sarcozy who claimed that "France is not a race, nor an ethnic group; France is a community of values, an ideal, an idea" and "in France, women are free, just as men are free" (2010, 513). In this example, there is a clear attempt to dissociate nationalist ideas based on the notion of *Volksnation,* hence to negate any indication of a "racial" or "ethnic" basis for the nation. Demarcating the nation and establishing clear national boundaries is now based on the notion of a *Kulturnation*, or rather on the imagined sameness of shared cultural values. Those values need to be, in order to make a nation (here: France) unique and identifiable, contrasted with the claimed homogeneous and substantially different value system of the "other".

In Europe, such a line of argumentation, hand in hand with the instrumentalization of sexual and gender politics, are reality in many political discourses concerned with immigration (Fassin 2010, 515). Indeed, with references to gender equality and sexual liberation, it is possible to provide "a modern justification to anti-immigration politics that could otherwise appear merely as reactionary xenophobia" (Fassin 2010, 2013). A striking example of this instrumentalization is the following citizenship inquiry: In 2006, the German province Baden-Würtemberg has introduced a new test for foreigners that apply for citizenship, implicitly, and almost explicitly, aimed at Muslims (Fassin 2010, 516). Indeed, as will be outlined further, it is Muslims whose loyalty to Europe and here to Germany was regarded with a priori suspicion (Fassin 2010, 516). In the German test in question, some of the questions asked were:

> What do you think of the following statement — a woman should obey her husband, who can otherwise beat her up?
> What do you think of a man in Germany who is simultaneously married to two women?
> How would you feel about an openly gay politician?
> (Fassin 2010, 516)

This test is a clear example of what Fassin calls a litmus test, in which applicants for citizenship are tested on particular "values", frequently related to sexual liberation and tolerance and gender equality, that will determinate whether they are suitable to be part of the nation or not (2010, 515 f.). At the same time, the applicants are a priori assumed and expected not to share the values tested on. In this way, the boundaries of the nation can be secured against immigrants in Europe. However, although it is explicitly said that it is not

"race" but "cultural values" that are essential to inclusion or exclusion, exclusion mechanisms only work if based on essentialist, fixed and homogenous concepts of "culture" and "cultural values", which in turn contribute to a "racialization of Europe" (Fassin 2012, 288). Similarly, Yuval-Davis argues that "some political projects[24] of belonging can present themselves as promoting more open boundaries than they actually do" (2011, 21). For instance, although "earned citizenship" in Europe are supposedly not about race (*Volksnation)* but culture (*Kulturnation*), in reality is not possible to differentiate between the two, because "different discourses of belonging can be collapsed together or reduced down to each other in specific historical cases" (2011, 21).

3.5.2 Nationalist Projects of Belonging in Britain

While European identity today is often conceptualized along the lines of shared values, Yuval-Davis focuses on the specific elements around which British identity is and has been constructed in three major political projects of belonging to the United Kingdom that have been applied in the past. With each of those project constructing "differential boundaries as well as a different 'essence of Britishness'" (Yuval-Davis 2011, 25), it is important to keep in mind that none of them appeared in a vacuum and that former strategies of nationalism and aspects thereof are continued, transformed or abandoned in particular discourses. The first discursive construction of British identity Yuval-Davis discusses, has been applied by Powell, a conservative political figure in Britain after the Second World War (2011, 21). During that time, Powell's administration imported black British citizens from the Caribbean islands as workers but simultaneously excluded them from the English national collectivity, as "descent was the ultimate criterion for belonging" (Yuval-Davis 2011, 22). Indeed, he went as far as to say that people of different origin "could not, by definition, become part of the same integrated society" (Yuval-Davis 2011, 22).

The second concept, in place a decade after Powell during Thatcher's government, deviated from the first in the lack of a clear notion of *Volksnation,* as the possibility for a black middle-class assimilation was granted (Yuval-Davis 2011, 22). However, the notion of belonging to the British nation promoted in this project was based primarily on identification and emotional attachment. This solidarity and loyalty to Britain was made feasible and testable with the introduction of the "Cricket Test" by Tebbit, a Conservative minister in

[24] Politics of belonging consist of projects of nationalism that aim specifically „at constructing belonging to particular collectivity/ies which are themselves being constructed in these projects in very specific ways and within very specific boundaries" (Yuval-Davis 2011, 10).

Thatcher's government (Yuval-Davis 2011, 22 f.). In this test, people with a different origin were to watch a Cricket match between Britain and a team from the country of their origin and only if they cheered for Britain could they possibly "belong" to the British nation (Yuval-Davis 2011, 22). This concept has been adopted by later projects of belonging, however, instead of the cricket metaphor, football was increasingly the sport referred to when emphasizing social cohesion and solidarity (Yuval-Davis 2011, 22 f.).

While the first project of belonging argued with origin, and the second with emotional attachment as the essential element of belonging, the third, which was prominently promoted by Gordon Brown, is based on the adherence to normative values (Yuval-Davis 2011, 23 ff.). Those values, often defined along the lines of tolerance and liberty, human rights and basic democratic values, are not only seen as what constitutes Britishness but also as what Britain had to offer "not only to its citizens but also to the world at large" (Yuval-Davis 2011, 24). This emphasis on democracy and human rights was strengthened, not only in the United States but also in Britain, in relation to the involvement in the wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, when such values not only figured as signifiers of British belonging but also as the base of Britain's mission in the world (Yuval-Davis 2011, 24). Here again, although such values are a seemingly open and inclusive basis for identification, they "can be transformed, under certain conditions, into the inherent personal attributes of members of particular national and regional collectivities (Britain, the West) and, thus, in practice, become exclusionary rather than permeable signifiers of boundaries" (Yuval-Davis 2011, 25).

3.5.3 Islam and National Identity in Britain

Not only are particular national or regional collectivities represented as homogenized but so are members of religious groups. Islam in particular, as Said prominently pointed out in his influential work on *Orientalism*, is often represented in such a simplified manner (Weedon 2004, 142). Thereby, the portrayal of Islam and its members as reduced to unchanging characteristics is based on a long history of depicting Islam as the clearly inferior, barbaric and savage "other" to "the West" (Weedon 2004, 142 f.). Today, such an orientalist view of Islam is still prominent in both media and politics as well as in intellectual discourses (Asad 1997, 184). One example thereof, which is still highly influential today, is the concept of the "clash of civilizations" (Fassin 2010, 509, Weedon 2004, 143). In this concept, it is not just any cultures that differ as strongly that they necessarily collide, but the cultures in question are a supposedly "Western" culture that clashes with "the" culture of Islam (Asad 1997, 184 ff.). Thereby, Islam is seen as the dangerous "other" at odds with "Western interests" and

"secular modern values" (Asad 1997, 185 f.). This binary distinction between the secular, rational modernity and the religious, irrational backwardness specifically of Islam, although theoretically of religions per se, underlies most "Western" discourses about Islam and that does not allow "Muslim people or nations to be diverse or democratic and modern" (Weedon 2004, 143). With such representations in Western media, politics and popular culture, reinforced by limited and often stereotypical images of Muslim people and society that deny complexity (Weedon 2004, 143 ff.), Muslims living in the West must, as Asad argues, "at the very least be regarded with suspicion" (1997, 186). Hence, the rising Islamophobia observable in contemporary Europe and "the West" is based on a long history of "othering" Muslims dating back to the Crusades (Weedon 2004, 145), which complicates and impedes the "process of identifying with and belonging to mainstream Western societies" (Weedon 2004, 157) for Muslims living in Europe faced with exclusion and hostility.

In Britain, although with a substantial, mostly South-Asian Muslim population that has arrived since the 1940s and has been settled for two or three generations, hostility towards Muslims remains (Weedon 2004, 245). Furthermore, negative perceptions of Islam have been, among others since the Rushdie Affair, caused by the publication of Rushdie's *Satanic Verses* in 1988, and more recently since the violent attacks in the US in 2001 and Britain in 2005, reinforced and spread (Weedon 2004, 245). However, while, as outlined above, „the representation of Islam in the West as a dangerous cultural 'other' and as a potential 'enemy within' are by no means 'new' to the post-9.11 era" (Moore, Mason, and Lewis 2008, 6), Moore, Mason, and Lewis found that the volume of media coverage[25] on Muslims in Britain has since increased dramatically (2008, 6). In their analysis of the media coverage of British Muslims in British print media between 2000 and 2008, they identify a frequent focus on questions "about the 'loyalty and belonging' of Muslims living in Britain" (2008, 6), while debating concepts such as integration and social cohesion. Thereby, religious and cultural issues are discussed increasingly more often, with stories most commonly highlighting cultural differences between British Muslims and other British people, based on cultural values and ideas around issues, such as freedom of speech, Sharia Law, forced marriages, or the veil (Moore, Mason, and Lewis 2008, 10).

[25] It is clear that news coverage is only one particular site of representation and it is difficult to establish the extent to which it is directly responsible for negative images of Islam and hostility towards Muslims. However, it has been argued that print media has at least contributed to promoting a simplified view of British Muslims and to discrimination itself (Moore, Mason, and Lewin 2008, 6 f.).

The issues commonly discussed when highlighting cultural differences between British Muslims and other British people are evocative of the contents included in Fassin's example of a litmus test. In light of his concept of sexual democracy and on Yuval-Davis elaboration on the significance of women and their behavior in the construction of national boundaries, it is not surprising that the subject of gender equality, behavior, and rights emerges. Indeed, in their study of the mediatized public discourse on British nationhood and the wearing of the Muslim face-veil, or *niqab*, Meer, Dwyer, and Modood find that the veil is taken to symbolize not only "a stubborn refusal to accept 'our' [British] culture or to embrace modernity" (Meer, Dwyer, and Modood 2010, 85) but its critique is simultaneously embedded in a discourse on female submission and hence the value of gender equality and liberation (Meer, Dwyer, and Modood 2010, 95). Despite the obvious contradiction between the oppressed women that are denied any agency and the active act of agency when wearing the *niqab* and thereby making "a hostile statement about the society in which the wearer lives" and further "asserting cultural separateness" (Meer, Dwyer, and Modood 2010, 97), both lines of argumentation have been used simultaneously. Thereby, the veil and the practice of veiling come to symbolize cultural difference and separateness in general and "competing values" with regard to women's rights in particular. Moreover, Weedon identifies similar views of competing values with regard to attitudes towards sexuality in general and homosexuality in particular (2004, 145 ff.).

In conclusion, current discourses on Muslims in Europe in general and British in particular are based on a long tradition of representing Islam in European and "Western" countries and have been shown to be simplistic, homogenizing and exclusionary. Furthermore, within the tendency to conceptualize belonging no longer on origin and race but rather on the idea of clearly identifiable cultures with different value systems, Islam is represented as a cultural entity at odds with "Western" values, an incompatibility often comprehended in terms of attitudes towards gender and sexuality. In Britain, such a representation is observable not only in political projects of belonging, but also in British media and popular culture discourses. However, while in all contemporary examples discussed shared values are emphasized, there have been other strategies to dissimilate Muslims from the British national identity in the past, based on notions of origin or emotional attachment, which can potentially be part of particular discursive constructions of British national identity as well. In this thesis, it is possible to analyze the specific elements portrayed as part of British national and British Muslim identity in the case study at hand.

4 Research Questions

In order to answer the overall research question of how the identity of British Muslims as well as British national identity is negotiated and constructed in the article "An Inconvenient Truth" and the hashtag discourse #WhatBrithsMuslimsReallyThink, the data is analyzed with regard to the following four working questions:

RQ1: *What* contents are referred to in a) the article and b) the tweets?

RQ2: *How* are the identity categories in question (re-)constructed and negotiated, e.g. what strategies of identification are employed in a) the article and b) the tweets?

RQ3: How do the contents mentioned *correlate* with the strategies of identification applied, e.g. what contents are used for different processes of identification in a) the article and b) the tweets?

RQ4: How do the tweets relate to the article and its portrayal of the identity categories in question and in what ways does the construction of British Muslim and British national identity in the tweets differ from the one in the article?

In answering the research questions posed, the aspects presented as constitutive of British national and British Muslim identity are explored. Moreover, the investigation sheds light on the specific ways in which the hashtag discourse and its constructions can be seen as resisting negative identifications of British Muslims that aim at excluding them from the British nation.

5 Data and Method

5.1 Data Mining on Twitter: Method and Limitation

The collection of data has been argued to be one of the most challenging aspects of Twitter research, requiring technical and methodological knowledge of the available tools and the kind of data needed for a particular project (Kumar, Morstatter, and Liu 2015, 21 ff., Rogers 2014, xxi), While manual collection of data can and has been done[26], most research has been based on data collected either through one of the three APIs (Application Programming Interface) available on Twitter or by applying a software package[27] (Bucholtz and Hall 2003, 376). In this paper, data has been retrieved through Twitter's REST (Representational State Transfer) API, which allows for a myriad of active methods of data collection based on the traditional pull method enabling the researcher to request data from the server (Gaffney and Puschmann 2014, 56 ff.). The REST API is limited by a rate-restriction that only allows for a specific number of requests per hour, with more requests placeable if an authenticated Twitter account is used (Gaffney and Puschmann 2014, 59). Therefore, an Open Authentication account was created for this research, resulting in a rate-limit of 180 possible requests per hour, with 100 tweets per request. Hence, it was possible for 18'000 tweets to be gathered per hour. Fortunately, the requests necessary for the data gathered never exceeded this rate-limit.

Information was gathered by means of the web-based tool TAGS (Twitter Archiving Google Spreadsheet) that accesses Twitter's REST API and allows for both the compilation of the tweets as well as a number of statistical operations (Gaffney and Puschmann 2014, 56). This method enables the researcher to gather all individual tweets that contain a certain keyword or, in this case, hashtag. Thereby, the content of the tweet (including information on retweets, @mentions (if the tweet does not begin with the @mention) and URLs), the username of the twitter user that tweeted, the exact time the tweet was posted, the user follower count[28], and the URL are recorded. However, although it is possible to access historical tweets to some extend when using the REST API, the ephemeral nature of Twitter does not guarantee completeness when data is gathered in hindsight, as "data loosely falls off of the search system within a week of being posted" (Gaffney and Puschmann 2014, 56 ff.).

[26] See for example Wills and Fecteau (2016).

[27] For in depth information on all three APIs and a variety of tools available for different kinds of research on Twitter, see for example Gaffney and Puschmann (2014), Bruns and Liang (2012), or Kumar, Morstatter, and Liu (2015).

[28] The follower network was not of interest in this thesis, hence the user follower count was not included in any analyses.

Hence, it is only sensible to gather data produced within the last couple of days, which complicates studies of events recognized as such only in hindsight (Gaffney and Puschmann 2014), as „any research method which seeks to establish a reasonably comprehensive dataset of tweets related to a specific crisis event will need to begin tracking the event as it happens“ (Gaffney and Puschmann 2014, 62). In order to obtain a data set as complete as possible, all data gathered was published no more than 48 hours prior to the data collection requests. Furthermore, given the yet unsolved question of how representative Twitter users present in a given dataset are of the overall population, even if their probable youth (see Chapter 2) is taken into account, or even of the entirety of users on Twitter, no such generalization will be attempted in this paper.

5.2 Data Sample: Newspaper Article and Hashtag Discourse

5.2.1 An Inconvenient Truth: Article

Before outlining the data gathered from Twitter, this section introduces the article “An inconvenient truth” (Phillips 2016), published 10th of April, 2016, which is included in the analysis. This article is regarded as a crucial part of the discourse, as the hashtag has been deliberately created as a response to it. Hence, the article written by Trevor Phillips as well as the cover of the respective issue of The Sunday Times are included and analyzed in this paper as well. Both the author and the newspaper are renowned in Britain.

On the one hand, Trevor Phillips, former chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality, is a public and political figure well-known for his views towards multiculturalism (Meer and Modood 2009, 475). He is an established advocate of the need to assimilate to “British values” and opponent of multiculturalism, as he sees tolerance of diversity to „have led to isolated communities, in which some people think special separate values ought to apply“ (Kundnani 2007, 27). With regard to Islam, he has prominently argued that its values and practices, particularly with regard to the veil (Khiabany and Williamson 2008, 81), are in stark contrast to “what being British is about” (Kundnani 2007, 27). Overall, scholars have referred to Phillips as an exemplary proponent of a view based on a singular constructed national identity along the lines of shared values and the simultaneous marginalization of Muslims (Kundnani 2007, 24 ff.). The specific logic Trevor Phillips uses in his reasoning will be illustrated in the Chapter 6, in which the results of a close reading of the article are presented.

On the other hand, the Sunday Times is one of the most widespread weekly print newspapers in national circulation in Britain[29]. With a basic cover price at 2.50 pounds, it is published by Times Newspapers and is qualified as a "quality" newspaper in comparison to less serious media, such as mid-market or popular newspapers including Daily Mail or the Sun. According to data retrieved from ABC (Audit Bureau of Circulation)[30], the circulation per issue averages at 767'016, primarily across the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. With this circulation, The Sunday Times is among the top 10 best selling newspapers in Britain. Furthermore, statistics based on the time period between January 2015 and December 2015 suggest that, including data on digital and print reach, around 6.6 million people were reached by The Sunday Times or its website[31]. Therefore, it can be assumed that the article in question was bound to reach a substantial population. Moreover, the study and contents the article presented were the basis of and intended as a promotion of a documentary called "What British Muslims Really Think", which aired on Channel 4 at 10pm on April 13th[32]. However, as the hashtag was initially created as a response to the article and because the documentary has not been released at the time the tweets in my data sample were published, the documentary will not be included in the analysis at hand.

5.2.2 #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

For this study, all tweets containing the hashtag #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink have been tracked and extracted from Twitter after the emergence of the hashtag on the 10th of April, 2016. Using the TAGS tool, the data set was established the evening of April 11th and updated in regular intervals of no more than 10 hours. The volume of tweets published per day gradually decreased after another surge following the airing of the documentary on April 13th. In order to ensure maximum coverage, the search request was continually updated until 21st of April, during which only 1 tweet was published.

[29] General data on the British media market and specifically on The Sunday Times have been retrieved from Newsworks Online, accessed 03.10.16, <http://www.newsworks.org.uk/>.
[30] ABC (Audit Bureau of Circulations) Online, published August 2016, accessed 03.10.16, <http://www.abc.org.uk/>.
[31] Statistica Online, accessed 03.10.16, < http://www.statista.com>, < http://www.statista.com/statistics/386877/the-times-the-sunday-times-monthly-reach-in-the-uk/>
[32] Channel 4 Online, accessed 20.04.16 <http://www.channel4.com/programmes/what-british-muslims-really-think>

Figure 1. Number of Tweets per Day



Although this decrease in published tweets indicates a decline in interest and activity in the hashtag discourse, it cannot, however, be guaranteed that no further tweets have been published in the following days thereafter. Overall, 28'735 tweets that contain the hashtag in question have been gathered over the course of 11 days.

As this study aims to do a close content analysis, a sample feasible in size had to be chosen. According to Krippendorff, sampling for the purpose of content analysis differs from sampling in other scholarly work, as texts may be sequentially ordered and their meaning is thus be dependent on prior texts (2004, 112). As the hashtag discourse might indeed contain consecutive contents and even conversational, interdependent tweets, a random sampling technique could possibly miss the meaning of such contents. Therefore, the integrity of such a sample is questionable. Furthermore, as the meaning of tweets may refer to what has been tweeted before, the initial introduction of the hashtag and its intention is essential to understanding the hashtag discourse. Hence, in order to ensure the integrity and the inclusion of all intra-conversation references necessary to understand any given tweet, the first 24 hours after the emergence of the hashtag have been chosen as a sample. This physical distinction of the data sample via a given time period (Krippendorff 2004, 109) is, of course, not without its limitations. Indeed, the sample might not be representative even of the overall hashtag discourse, as there might be different users in the initial sample than after the hashtag has gained further momentum. Furthermore, meaning of hashtags can change over time, and in the case of the hashtag #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink, the release of the documentary has lead to not only an upsurge in the volume of tweets published but is also likely to have

changed the reference point and scope of the discourse. Therefore, it would be interesting to conduct further research on the way the hashtag discourse has changed over time. In such an approach, the way the hashtag discourse has changed due to new offline inputs, such as the airing of the documentary but also possible coverage of the hashtag in other media, would be of interest. However, with the sample at hand and within the scope of this thesis, such variation over time cannot be examined.

For this thesis, the sample of 24 hours chosen included tweets published between 00:39 o'clock until 23:57 on the 10th of April. This resulted in a total number of 2'134 tweets, of which 76% were retweets, leaving 511 original tweets, published by 237 Twitter users[33], to be included in the content analysis. For practical reasons, tweets were only included if they were, for the most part, written in English. As a result, 1 tweet, which was written in Arabic, was excluded based on its language. Furthermore, 2 tweets only contained the hashtag with no further content. Although this could be interpreted as participating or at least openly marking oneself as part of the hashtag conversation, those tweets did not contribute any further content to the hashtag discourse and they were hence excluded from analysis. In a second step, the remaining 508 tweets were coded with regard to the communicative features they contain, specifically hyperlinks, @mentions, and retweets.

Hyperlinks

As mentioned in Chapter 2, Twitter users have developed shortening services for URLs due to the character limits on Twitter, so that they can include hyperlinks to articles, websites, pictures, and other multimedia content in their tweets (Rogers 2014, x). Of the 508 tweets included in the sample, 118 featured at least one hyperlink. Each URL was opened and the content it referred to grouped into the following 6 categories:

Table 1. Reference Object of the Hyperlinks

Category	*Number of Tweets*
Images	65
Tweets	20*
Articles	10
Videos	7
Whole Websites	7
Not found	9

*11 of those tweets included images themselves.

[33] Tweets per user: Mean=2.13, Standard Deviation=2.57.

All 9 tweets with hyperlinks that could not be traced were excluded from further analysis. As articles, whole websites, and video material are all multi-layered and time-consuming to analyze, tweets with hyperlinks referring to such contents were only included in the analysis if their content could be feasibly understood without the hyperlink. Thereby, the content of those hyperlinks was not included in the analysis. If, however, the meaning of the tweet was dependent on the content of the hyperlink, the tweet was excluded from the sample. Two tweets, which read "#whatbritishmuslimsreallythink is now trending in #London/UK", contained hyperlinks to websites that automatically generate tweets when the volume of tweets that contain a certain hashtag reaches a given level. As those tweets are automatically generated, their content cannot be read as an active or conscious contribution to the hashtag discourse and they were thus excluded. Overall, 19 additional tweets were excluded, all 7 that included videos, 7 that referred to websites, and 5 that referenced articles.

Table 2. Exclusion based on Hyperlinks

Exclusion Criteria	*Number of Tweets*
Hyperlink to Article	5
Hyperlink to Website	5
Hyperlink to Video	7
Hyperlink not found	9

In this way, 29 tweets were excluded on the basis of their URLs, yielding a total of 480 tweets included for further analysis.

Hyperlinks that referred to other tweets (21) were included in the analysis. They can be understood as a specific form of retweeting, as the original tweet and its author are still present in the hyperlink. However, the tweet containing the hyperlink may comment or add to the original tweet. Even in case the new tweet contains nothing but the hyperlink and the hashtag #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink, the original tweet is marked as meaningful to this hashtag and is thereby brought to the public, macro-level of Twitter communication (Bruns and Moe 2014, 19). With 55%, the majority of the hyperlinks present in the sample directly referred to images. Scholars have identified those user-generated microblog posts that contain embedded images as "image tweets", which are "a staple of user-generated content" (Chen et al. 2013, 781). In addition, 11 of the 23 tweets referred to in hyperlinks were image tweets themselves. However, there were 11 images that contained text only. Those text images were transcribed into text form and analyzed as text. Other images contain both text and visual

elements, in those cases, the text was considered part of the image and the respective tweet counted as an image tweet. Overall, 65 image tweets were included in the analysis.

As an in-depth analysis of the images on their own and questions of what and how contents are visually represented would exceed the scope of this thesis, the images were analyzed in terms of their relation to the text. In their work on image tweets and the image-text relation therein, Chen et al. (2013) introduce the differentiation between *visually-relevant* image tweets, namely those "where at least one noun or verb [of the tweeted text] corresponds to part of the image" (2013, 782), and *non-visual* image tweets, "where the text and image have little or no visual correspondence" (2013, 782). In the data gathered, all image tweets could be identified as visually-relevant. This is probably due to the logic of the hashtag itself, which serves to indicate that contents included in the tweet are subjects that "British Muslims really Think" about. In this way, images are part of a greater syntax that is introduced by the hashtag and are hence analyzed as such.

@mentions

Of the 480 tweets in the sample, 74 included an @mention. It is important to keep in mind that tweets that start with @mentions are privatized by Twitter and could not be gathered by search requests (Bruns and Moe 2014, 22). Thus, there might be tweets and whole Twitter conversations containing the #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink that are not included in the sample at hand. However, if such exchanges are intended to be public, Twitter users can prefix the @mention with a "." in order to prevent the message from becoming private. In this sample, 7 tweets started with .@mentions, which indicates that the users deliberately and purposefully use the Twitter syntax in order to be and stay part of the macro-level hashtag discourse.

Furthermore, @mentions can figure both as intention to start a private conversation with a given user as well as a reference to a celebrity user, brand or institution (Bruns and Moe 2014, 19 f.). In the sample at hand, the directionality of the @mentions included in the 74 tweets was distributed as following:

Table 3. Directionality of the @mention

Directionality	*Number of Tweets*
Twitter users	46
Persons of public interest	13
Media or political institutions	11*
Other	4

*5 of which were explicit mentions of either The Sunday Times or Channel 4.

13 @mentions referred to politicians and celebrities who were not directly addressed but merely mentioned, as for example in the following tweets:

(A) #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink I must reread @jk_rowling 's Harry Potter series and @AuthorDanBrown's books again. The best. #bibliophile

(B) @David_Cameron should resign #panamapapers #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

With regard to media and political institutions, however, there were several cases where the media or political entity in question was directly addressed, as in:

(C) And prob from a narrow unrepresentative group. @Channel4 please note. #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink.

Furthermore, 5 of the 12 mentions of media institutions referred to either The Sunday Times, or Channel 4, which further emphasizes the intention of the hashtag discourse to directly respond to the article and intended documentary. The three other institutions mentioned were a restaurant, a sports teams, an airline brand, and the name of a video game, e.g. @NandosUK, @ManUtd, @easyJet, and @PlayOverwatch. Last but not least, 46 tweets included @mentions and .@replies to individual Twitter users that were either themselves active in the hashtag conversation or which were not recognized as persons of public interest.

One particular user, Sayeeda Warsi[34], was addressed in 18 of the 46 tweets. Hers is a specific case as she is a well-known British politician and is hence a person of public interest, renowned also on Twitter, her profile having 121’000 followers. She had been mentioned in

[34] Although all hashtag activity can be read as public, the names of Twitter users are made anonymous in this paper. The only exeption to this rule is Sayeeda Warsi, who is active on Twitter in her function as a political person of interest and whose identity can be seen as relevant to the hashtag discourse.

one of the initial tweets (tweet D) containing the hashtag and invited to join and start the conversation:

(D) .@SayeedaWarsi, let's start the conversation. #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

She accepted this invitation and contributed to the hashtag several times, 8 times during the first 24 hours alone. Hence, although she is a person of public interest, the @mentions that address her can be counted as direct addresses with the actual intention to be read or even start a conversation and not a mere mention of a celebrity. The inclusion of Sayeeda Warsi as a figure active in British politics in the conversation and the frequent references to her Twitter profile highlight the intention for the hashtag discourse to be part of a wider public and political discourse. Moreover, she is not only addressed several times in my sample but her tweets were also frequently retweeted. Her first tweet in particular, "Start the conversation #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink It's a beautiful sunny day today so no excuse for the husband to avoid mowing the lawn", was retweeted 115 times. This further implies that retweets do not only favor content but are also influenced by the reputation of the user who posted the original tweet.

Retweets

As outlined in Chapter 2, it has been argued that the number of times a tweet is retweeted can be considered a sign of impact (Starbird and Palen 2010, 9). Hence, the retweets for each of the 480 tweets included were gathered. In order to maximize the completeness of the retrieved retweets, they were extracted from the dataset gathered over the course of 10 days. However, as it is possible that tweets were retweeted even after the 10 day period, even though tweeting activity with regard to the hashtag has decreased significantly, there is no guarantee that all retweets were collected. Overall, about half of the tweets in the sample, 241, were retweeted at least once, yielding an overall number of 2'282 retweets. However, although every tweet has been retweeted 5,14 times on average[35], there are some statistical outliers that have been retweeted more than a 100 or 200 times respectively. Hence, as the distribution of retweets is highly irregular, retweet counts were not used for further quantitative analyses, as for example to quantify priorisation of content categories by Twitter users. Furthermore, as indicated

[35] Retweets per tweet: Mean=5,14, Std Deviation: 19,83, where the high standard deviation is due to the statistical outliers.

above, retweet counts cannot only be considered a sign of importance of a given issue raised by a tweet but also a sign of reputation of single users, which would further complicate such an analysis.

5.3 Data Analysis: Mixed-Method Content Analysis

As suggested by Parker et al. (2011), who argue in favor of using a qualitative content analysis method for research on the internet, especially with regard to social media discourses, the compiled data is analyzed using a mixed method content analysis approach conceptualized on the basis of category development as a qualitative-interpretive act, following content-analytical rules expressed by scholars such as Mayring (2000, 2014). Content analysis has been termed "a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use" (Krippendorff 2004, 18). In this definition, the material examined in a content analysis is identified as text. However, text is not meant to be restricted to written material (Krippendorff 2004, 19, Mayring 2014, 43 f.). The term is rather used as a metaphor in content analysis, which includes images, maps, sounds, symbols and other data, as long as they are intended to provide meaning (Krippendorff 2004, 19). Hence, in the analysis of the data outlined above, images are regarded as text in that they are "meaningful matter" (Krippendorff 2004, 19) and are included in the analysis both in the data retrieved from The Sunday Times as well as Twitter. Thereby, image tweets are seen as meaningful wholes in which text is constituted by both the written content of the tweet as well as the image.

The approach chosen in this paper is a mixed-method content analysis according to Mayring, whose model of Qualitative Content Analysis combines the qualitative step of assigning categories to text with the quantitative step of „working through many text passages and analyzi[ng] frequencies of categories" (2014, 10). Thereby, the research design is mixed as well, as the analysis consists not only of an explorative step, guided by an inductive approach to category development, but also of a second, descriptive step, based on theory-driven, deductive categories (Mayring 2014, 104). In order to answer my research questions, both the contents mentioned as well as the strategies applied in the tweets will be analyzed and coded. The means of realization outlined in Chapter 3.4 were analyzed as a basis for understanding the strategies applied, they were, however, not coded separately.

In order to answer the first research question, RQ1, which asks for the specific contents mentioned in the data, an inductive category development was applied, which is a process that lies at the basis of the grounded theory approach (Mayring 2014, 79). Thereby,

the material was worked through line-by-line and openly coded for contents (Mayring 2014, 80 f.). After an initial screening of all data, 50% of the tweets were closely analyzed and coded for all contents present. After appropriate categories were developed, the content of each individual tweet was coded. Thereby, a tweet can contain more than one subject. In a next step, a first coding scheme was devised, which was applied to all tweets in the sample and adjusted where necessary. This process of coding for the presence of a subject=1 or its absence=0 and the subsequent adjusting of the guideline was repeated until the coding guideline contained all contents present in the tweets. The categories thusly developed have been revised and possibly adapted after having working through a certain amount of the material[36] (Mayring 2014, 80 f.). Finally, main categories were developed. The final coding guideline for the analysis of the specific contents present in the article and the tweets can be found in the appendix (see Appendix A).

In a second step, the material at hand was examined with regard to the discursive strategies applied (RQ2). In this step, a deductive procedure was applied in that "the category system [was] established before coding the text" (Mayring 2014, 97). Thereby, the categories were deduced from previous work (Mayring 2014, 97), specifically from the theories of De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak (1999), Wodak et al. (2009), and Bucholtz and Hall (2005) outlined in section 3.4. The categories were incorporated into a coding guideline, which was revised after coding the material a first time. The final version of the coding guideline can be found in the appendix (see Appendix B).

In order to ensure the validity of the developed coding guideline, an inter-coder reliability test was conducted (Mayring 2014, 61 ff.). For this test, a random sub-sample of 50 tweets, or 10% of the overall data sample was selected[37]. Both coding guidelines as well as the random sample selected were given to one reliability coder[38]. After reading and discussing the coding guidelines, the sub-sample was coded independently by the researcher and the additional coder. The results were calculated with regard to percent agreement and, in order to account for chance agreement, the Cohen's Kappa was calculated for all variables (see Appendix C). Thereby, acceptable agreement was determined according to (Landis and Koch 1977, 165) at a Cohen's Kappa result of 0.61 and above. The results of the inter-rater reliability test indicate the agreement between the two coders to be sufficient for all variables

[36] It is this reflexive nature of qualitative content analysis that allows the researcher to develop analytical constructs and categories appropriate to specific investigations.
[37] According to Lombard et al. (2002), this is the minimum size appropriate when calculating reliability (2002, 601).
[38] The reliability coder selected is a graduate student in media and communication science and gender studies. She is familiar with qualitative and quantitative content analysis methods.

possible to calculate (Cohen's Kappa ≥ 0.61). Afterwards, the coding guidelines and the disagreements were discussed and some adaptations to the guidelines were made[39].

After a final coding process, the software package SPSS Statistics was used in order to conduct further descriptive statistical analyses in terms of frequencies of the categories. The results will be outlined in section 7.1 and 7.3. Moreover, the correlation between content categories and the strategies was calculated according to Spearman (see Appendix D). All significant correlations will be discussed in section 7.3.

[39] The guidelines in Appendix A and B are the final and adapted versions. As the adaptations were mostly minor and of clarifying nature, no further inter-coder test was conducted.

6 "An Inconvenient Truth": Results and Discussion

The article "An Inconvenient Truth" written by Trevor Phillips and published April 10th, 2016 by The Sunday Times can, I argue, be seen as a characteristic of the prevalent discourses on Islam and British nationality and in line with the views Phillips is known for. In the article, the primary line of argumentation is based on a vision of difference and incompatibility of Muslim and British identity, which leads Phillips to suggest a "more muscular approach to integration" (2016, 1). Starting with a suggestive "they seemed no different from the rest of us" (Phillips 2016, 1), this argument is introduced and followed by excurses in which the internal boundaries of the British nation against British Muslims, constituting a "nation within the nation" (Phillips 2016, 2), are drawn. In this way, "Britishness" is not only (re)constructed but the need for the continuity, if not protection, of the thusly defined British identity is emphasized. In the following, the results of a close content analysis and the specific contents, strategies, as well as linguistic means of realization present in the article will be discussed.

6.1 Contents

While "they seemed no different", Trevor Phillips states that the evidence of the survey he is reporting clearly indicates that "that just isn't [sic.] how it is" (2016, 2). This distinction between "Muslims and non-Muslims" is allocated to "key issues" (2016, 4), fundamental values in which British Muslims are said to differ. Hence, the compatibility of Muslims to the nation is conceptualized along the lines of a common culture, or rather shared values. Some of the specific values along which the differentiation is made are introduced in heading of the article, in which three of the survey questions are depicted:

> Should homosexuality be illegal? Should wives always obey their husbands?
> And can a man have more than one wife?
> (Phillips 2016, 1)

These questions recall examples of „litmus-tests" discussed in Fassin's work on sexual democracy outlined above (2010, 2012). Hence, attitudes towards homosexuality[40] and women's rights, or rather "equality, between men and women, gay and straight" (2) are seen as fundamental values in which British people not only all agree but an obligation to which

[40] Attitudes toward homosexuality were retrieved among others in terms of views on the legal status (should homosexuality be legal) and attitudes towards gay marriage (Phillips 2016, 4).

Phillips even calls "our [the British people's] national commitment" (2). Thereby, the subject of gender issues figures prominently, as Phillip states that the most alarming "set of alternative values [is] attitudes towards women" (4). The survey results are depicted as backing "the impression that this is a community whose idea of women's equality lies eons away from the mainstream" (4) and the "oppression of women is [termed] a *cultural* trait" (6, my emphasis). Many of the specific issues raised in the article with regard to attitudes towards women operate along the line of the idea of female suppression and submissiveness in Islam, prominent examples of which are the need for a woman to "cover [her] head", "obey her husband", the possibility of her to live in polygamy (Phillips 2016, 4), and the issue of forced marriages (6).

While the article explicitly links female suppression and submissiveness in Islam to the need for a woman to "cover [her] head" (4), the cover of the Sunday Times magazine issue the article was published in is suggestive of a similar argument:

The cover included the image[41] above, which shows a woman wearing a veil with the colors and seemingly also with the color arrangement of the British flag, published under the headline "What Do British Muslims Really Think?" and the sub-heading "The attitudes revealed in a new survey may surprise you. Trevor Phillips says it's time for action". In light of the overall argument of the article that seeks to both delineate British identity as well as problematize and negate the inclusion of British Muslims therein, this picture is a further indicator of the gendered nature of nationalist discourses. In this way, the woman wearing a

[41] The image included here was taken from Mend Advocacy Online, accessed 10.09.2016, < <http://mend.org.uk/british-muslims-really-nation-within-nation/>.
All further images included in this thesis were published in the gathered tweet and no further references to their sources are given. Images of the cover of the Sunday Times Magazine published in the tweets seem to be photographies taken Twitter users themselves.

veil can be interpreted as a signifier (Yuval-Davis 1993, 627) of both the oppressed status of women in Islam as well as the active assertion of cultural separateness on behalf of Muslims (Meer, Dwyer, and Moodod, 95 ff.). Moreover, the fact that the veil is designed as a Union Jack flag further might be interpreted as supporting Trevor Phillips argument that it is within, and under the cover of, the multicultural United Kingdom that a separate and "misogynist" "nation within a nation" (2) has "unacknowledgedly" (2) been created or that, even when actively wearing the symbol of the British Nation, Muslims are still separate in their misogynist views and practices. Hence, the "time for action" Phillips calls for may, with regard to the picture, be interpreted as a call to "lift the veil" and thereby overcome the cultural separateness it symbolizes.

In addition and closely related to the gender issues raised in the article, Muslims' respect for the law in the UK is doubted, as „one in three British Muslims supports the right of a man to have more than one wife, even though it is illegal in the UK" (4). This is further linked to the „sharia law", which the article indicates to recognize polygamy and which is hence placed in opposition to UK law (4). Indeed, attitudes in which the "chasm" between Muslims and non-Muslims is claimed to show include legal issues, such as the "freedom of expression" (2) and respect for a secular democracy, as many Muslims "supported the introduction of sharia laws in part of the UK" (5). This relates back to the idea that secular modernity and religions necessarily stand in contrast to each other (Lincoln 2002, 27), with Islam being a pre-modern religion incapable of secularization. In his words, Phillip claims that "Allah's law [read: sharia], apparently, need take no heed of democracy" (5).

Another issue that frequently appears in the article is violence, both in terms of gender violence as well as with regard to "violence in defence of religion[42]" (2). With regard to violence against women, the general reference to domestic violence in terms of chastising a wife is given. However, most strikingly, what Phillips highlights as reflecting "a deeply ingrained sexism that runs through Britain's Muslim communities" are the specific examples

[42] In terms of religious violence, scholars have argued that by defining certain violent acts as "religious" or "religious terrorism", such as for example the execution of suicide bombings Asad analyses in his work *On Suicide Bombing* (2007), those acts are effectively delegitimized. Indeed, calling a violent act as "religious" defines the actor as "morally underdeveloped – and therefore pre-modern – when compared with peoples whose civilized status is partly indicated by their secular politics and their private religion and whose violence is therefore in principle disciplined, reasonable, and just." (Asad 2007, 45). Such argument, integrated in the faulty concept of a necessary opposition between modernity and religious traditions, serves to delegitimize certain acts of violence and "silence representatives of certain kinds of faiths" (Cavanaugh 2007, 9).

of rape scandals in Rotherham, Oxford, Rochdale and other towns, all cases in which "white girls" were abused by "Muslim men" (2016, 4). These examples make clear not only that the threat of the "enemy within" is clearly gendered, with Muslim men portrayed as the perpetrator and Muslim women as suppressed victims, but also that it is not free from racialized logic. Recent studies on those cases, specifically on the Rochdale case (Salter and Dagistanli 2015) and on both the Rochdale and Rotherdam case (Tufail 2015), have emphasized the racialized representation of the perpetrators, who were attributed "variously, to 'Muslim', 'Asian' and 'Pakistani' communities" (Tufail 2015, 21). Furthermore, both Tufail (2015) and Salter and Dagistanli (2015) see the representation of the Muslim man as a racialized threat as a continuation of the "othering" in colonial discourses. And it is this process of "othering" that draws both on the idea of a clashing culture as well as on the concept of ethnic origin, in which it has been argued that "there is a reworking of long-running racist myths – so the black rapist becomes the brown man from a backward and misogynistic culture" (Bhattacharyya quoted in Tufail 2015, 38). Moreover, while the threat is attributed to coloured minorities, it is "white" young women and girls that are threatened (Tufail 2015, 39), which, when those rape cases come to symbolize the threat to Britain, further reinforced the idea of the nation as white.

In addition to this example, there is further evidence of racialization in the article in question, rendering the attempted exclusion of Muslims merely on the basis of their supposedly deviant culture disputable. In a first categorization, Phillips emphasizes the difference in origin, with "half of [the Muslims] born abroad" (2) and a steadily growing number "from Africa, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Far East, as well as the traditional flow from the Indian subcontinent" (2). Wherever they are from, however, the article continues to contrast the "Muslim population" with the white British population[43]. Moreover, the article argues that "white Britain", and especially "Britain's white elite", are "puzzled by the fierce attachment to religion among ethnic minorities" (5). In this way, not only Britishness but also secularism is attributed to whiteness, aligning „people of colour" to religiosity per se. When religiosity is contrasted with the secular, this contrast resonates with the binary between the modern, rational West and the irrationality and backwardness of religion per se and Islam in particular. Such a binary juxtaposition becomes increasingly more troubling, if it is additionally charged with racial attributes, as is the case in the article.

[43] Quotes such as „the Muslim population, now approaching 30%, barely mixed with whites" (3), „there are certain areas that are wholly Asian, others wholly white" (3), „white and Asian communities living „parallel lives" (4) exemplify this juxtaposition.

However, Phillips, after attributing religiosity to ethnic minorities, distances himself from the concept of origin as the basis of distinction and argues that "Britain's Muslims are a diverse group; but, rich or poor[44], British-born or not, most have a deep commitment to their faith" (5). In this way, people of different origins are seen as prone to a commitment "to their religious beliefs and practices [so intense it] seems baffling to secular liberals – indeed, somewhat threatening" (5). While at the same time it is not only the origin and, indeed, not any religion that is problematic but it is Islam as a "faith" that is rooted in Britain's Muslims and causes them to be "distressed by what they see as white Britain's increasing secularism [and] low morals" (5). Hence, although effectively racializing Muslims, Phillips insists that the problem is not the race or the fact of immigration, as other waves of immigration, such as Catholics, were able to integrate and "gradually abandon their ancestral ways, wearing their religious an cultural baggage lightly, and gradually blending into Britain's diverse identity landscape" (3). However, with the Muslim population, such an integration is seen as impossible, as they will not "grow out of" (5) their commitment to Islam and it is their faith on which the problematic cultural values are seen to be based on, such as the "oppression of women" seen as a "cultural trait" inherent in "the true face of Islam" (6).

In conclusion, the contents that emerge when analyzing the article with respect to the way boundaries of the British nation are conceptualized include elements from *Kulturnation*, such as a shared culture and specific cultural values, as well as elements from *Volksnation*, as a common origin and being British-born features in the text. The arguments outlined show that in the demarcation of what it means to be British and the attempt to exclude Muslims from this definition, different axes of difference clearly intersect. Indeed, while Britain is not only constructed in terms of its culture, which includes a certain secular disposition, but also in terms of its whiteness, British Muslims are racialized, homogenized in terms of their cultural values, and ascribed a seemingly irrational, or "baffling" religiosity. Moreover, while culture, religion, and race are constructed in relation to each other and all contribute to the national boundary, gender figures in both the representation of each group, especially with the threat of the racialized male Muslim and the behavior of the oppressed veiled woman, as well as in the specification of the cultural values in which they differ.

[44] There are further references to class in the article, which serve to delegitimize those politicians and media personae that argue against a clear distinction of British Muslims and British people as elitist and escapist, as will be shown in section 6.3.

6.2 Linguistic Means of Realization

Before illustrating the specific strategies present in the article, it is important to elaborate on the variety of linguistic means of realization are applied. The first and most important means of realization is the use of personal pronouns in the establishment of a "we"-group. In this article, such a "we"-group is constructed in the repeated use of pronouns such as "us", "we" and "our" with regard to British (Non-Muslim) identity and in contrast to "they", "them", their" concerning (British) Muslims. Hence, Phillips repeatedly differentiates between "us", British people, in which the reader of the article is included, and "them", Muslims. In the following, a selection of the most important means other than the use of personal pronouns is discussed and demonstrated.

Wodak et al. identify temporal and spatial references as frequent elements in the construction of national identity (2009, 35). In this article, Phillip indeed refers to the "nation within a nation" of the Muslim community in Britain as featuring "its own geography" (2). Moreover, there are said to be "wholly Asian" and "wholly white parts", which further emphasizes the spatial differentiation between Asian (Muslims) and white (British) people. In addition to the separateness today, half of the Muslims are said to be born "abroad" (2), which is indicative not only of a different origin but also of a concept of a spatially defined home country, or a "here" (2). In terms of temporal references, the "nation within a nation" is said to have "its own very separate future" (2), which is indicative of what De Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak identify of the trope of a common political presence and future (1999, 159) and can be seen as a reference to the dimension of a *Staatsnation*.

Other linguistic means identified by de Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak (1999) and Wodak et al. (2009) are applied in the article as well. Synechdoches, for instance, are used in a variety of ways. The particularizing synecdoche (*pars pro toto*), in which the referent is replaced by the name of another referent belonging to the same field of meaning, which, however, is narrower in meaning, is used to generalize and essentialize stereotypes that apply to the whole group of persons, here to all Muslims (De Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak 1999, 165). In this way, the survey is an inquiry into "(British) Muslim opinion" (2), in which Muslim opinion figures as the "collective singular" (De Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak 1999, 162) for the opinion of all Muslims. In addition and similar to synecdoches, there are metonymies and personification, which often function as particular kinds of metonymies (1999, 165). A metonymy thereby "replaces the name of a referent by the name of an entity which is closely associated with it in either concrete or abstract terms" (Wodak et al. 2009, 35). An example of a metonymy and simultaneously a personification in the text is "Britain's moral agenda", in

which the country (Britain) refers to all British people and is personalized. The usage of this metonymy further emphasizes the sameness of British people who collectively have this moral agenda. Furthermore, Phillips argues that "they [British Muslims] provide the sternest test" for "Britain's moral agenda". In this sentence, Muslims are effectively denied the possibility to be British, as they are what is at odds to, what "tests" the "moral agenda" of British people.

Overall, the article features all levels of indexicality when it differentiates, positions, essentializes, and evaluates identities. Thereby, the overt mentioning of the categories British and Muslim is accompanied by implicatures regarding one's own and other's position; the "us" of the author and the reader of the article is aligned to Non-Muslim Britishness, which is juxtaposed with "them", Muslims in Britain. Furthermore, evaluative orientations towards the identities in question are made clear when Muslims are seen as "a lethal threat" and their views as "worrying" (2). However, in addition to "our" (reference to British people, including the author and the reader of the article) attitude towards "them", the author uses language that is presumably coherent with the position of Muslims. In this way, one Muslim woman is indirectly quoted to think of British people as "*faithless modern* hipsters" (5), and Muslims in general are portrayed as so attached to their faith that they do not want to adapt to "our *decadent* way of life" (4). In this way, Muslims are implicitly pictured as opposed to modernity, secularity, and, indeed, British way of life. Moreover, the Arabic term "Allah", although translatable to nothing more specific than "God", is used twice throughout the article. In this way, the term serves as an indexical referent to Islam and the homogenous entity of Muslims.

6.3 Strategies

On a macro-level, Phillips article displays both *strategies of construction* as well as *perpetuation and justification.* On the one hand, the British national identity is established by the promotion of "shared values" portrayed as "national commitment" (Philipps 2016, 2). Those values are further attributed to the "we"-group as outlined above. Moreover, the portrayal of British Muslims as a threat that "collides head-on with our ["we"-group] national commitment" (2) is exemplary for accentuating the need for continuity of a certain national identity, which is threatened to be altered and in state of overall jeopardy. By accentuating the threatening nature of British Muslims, the need for the maintenance and even defence of the current status quo is justified.

6.3.1 Adequation and Distinction

In order for this argument to work, both groups (e.g. "us" and "them", British and Muslim identity) need to be constructed as cohesive and internally consistent by way of downplaying inter-group differences (*strategy of adequation*) and at the same time represent the two groups as sufficiently different from each other to be meaningfully contrasted (*strategy of distinction*). Thereby, British national identity, on the one hand, is constructed along the lines of shared values, a national commitment to which is constitutive of "Britain's moral agenda" (2), as well as a shared vision of secularity, or rather a noncommittal approach to religion when contrasted to the "fierce attachment" (5) thereof among ethnic minorities, and a common origin. At the same time, Muslims are represented as constitutive of a community with a "complete set of alternative values" (4), and a "nation within a nation, with its own geography, its own values and its own very separate future" (2). The particular way in which these two strategies are applied and the specific aspects of imagined sameness used to both construct sameness as well as differentiation have been outlined above (6.1.1) and will not be further elaborated.

6.3.2 Authorization and Illegitimation

One pair of strategies identified by Bucholtz and Hall, namely *authorization and illegitimation* (2003, 896, 2005, 603), are of particular importance in Phillips argument. In an effort to authorize and legitimate the inter-group sameness, or essence he constructs for British Muslims and their distinction from his version of British identity, Phillips introduces several sources of authority, while delegitimizing others.

The first level on which the British Muslim identity is affirmed in the article is the "scientific evidence" on which the portrayal of Muslims is based[45]. Therefore, "the structures of institutionalized power" (Bucholtz and Hall 2005, 602) referred to in the article is "the respected research firm ICM" (Phillips 2016, 2) and its "polling experts" (2). Furthermore, the method of the research is explained to be better than in other polls, as "the research was conducted in the old-fashioned way – face to face [in order to] avoid the failures associated with phone and Internet polls" (2). This is supposed to make the research better, as "code-switching", or "the all-too-human minority impulse to fit in, to shape your response to meet

[45] In this paper, the quality of the scientific study the article draws on will not be appraised. Hence, I will not argue whether or not the method and results of the study are to be taken seriously but only analyse how the study and its method is used to legitimate what is being said.

the expectations of the majority population"(2) is prevented[46]. Indeed, Phillips goes as far as to claim that "the ICM methodology makes this probably the most revealing inquiry into Muslim opinion yet conducted in this country" (2).

A second source of authority in the article is Trevor Phillips[47] himself on both a professional, as well as a personal level. As a professional source of authority, Phillips refers back to his past in politics and states that "when I was chairman of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, I played a principal role in the creation of UK laws against religious discrimination – and it was a report that I commissioned exactly 20 years ago that first introduced the term Islamophobia to Britain" (2). With this statement, he establishes himself not only as an expert on UK politics and law, but also as concerned with religious discrimination and Islamophobia himself. As such, it seems that his authority is not only justified but possible criticism of Islamophobia or discrimination is pre-emptively refuted. Furthermore, Phillips refers to his personal experience as a "black person" with both racism as well as people with "fierce attachment" to religion among ethnic minorities, in order to further legitimate and authenticate his arguments. Indeed, he further outlines that while he shares the background of (black Christian) minorities and has respect for their sincerity, he may still oppose what they do. In this way, it can be argued that it is because of his race and his experience as a "black person" that it is possible for him to not only understand but also "call out" stereotypical attributes without being discriminating.

Furthermore, it is on the basis of his minority background that he can refute and de-legitimize other sources of authority. For example, while he himself understands the reluctance of "people of colour" to "reveal their true selves to people who do not share their background" (5), Britain's liberal white elite does not. Another *strategy of illegitimation* portrayed in the article is to fault "the political elite and liberal media" for having the mistaken "optimistic belief that time and social contact will naturally lead to the integration of Muslims" (5), which liberal Muslims themselves are said to deny. Moreover, a newspaper columnist who assumed that his friends were integrating did not see that his "circle of acquaintances - probably doctors, lawyers, journalists" were not representative, not "typical of the British Muslim experience" (5). Here, some exceptions to the general "Muslim opinion" or "Muslim experience" are given and instantly dismissed again, when it is outlined that,

[46] Interestingly, the "nationally representative control sample of 1'008 adults aged 18+ was [...] conducted by telephone" (Phillips 2016, 7), which implies that out of the non-Muslim population, nobody belongs to a minority, or at least everyone shares the majority views.

[47] The fact that the only image in the article is one of Trevor Phillips himself is indicative of his importance as a person who figures in the argument not as an impartial author but as an expert who expresses his (authorative) opinion.

although "Britain's Muslims are a diverse group; but, rich or poor, British-born or not, most have a deep commitment to their faith" (5). In this way, it is possible to de-legitimize other sources of authority, such as the liberal press or political elite, and at the same time retain the portrayal of intra-group sameness.

6.3.3 Authentication and Denaturalization

Similar to strategies of authorization, the strategy of authentication legitimizes identities in depicting authenticity as the authoritative source of an identity. In the article, the notion of the "authentic, true self" as a way of verifying certain identities is activated in several instances. Already in both the title of the article, *An Inconvenient Truth,* as well as the cover headline of the respective The Sunday Times issue, "What British Muslims Really Think", the idea of an authentic, "real" truth the article discloses is conveyed. Moreover, the method of the survey, as outlined above, is said to be so un-biased that it "reveals British Muslims speaking for themselves" (2), hence the authentic selves of Muslims is revealed, which are claimed to have too often been "spoken for by self-styled community leaders, or interpreted by academic experts" (2). In this way, not only is the study and its result legitimized and authenticated but other representations are de-legitimized at the same time.

Similarly, the article quotes some individual Muslims directly, which further conveys the idea of a direct, authentic representation. For instance, Anjum Anwar, a Muslim "working to promote integration", has been quoted on her practice of the sharia. She is quoted saying that:

> What I eat is according tot he sharia, how I pray is according to my sharia, how I dress is according to my sharia, how I treat the stranger and family members is according to sharia, [...] I think people misunderstand the concept of sharia law. Their only thinking is, uh-oh, once you've got the sharia you'll be chopping heads off and hands off. That is not the case.
> (Phillips 2016, 5)

However, the article continues to state that "[s]he [Anwar]'s saying to faithless modern hipsters that she isn't going to give it [sharia] up" (5). Hence, although the direct quote of a Muslim individual conveys the idea of an authentic self-representation, in reality, her statement is not only misrepresented but she is spoken for. Furthermore, this can be read as a particularizing synecdoche as Anwar's (misrepresented) opinion is generalized and

represented as essential to all Muslims, as the ""the chasm [symbolized by Anwar's statement about the Sharia] isn't going to close any time soon" (5).

In conclusion, the article constructs British national identity unified along the lines of shared values and at the same time as necessarily distinct from Muslim identity. Thereby, it effectively marginalizes and excludes British Muslims from the national collectivity. Such a representation is legitimized by way of attributing authority to the scientific poll and to Trevor Phillips himself. At the same time, authentic readings of British Muslim identity as it is portrayed in the article is activated in several instance. However, even the British Muslims quoted and hence directly represented are effectively silenced and spoken for.

7 #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink: Results and Discussion

As a reaction to the article and its representation of British Muslims, the Twitter hashtag #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink was introduced as a shared platform for British Muslims to contest the way they were represented and excluded by Trevor Phillips as well as to give voice to their experience and identity as British Muslims. On the one hand, strategies of construction and justification of British and Muslim identity used in the Sunday Times article as well as the contents attributed to the respective identity categories are contested and dismantled in the Twitter discourse. On the other hand, an alternative version of British Muslim as well as British identity is constructed in the tweets in a variety of ways. However, hashtag discourses may become contested spaces themselves and not all tweets that contain the hashtag must necessarily agree with the intention of the hashtag. Therefore, there is also evidence of Twitter users who do not contest but reproduce and re-affirm the identity construction portrayed in Phillips article as well as draw on the same exclusionary logic. In the following, the results of a mixed-method content analysis and the specific contents, strategies, as well as linguistic means of realization present in the Twitter data will be discussed.

7.1 Contents

In order to answer research question RQ1, namely "what contents are referred to in the tweets", an explorative content analysis was conducted, which resulted in the coding guideline in Appendix A. Overall, the following 10 main subject categories identified in the sample of 480 tweets:

Table 4. Frequency of Main Content Categories

Content Category	*Number of Tweets**	*Percentage***
Everyday Life	202	42,1
Religions and Islam	105	21,8
Discrimination	99	20,6
Popular Culture	85	17,7
Media	65	13,5
Politics	44	9,2
Twitter	27	5,6
British Nation	21	4,4
Shared Values	20	4,1
Race and Ethnicity	9	1,9

*A single tweet may be coded for more than one content category.
** Percentage of tweets that contain references to the content categories.

In the following sections, each of the categories above and their respective sub-categories are defined and illustrated[48].

7.1.1 Everyday Life

The first category of contents identified and the one present in 42 % of all tweets is called "Everyday Life". Although this is as an open and broad category that subsumes a myriad of everyday attitudes and practices (Antonsich 2016), the term "everyday life" was chosen here with regard to the way Edensor conceptualizes it in his work on *National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life* (2002). In this way, the category is applied to all contents that refer to "the mundane details of social interaction, habits, routines and practical knowledge" (Edensor 2002, 18). Hence, activities, attitudes, and practices located in the quotidian area of life in contrast to those related to the exceptionality of celebrity, spectacular events, and those otherwise marked as extraordinary are interpreted as part of everyday life. For Edensor, the everyday is crucial in the construction of shared identity, as "it is the mundane choreographies of ordinary people queuing at the bus stop, getting stuck in traffic jams on holiday trips to popular destinations, or sitting in front of the TV for the evening news which produce a common spatial-temporal matrix" (Antonsich 2016, 38).

In this thesis, the category of "Everyday Life" incorporates the reference to quotidian reference points, such as daily activities, common attitudes and everyday practices. In the hashtag discourse around #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink, there were repeated references to the following 10 subject areas of quotidian life:

Table 5. Everyday Life Sub-Categories

Sub-Category	*Number of Tweets**
Food and Drinks	98
Clothes and Style	20
Work and Studies	17
Household and Finances	16
Travel	14
Routine Activities	14
Dating and Marriage	11
Weekend and Weekdays	8
Weather	7
Language Use	4
Other**	9

*A single tweet may contain more than one sub-category.
** Quotidian reference points mentioned in less than 3 tweets are coded as "Other".

[48] For further examples and the guiding questions to each coding category see Appendix A.

The first category of "Everyday Life" identified in the analyzed Twitter data was the subject area of "Food and Drinks", which includes all references to specific food or drink items, to cuisines, to restaurants and food chains, or to food and drink related activities, such as eating and drinking, or gaining weight:

(A) #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink I'm craving Indian cuisine.
*(B) *googles* "Can Muslims halalify a haribo if we say 'Bismillah'"? #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

Overall, 98 tweets were found to include contents attributed to this category, which makes food and drink related tweets the most frequently occurring sub-category in the data at hand.

Other sub-categories of "Everyday Life" that were mentioned more than three times in the data set are:

1) *"Clothes and Style"*: including 20 tweets with references to clothing items, fashion style, or other markers of personal style.

(C) Does my hijab match my dress? #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

2) *"Work and Studies"*: including 17 references to work in general, the job situation in particular, or to work or study-related tasks and activities.

(D) I should probably be doing work instead of tweeting right now #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

3) "*Household and Finances"*: coded for 16 tweets with references to household related activities, such as laundry, cleaning, or gardening, and to financial considerations (that are not directly related to the work situation) and money-related activities, such as purchasing goods, paying bills, or shopping.

(E) Bills are due. Crap. Just got paid. There goes my shopping spree. #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

4) *"Travel":* including 14 tweets that contain references to activities or entities related to travelling or mobility, such as travelling itself, finding a parking space, obtaining a travel visa, or airport and border control.

(F) Will I get a seat on my commute to work tomorrow? In fact will the train be on time... #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

5) *"Routine Activities":* including 14 tweets with references to routine and quotidian activities, such as taking a shower, sleeping, greeting people, or getting up in the morning, or references to habitual activities done as a hobby, such as hiking, dancing, or playing games.

(G) Should I have a shower now or later? Always asking the important questions #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

6) *"Dating and Marriage":* including 11 tweets with references to dating activities, relationship status, marriage, or marriage proposals.

(H) Will I be able to get a date every day this coming Ramadan #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

7) *"Weekend and Weekdays":* including 8 tweets with references to days in general or the weekend or weekdays in particular.

(I) Why is the weekend only two days? #whatbritishmuslimsreallythink

8) *"Weather":* including 7 tweets that referred to the weather in some way.

(J) Why is the weather bipolar? #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

9) *Language Use:* including 4 tweets that made references to languages or language use, e.g. addressed the way things are said and in what language.

(K) If only Adele said Salaam instead of Hello... #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

In addition to the 10 sub-categories of "Everyday Life", there were 9 references to everyday subjects or activities that were mentioned only once or twice and could not be grouped into any of the other sub-categories. These 9 tweets included references to topics such as health problems, everyday environment conservation, living life in general, and others:

(L) #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink this toothache is driving me mad!!
(M) Are daily disposable contact lenses less environmentally friendly than monthly disposable? #Serious Question #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink
(N) The Midlands is the best place to live :) #WhatBritishMuslim-sReallyThink

7.1.2 Religion and Islam

Nearly 22% of all tweets (104) included references to religion in general or particular religions, or rituals, concepts, clothing, or vocabulary connected to those religions. Thereby, most references made were to Islam and entities connected to it. As outlined in Chapter 3.3, religion and religious identity are conceptualized as categories constructed in discourse. Therefore, rituals or concepts identified as religious in this category are not seen as religious because of their essence but rather because they are attributed to discursive traditions that are identified as religions. Contents were identified as connected to a particular religious tradition with help of the *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (RGG)* and its online translation, *Religion Past and Present (RPP)*. If a given content was present in the RGG / RPP and identified as part of a religious tradition, then it was coded in this content category. For example, the word "halal", which was mentioned in many tweets, is identified in the RPP with regard the dietary law of Islam (Borgeaud et al. 2011).

Furthermore, as the tweets contained highly specific vocabulary mostly with regard to concepts and rituals connected to the tradition of Islam, *the Encyclopedia of Islam* (Version 3), *the Encyclopedia Islamica* and *the Encyclopedia of the Qurān* were consulted in addition to the RGG / RPP if the content referred to could not be found otherwise. An example of such specific vocabulary is the word "abaya", which was not found in the RGG / RPP but was included in the Encyclopedia Islamica in the article "Abā", „variously called *ʿabāya, ʿabāʾa, ʿabāh*", where it is described as an outer garment (Gholami and Quasemi 2008). In this case the clothing item has a diverse history of usages with regard to religion but also without any references to it (Gholami and Quasemi 2008). However, as there is evidence of usages connected to the tradition of Islam for example in Turkey, where „it has served as one of the Sufis' distinguishing marks" (Gholami and Quasemi 2008), it has been coded as connected to Islam in the light of the overall hashtag discourse being marked as "Muslim". In case none of the three reference works included the reference or described it as not connected to any religious tradition, the content was not coded in the category "Religion and Islam".

The 104 tweets that contain contents coded for the category of "Religion and Islam" include references to religions and elements of religious traditions in the following 4 subject areas:

Table 6. Religion and Islam Sub-Categories

Sub-Category	*Number of Tweets**
Religion in General	40
Concepts	32
Rituals	29
Clothing	14

*A single tweet may contain more than one sub-category.

Thereby, the first sub-category included 40 tweets with references to "religion" per se, to particular religions (e.g. Christianity, Islam, Judaism, etc.), members of those religions, or to religiosity, or faith.

(A) *Love for one's country is part of faith'. (Hadith) #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

Moreover, words that refer to faith, God, or to persons central to a religious tradition, such as prophets, were coded as part of the sub-category "Religion in General".

(B) *Pakoras[49] are a blessing from God (cheese & chocolate & parathas 2[50]) #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

The second sub-category covers all 32 references to concepts, rules, or laws connected to the tradition of Islam or other religions mentioned in the tweet. The rule referred to most often is "halal", which has been identified as belonging to the tradition of Islam as elaborated above. In the tweets, such references are made both explicitly and implicitly:

(C) *#WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink Why can't all the Subways be halal?*
(D) *Hmm, that tastes good. Wait ... did I just accidentally eat bacon? #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

The third sub-area contained references to rituals, activities, or holidays connected to the tradition of Islam or other religious traditions. Here, activities identified as belonging to

[49] This tweet is also coded for the category "Food and Drinks" and is hence an example of a tweet included in more than one category. In the description of further content categories, such individual overlaps in the examples given will not be further indicated.
[50] Due to the limit in characters, many tweets were shortened by abbreviations using numbers, such as in this case "2" for "too", or other spelling abbreviations, such as "y" for "why". Those abbreviations as well as colloquial uses of language and spelling errors, for example with regard to capitalization, are not further indicated in the examples given.

various religious traditions at once, for example prayer (Alles et al. 2011) as well as rituals or holidays specific to one religious tradition, for example Ramadan (Freiberger et al. 2016) or wudu, the minor ablution in Islam in order to reach ritual purity (Stausberg et al. 2011), are included. Overall, 29 references to religious activities and rituals were made in the tweets, as for example:

(E) Can't remember if I still have wudu or not #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink
(F) #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink Do I give 1 or 3 hugs on Eid[51]*?*

Lastly, the reference to clothing items that are connected to the Islamic tradition and may serve as a marker of person's religious identity were grouped in the sub-category of "Clothing". The clothing item referred to most often was the hijab, a word that appears in the Qurʾān and which today is "most commonly used to denote the idea of a Muslim woman's veil, either full or partial" (Siddiqui 2016). The code was applied not only when words such as hijab or burka were used but also when there was a reference to the practice of veiling, such as in the following tweet:

(G) @SayeedaWarsi no, I don't wear my scarf to bed or in the shower.... #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

Overall, there were 14 references to religious clothing in the Twitter data analyzed. Furthermore, tweets were only coded for this category if references to the category of "Religion and Islam" were made in addition to the mentioning or mere repetition of "British Muslims"[52] already included in the hashtag.

7.1.3 Discrimination

The third content category, "discrimination", is referred to in nearly 21% of the tweets (99). This category includes all references to discriminating practices, such as hostile or otherwise different treatment or media portrayal specifically towards the group of (British) Muslims. Thereby, discrimination is defined as not mere distinction between the identity categories but

[51] Eid, short for *ʿīd al-fiṭr*, is „the non-quranic (but nonetheless regarded as canonical) festival of Breaking the Fast" (Freiberger et al. 2016) after Ramadan.
[52] For an example of the way this distinction has been applied with regard to the content category of British Nation see section 5.2.1.8.

a (d)evaluation of differentiated groups, or rather „that which allows people to make judgments of persons and groups based on the group or classification to which they belong, rather than on their actual qualities or merits“ (Moore 2011). In case of the hashtag #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink, judgment and devaluating treatment of British Muslims is addressed in the tweets in various ways, which have been categorized in three sub-categories:

Table 7. Discrimination Sub-Categories

Sub-Category	*Number of Tweets**
Mal-treatment	52
Discriminatory Question	37
Voice	22

*A single tweet may contain more than one sub-category.

The first and most explicit way discrimination is present in the tweets is when "Mal-treatment" is explicitly mentioned. Tweets have been coded for this category if discrimination itself, Islamophobia, or racism are mentioned or when explicitly different treatment, mal-treatment, e.g. harassment, or stereotyping on the basis of religion and/or race is discussed. The following two tweets are examples of contents coded in this sub-category, in which 52 tweets that address discrimination explicitly are included:

(A) *Do islamophobes realize that water is halal? #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*
(B) *When's the next time I'm going to stopped and searched at the airport? #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

In the second sub-category, tweets that implicitly or explicitly frame the guiding question of the article and of the hashtag, namely "what do British Muslims really think?" as questionable, not sensible, irrelevant or repetitive, e.g. part of a greater narrative. In this way, the question is identified as discriminatory in that it is makes the classification of a Muslim identity group specific and fixed, which is related to and indeed enables devaluating judgments based on such an identity concept. In 37 tweets the article's study question and approach to identifying and fixating the British Muslim identity is questioned, or deemed irrelevant, not sensible or repetitive and discriminating:

(C) *#WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink doesn't make any sense. The only thing every muslim has in common is that they call themselves muslim.*
(D) *#whatbritishmuslimsreallythink why are we forever discussing Muslims wallah I'm bored of myself now*

The third and last sub-category of discrimination includes tweets in which the hierarchical structures of representation are demonstrated to be uneven and questions of voice are raised. In this way, asymmetrical constructions of identity groups and the selves of its members (Yuval-Davis 2011, 17) are challenged and identity constructions that have been forced on British Muslims can be questioned, refused, or corrected. The questions raised in the 22 tweets included in the sub-category "Voice" ask about the authenticity of the subjects questioned by the poll or of representations in general, e.g. who and what is portrayed as representative of British Muslims. Furthermore, questions are raised about the hierarchical structure of representation itself in terms of who represents whom, who is allowed to talk, and who is silenced, or rather talked for:

> *(E) @WritersofColour #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink is stop stereotyping us & using images that suit u rather than being representative of us*
> *(F) was going to ask Muslim friends what they thought of my new haircut but going to ask the Sunday times instead #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

7.1.4 Popular Culture

85 tweets contain references to the category of "Popular Culture". In this paper, I apply the term in agreement with Edensor, who uses the term popular culture in order to refer "to those cultural forms and practices which have commonly been regarded as 'popular'" (Edensor 2002, 17). In this way, Edensor refers to TV series, film-makers, music, writers, television stars as well as sporting heroes and sports teams (2002, 14 ff.). In the Twitter data analyzed, two sub-categories of references to popular culture were identified:

Table 8. Popular Culture Sub-Categories

Sub-Category	*Number of Tweets**
Entertainment	56
Sports	30

*A single tweet may contain more than one sub-category.

56 pop culture references were made with regard to the entertainment industry, in which all references to movies, TV-series, books, music and musicians, advertisement, actors or actresses, or other celebrities were included. Such reference included for instance mentioning authors, such as JK Rowling, musicians, such as Adele, or well-known television series, as

can be seen in the following tweet in which the American series "Friends", which aired 1994-2004, is referred to:

> *(A) #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink Were ross and rachel really on a break?*

Celebrity persons were only included in this code when they are not primarily known as sports, media, or political figures, which are included in other categories and sub-categories.

In addition, 30 tweets contained references to sports in general or to particular teams, matches, match results, or individual players and athletes.

> *(B) #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink When/How are we gonna get rid of Cellino ??*
> *(C) @julianbond12 @SayeedaWarsi #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink when watching Wimbledon "Come on Tim!"*

While for the category of entertainment a broad knowledge of past and present popular culture was required, coding for the sub-category of sports prerequisites a certain knowledge of British and international sports[53], both was acquired through reading up on the respective people, shows, and teams referenced in the tweets.

7.1.5 Media

The term media was chosen to identify references to institutionalized news media organizations, such as print newspapers, television channels, or magazines and other subjects of the professional production and dissemination system of news, such as journalists and news-editors (Nossek 2008). Although media often refers to new, social or digital media as well, references to the social media platform Twitter were coded separately in this paper.

All 65 tweets that included direct references to particular institutions or journalists as well as tweets that refers to the media in general or those with vocabulary specific to particular forms of media, such as columns, newspaper headlines, etc. were categorized in this

[53] For example, the tweets B and C could only be identified as a reference to sports when Cellino was identified as the owner of the football club Leeds United (referenced in "Massimo Cellino", BBC Sports Online, accessed 30.09.2016, <http://www.bbc.com-/sport/football/37313500>) and Tim was identified as the former British tennis player Tim Henman, who was often cheered for with the signature cheer "Come on Tim" (referenced in "Come on Tim", Urban Dictionary Online, accessed 30.09.2016, <http://www.urban-dictionary.com/define.php?term=come%20on%2C%20Tim>).

category. Furthermore, images that showed covers of newspapers or magazines were counted as references to the identifiable print media[54]. With this approach, 70 references to media institutions or individual persons involved in such institutions were identified. While some references were made to media, e.g. "mainstream media", or news channels in general, others referred to particular British print and television media institutions, such as BBC or Daily Mail.

However, most of the media references made in the tweets were directly linked to the article "An Inconvenient Truth". In those tweets, either the Sunday Times or its cover, the author of the article, Trevor Phillips, or the upcoming documentary on Channel 4 were mentioned:

> *(A) Trevor Phillips, The Sunday Times and Channel 4 (home of Benefits Street) Toxic mix. #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

Moreover, the poll, its methodology and sample, and its results have been included as references to the media that presented it, as such references can only be understood with regard to the media article itself:

> *(B) #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink - a poll based on 1,000 people represents over 5,000,000 British Muslims. That's stupid.*

Tweets with references to media entities directly related to the article "An Inconvenient Truth" accounted for 74% (52) of all 70 references to the content category "Media". This further shows the hashtag to be intended as a direct response to the article.

7.1.6 Politics

In 9.2 % of the tweets (44) there are references to politics. All tweets that mention politicians (e.g. David Cameron), political issues (e.g. panama papers, terrorism, the Israel – Palestine conflict), political parties and players (e.g. Torries, ISIS), or political affiliations (e.g. liberal) were coded for the category of "Politics". Thereby, 19 tweets contained references to British politics and politicians, such as David Cameron or the Torries:

[54] In this way, the inclusion of the image of the Sunday Times magazine cover has been counted as a reference to the media and the article and was only coded for the gender specific contents present in the picture (see section 6.1) if such contents were also referred to elsewhere in the tweet.

(A) *Can we focus on david cameron please… #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

Another 14 tweets mentioned issues related to ISIS or terrorism in general:

(B) *#WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink lets get out and protest against the latest ISIS atrocities. Oh, hang on, who will look after the shop?*

Lastly, the remaining references to content category of politics were to politics and politicians in general, to the human rights organization or other international politics issues, such as the Israel-Palestine conflict.

7.1.7 Twitter

One content area that was present repeatedly in the data analyzed is Twitter itself. In 26 tweets there are references to either Twitter, Twitter related activities, such as tweeting and retweeting, or the conversation around the #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink. Some tweets only referred to activities, such as tweeting or retweeting in general. Others, however, evaluated or promoted the hashtag discourse itself. Thereby, initial tweets introduced the hashtag and its intention and further tweets referred to this intention and to the hashtag conversation in order to promote it. This initial introduction of the hashtag can be traced in the first 8 tweets that contained the hashtag. The same user has published the first four of those tweets that introduced the hashtag:

Example (A):

(1) *What time is the match on tomorrow? #WhatBritishMuslims-ReallyThink*

[image 1][55]

[55] Tweet 1-4 contained the image of The Sunday Times cover *[image 1]*, while tweet 6-7 included Sayeeda Warsis initial image tweet, which did not contain the hashtag yet but featured the cover of the Sunday Times magazine *[image 2]*.

(2) *I think I'll have some crisps. #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink [image 1]*
(3) *Are the Wurzels playing Glastonbury this year? They were fun the other year. #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink [image 1]*
(4) *You get the point. #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink [image 1]*
(5) *@username What's best, sugar before milk in your cuppa or milk then sugar? #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*
(6) *.@SayeedaWarsi, let's start the conversation. #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

[image 2]

(7) *#WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink - To have a peaceful society we have to have a clear understanding of all religions [image 2]*
(8)[56]: *Start the conversation #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink It's a beautiful sunny day today so no excuse for the husband to avoid mowing the lawn*

In these initial tweets, tweets number 1-3, 5 and 7 can be interpreted as examples of the way the hashtag was intended. Hence, it is important to see that the first 4 tweets, as well as tweet 6 and 7 explicitly refer to the article with either including an image of The Sunday Times headline or of the cover of the Sunday Times magazine. Thus, the intention of responding to the article with the use of the hashtag, as well as the way the hashtag can be used is established in those initial tweets. Furthermore, tweet number 4 directly refers to this intention, e.g. "the point" that the first 3 tweets showed, while tweet 6 and 8 promote the

[56] This tweet was published by Sayeeda Warsi (see section 5.2.1), hence her entry in the hashtag discourse can be traced to the very beginning, which might be part of the reason for its rapid spread.

hashtag conversation by starting "let's start the conversation". In this way, tweet 4, 6, and 8 have been coded for the category "Twitter".

References to Twitter later in the data sample may emphasize the original intention again but more often evaluate the hashtag and its tweets or refer to the status of the hashtag, e.g. if it had reached a volume of published tweets that would mark it as trending. An example of such a tweet is:

> *(A) Quite enjoying all the wittiness of UK Muslims responding to the Sunday Times via #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink [image 2]*

Overall, tweets in the content category of "Twitter" can be seen as those that initiate, define, and promote, but also sometimes contest and discuss the intention of the hashtag and the particular way Twitter is used in the hashtag conversation.

7.1.8 British Nation

Another subject mentioned in the tweets is the "British nation". In the 21 tweets coded for this content category, references to British identity or Britishness, to Britain as an entity or country (e.g. UK, United Kingdom, Britain, etc.) or to people and symbols that are attributed to the nation (e.g. the queen, flag, or Union Jack) were included. Tweets were only coded for this category if references to British nationality or the British nation were made in addition to the mentioning or mere repetition of "British Muslims" already included in the hashtag. For example, tweet A was coded for the category in question but tweet B is seen as a mere repetition and is hence not included:

> *(A) @username snarky tweets is the British way. Don't people want to know #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*
>
> *(B) #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink - a poll based on 1,000 people represents over 5,000,000 British Muslims. That's stupid.*

In addition, tweets that referred to the geography of Britain, e.g. references to the country as a limited area or to regions or places in Britain were included in this category as well. However, there were few only few tweets (5 in total) that referred to Britain as a spatial entity or to

geographical places in Britain, of which 2 referred to London, one to the Midlands and only two to Britain as a country[57].

7.1.9 Shared Values

As outlined above, the exclusion of Muslims from the British nation has often been delineated via the concept of shared values. Those values have often been defined with regard to gender and gender relations, tolerance towards homosexuality and attitudes towards violence (Fassin 2010, 509). Furthermore, shared values in general and values that are attributed to democracy and modernity, such as freedom of expression and a shared sense of solidarity or humanity, have been used in such discourses as well[58]. In 4 % of the tweets (20) analyzed, implicit and explicit references to such values were present, for example:

> (A) *Why do acquaintances & complete strangers insist on telling me Muslim women are oppressed? #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

Another reference to a morally evaluated concept a shared judgment of which could be interpreted as a shared value is pedophilia, which was mentioned in 3 tweets:

> (B) *#WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink is that pedophilia should be legal.*

Interestingly, many references to values in general and all 3 references to pedophilia could be attributed to Twitter users that intended to disrupt or contest the hashtag discourse and its intention. The ways references to shared values were instrumentalized in the strategies used by such users be further outlined in section 6.2.3.3.

7.1.10 Race and Ethnicity

Lastly, 2 % of the tweets (9) contained references that were coded in the content category of "Race and Ethnicity". Those tweets included vocabulary that referred to either race or ethnic

[57] Interestingly, both references to Britain as a geographical space were made in tweets that aimed to exclude British Muslims from the British nation and hence re-enforce the arguments made by Trevor Phillips. Such tweets will be discussed further in section 7.3.3.

[58] Although the different values referred to could be distinguished, such as gender related issues, none were mentioned more than 4 times, hence those mentions were not categorized separately.

origin. Furthermore, references to racism or racialization explicitly, or to discrimination on the basis of skin colour were included in this category:

> *(A) I hope some racist doesn't get me kicked off @easyJet for flying while Muslim in a couple of weeks. #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*
> *(B) #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink Bin Laden was light skinned so why did so many black and brown men become victims of stop and search*

Overall, 9 tweets referred to ethnicity, skin colour, or racial discrimination. Thereby, most tweets that referred to the category of "race and ethnicity" did so by reference to mal-treatment experienced were also included in the category of "discrimination". And while most tweets merely mentioned racist experiences, in one, namely in tweet B above, the racialization of Muslims is challenged. This can be seen as an attempt to explicitly contest and resist the racialization experienced and promoted in the article.

7.2 Linguistic Means of Realization

Before the strategies themselves and the tweets in which they are applied can be elaborated, the most important linguistic means of realizations present in the data need to be outlined, as they are fundamental to understanding how the strategic meaning is created in the tweets. First and most importantly, the hashtag does not only mark the topic of the tweet, in this case both the response to the article as well as communicating an authentic sense of "what British Muslims think", but also serve as the target of appraisal and identification (Zappavigna 2011, 799). Hence, the identity category of "British Muslims" is intended to serve as a marker of identification for the Twitter users tweeting in the hashtag. In this way, the hashtag can be seen as having "created a space for the construction of the Muslim community" (Wills 2016, 2), in which British Muslims can communicate and share their experiences online. Overall, the *overt mentioning of identity categories* Bucholtz identifies as the first and most explicit layer of identification (2005, 594) is present in the hashtag itself, which is intended to serve as a marker for identification for the groups of British Muslims to unify in their experience as well as in their rejection of the way they are represented in the article "An Inconvenient Truth".

In addition to the implicit identification of the Twitter user participating in the hashtag discourse with the category of British Muslims, there are tweets in which the unification of British Muslims around the hashtag is made explicit. This is done by establishing a "we"-

group by applying personal pronouns, such as "we", "us", "you", "they", etc., that imply one's own identity position and simultaneously make presuppositions with regard to that of others. In this way, there are 47 tweets that contain explicit references to the identity positions of a distinct "we"-group with regard to British Muslims through personal pronouns. This can be seen in the following two tweets:

> *(A) when will we stop having to prove our humanity? #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*
> *(B) That hashtag should've been #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink - Ask a non Muslim to conduct a survey for us.*

On the one hand, as seen in example A, this "we"-group is established by attributing the personal pronoun to the identity category of "British Muslim" in the hashtag. On the other hand, there are tweets, such as tweet B, where the "we"-group is not only attributed to the hashtag but further distinguished from other identity categories, here from "non Muslim[s]". Overall, while there are tweets that may be seen as disrupting the hashtag, all Twitter users that explicitly refer to a "we"-group around the hashtag identify with the category of "British Muslims".

Another important means of realization that is present in the Twitter data analyzed and that helps to construct a unified identity group and create sameness between people is the trope of the *synecdoche*. As indicated before, a synecdoche "replaces the name of a referent by the name of another referent which belongs to the same field of meaning and which is either semantically wider or semantically narrower" (Wodak et al. 2009, 43). Thereby, particularizing synecdoches replace a semantically wider term with a semantically narrower one (Wodak et al. 2009, 44). In this way, it is possible for a singular to stand for a plural, or rather for an individual person to speak for a group of people imagined to belong to the same identity category and hence to be the same. In the data analyzed, the synecdoche only works as part of the overall logic of the hashtag, which, if paraphrased, would read in the following way: "what (the plural of, e.g. all) British Muslims really think [is that/the following/previous]". Based on this syntax, Twitter users recount their individual (singular) thoughts and experiences, which are attributed to be typically shared by British Muslims, as for example in the following tweet:

> *(C) Also, I wonder if I will be racially abused as I go to buy my cheesecake? #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

In this example, it is indicated that what "I" as a singular British Muslim think is indeed what all "British Muslims really think", hence that the worry of being racially abused while buying a cheesecake is shared by the whole group. Other tweets apply the same logic inherent in the hashtag syntax but attribute particular thoughts directly to the group of "British Muslims" without including a singular person in the first place:

(D) *Leicester will win the League #WhatBritishMuslimsReally-Think*
(E) *Why is the weather bipolar? #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

In this way, all British Muslims are said to be interested in whether Leicester will win the sports championship and to worry about the fluctuating weather. Indeed, all tweets structured in such ways make implicatures and presuppositions regarding not only the individual user's but also the identity position of others thought to belong to the identity group of British Muslims. In addition to the two layers of 1) overt mentioning of identity categories and 2) the positioning of self and others, there are two more layers with regard to Bucholtz and Hall's concept of indexicality (2005, 594). As outlined in Chapter 3.5, the third level of indexicality is the display of evaluative orientations (Bucholtz and Hall 2005, 594). In this way, sameness is constructed through adopting the same stances, identifiable through shared evaluative language towards identity positions or aspects thereof (Zappavigna 2011, 794). Such expressions can be identified in evaluative language, which ranges from language that displays *affects* (positive and negative feelings, such as love and hate), *judgment* (attitudes towards behavior, such as critique, admiration, or denunciation thereof), or *appreciation*, (other value based assessments) (Zappavigna 2011, 794). In the analyzed tweets, evaluative language is present often and for the purpose of displaying shared evaluations with regard to a variety of different aspects, as shown in the following two examples:

(F) *Love for one's country is part of faith'. (Hadith) #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*
(G) *@username People should stop worrying #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink because we are such a diverse faith, that's part of the beauty.*

While the first example displays positive feelings, e.g. "love", tweet G explicitly appraises the "we"-group, defined by its "faith", and further implicitly judges the activity of "worrying" about what British Muslims really think as essential sing a diverse faith. Since different entities are evaluated, the mere presence of evaluative language is not as such indicative of

the content around which affiliation takes place and has thus not been quantitatively analyzed. However, the ways in which strategies of identification have been realized by evaluating certain contents in specific ways is central to the results presented in section 6.2.2.3 below.

Last but not least, Bucholtz and Hall identify the use of linguistic structures and systems that are ideologically associated with specific personas and groups as the fourth layer of indexicality (2005, 594). In their work on the hashtag #MuslimCandyHearts, Wills and Fecteau define "liturgical language of Arabic, Arabic-derived Islamic phrases, or Muslim-majority languages such as Urdu" as „highly identified with Muslim communities" (2016, 9). In the data analyzed in this thesis, 13 % of all tweets (56) contain either Arab words or words derived from the Arab language, as seen in tweet H and I, or refer to other languages or language (7 tweets), such as Urdu:

> *(H) If only Adele said Salaam instead of Hello... #WhatBritish-MuslimsReallyThink*
> *(I) Is Pizza Express Chicken really halal? #WhatBritishMuslim-sReallyThink*
> *(J) Instead of French / German, every1 should be taught Urdu or Punjabi in school so they can speak 2 my elders*

Thereby, some tweets can only be understood with a basic knowledge of the Arab language and references to Arabic-derived expressions with regard to Islam. Hence, the use of Arab language can be seen as something attributed to, used by, and expected to be understood by the group of British Muslims participating in the hashtag discourse in order to construct and demarcate their distinct group identity.

Overall, various means with which the strategies of identification have been realized are present in the Twitter data analyzed. Thereby, the syntax of the hashtag itself, which implies intra-group sameness, and the overt mentioning of identity categories in it, as well as the establishment of a "we"-group around the hashtag are of central importance in order to understand the specific strategies applied in the tweets.

7.3 Strategies

On a macro-level, there were two main strategies consistent with the hashtag, namely the *strategy of construction* as well as the *strategy of dismantling or deconstructing identity categories*. In this way, the identity of British Muslims was constructed through sub-strategies of *adequation* and *distinction* as well as *authorization*. At the same time the negative portrayal of British Muslim identity in the article was deconstructed and dismantled through

strategies of *illegitimation* and *denaturalization.* In addition to those two macro-strategies, there was one set of strategies present in 25 tweets that does not conform to the intention of the hashtag, or rather opposes the strategies present in the other tweets. Indeed, while the majority of the tweets indicate that the respective users identify with the identity position of British Muslims, hashtags are also used by other users who might promote discriminatory views and try to reinforce „negative ideas about Muslims or [turn] the hashtag into an Islamophobic environment" (Wills 2016, 4). In those tweets, the representation of British and British Muslims identity voiced in the article in line with the *strategy of perpetuation* that portrays Muslims as a opposed to and as a threat to British identity was reproduced and re-affirmed by applying strategies of *distinction, authorization* and *illegitimation.*

As shown in Table 9, the macro-strategy of construction is applied most often, with 356 tweets included in the category. The strategy of dismantling with regard to the identity category as constructed in the article is present in 140 tweets, 15 of which were coded for both the sub-strategy of illegitimation and denaturalization.

Table 9. Frequency of Strategies of Identification

Macro-Strategy	*Number of Tweets**	*Sub-Strategy**	*Number of Tweets***
Construction	356	Intra-national Adequation	202
		Intra-group Adequation	144
		Authorization	10
Dismantling	140	Illegitimation	115
		Denaturalization	40
Justification, Perpetuation	25	Distinction	16
		Authorization	7
		Illegitimation	7
Other	17	Other	17

*The total number of tweets that contain the respective macro-strategy.
**A single tweet may be coded for more than one sub-strategy.

All those macro-strategies with their respective sub-strategies and the way they are realized in the tweets are elaborated and illustrated in the next three sections[59].

7.3.1 Strategy of Construction

According to De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak (1999, 160), and Wodak et al. (2009, 33), the macro-strategy of construction establishes shared identity by "promoting unification, identification and solidarity, as well as differentiation" (Wodak et al. 2009, 33). Unification is often achieved by establishing a "we"-group. In case of the sample analyzed, a "we"-group of

[59] For further examples and the guiding questions to each coding category see Appendix B.

British Muslims was formed around the hashtag in question. Thereby, a shared identity is emphasized along the lines of shared sorrows, problems and worries, as well as common interests and activities. In the Twitter data gathered in this thesis, two similar but distinct strategies of constructing the identity of British Muslims could be observed; 1) *Intra-national adequation*: the portrayal of British Muslims as a unified group that is the same as British people and/or people in general and 2) *intra-group adequation*: the identification of British Muslims as a unified group that is distinct from British non-Muslims. In both approaches, the strategy of adequation, e.g. the "pursuit of socially recognized sameness" (Bucholtz and Hall 2003, 383), is the central strategy and in both cases the argument works on the basis of explicit or (mostly) implicit comparison between the group of British Muslims on the one hand and various other groups, such as British non-Muslims, Christians, or people in general, on the other hand. The fundamental difference between the two approaches is that in the first construction the groups or elements compared are imagined as similar, hence conforming, while the second construction relies on an explicit or implicit differentiation thereof.

In the following sections those identity constructions will be elaborated by first illustrating the strategy of intra-national adequation based on the portrayal of sameness and downplaying the notion of difference and secondly, outlining the use of the strategy of intra-group adequation when portraying British Muslims as a distinct but unified identity group. Last but not least, the third section in this Chapter will outline how the identity constructions are legitimized and supported by applying strategies of authorization.

7.3.1.1 Intra-National Adequation

The 202 tweets that contain this strategy aim at aligning British Muslims to British people by foregrounding aspects of identity that are imagined not only to be shared by all British Muslims but also by British non-Muslims. In most tweets, this adequation is implicit, however, there are a few instances where it is made explicit, as for example in the following two examples:

> *(A) Living according to the stated 'British Values'* (1) *is pretty easy as in many ways Islam requires the same* (2) *of us #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*
> *(B) Do Christians know that we really love Jesus* (1) *(peace be upon him) as well* (2) ☺ *#WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

In both tweets, (1) aspects are first attributed to British identity in general, e.g. “British values”, and to Christian identity in particular, e.g. love for Jesus, and secondly (2) portrayed as also shared by British Muslims. Both tweets portray the identity of British Muslims via an aspect that is explicitly attributed to British non-Muslims, or Christians. In this way, the construction of Muslims as different from British people and incompatible with ”Western” values prevalent in the article and in overall discourses on Muslims in Europe is indirectly contested. Moreover, there are some everyday interests and sorrows mentioned that might be understood as not only shared by British people but by people in general. Those tweets can be interpreted as negating discriminatory and vilifying identifications by emphasizing the normality and “banal” humanity of British Muslims. In this way, those tweets do not directly align British Muslims to Britishness in general but complicate the basis for any juxtaposition between the two identity categories. They are thus included in the category of intra-national adequation.

In most tweets that apply this strategy, its realization is implicit. Tweets are coded included in the strategy of intra-national adequation, if they contain references to one of two sets of shared aspects. The first set of shared aspects along which unification is accomplished are references to shared interests, such as interests in sports or food, shared activities, mostly with regard to everyday life activities, as well as shared reference points, such as shared knowledge of popular culture references. There are cases in which the aspects of interest are explicitly attributed to Britishness, for example interest in the “British weather”, which exemplifies the intention of portraying British Muslim identity along the line of imagined sameness with British identity in general. In other cases, either aspects that are implicitly attributed to Britishness (e.g. the word “crisps” in tweet C and Tim identified as a former British tennis player in tweet D) or generally shared everyday activities and worries (tweet E) are referred to:

(C) I think I'll have some crisps. #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink
(D) @username1 @username2 #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink when watching Wimbledon "Come on Tim!"
(E) Sunny Sunday afternoons are great for a nap #whatBritishmuslimsreallythink

In this way, an everyday culture is established that is attributed to British Muslims as well as imagined to be shared by British people in general. Such a construction in terms of interest in British sports, as in tweet E, further recalls constructions of national identity via a shared sense of belonging and emotional attachment identifiable in displays of solidarity with regard

to British sports team, as conceptualized prominently in the so-called cricket test previously outlined (see section 3.5.2).

The second set of unifying aspects is identified in shared sorrows, worries, or problem in terms of both everyday worries as well as political issues of concern. Those shared worries and sorrows may be explicitly (tweet F) or implicitly (tweet G) attributed to Britishness or be of a nature that is imagined to be shared by (British) people in general (tweet H):

(F) It's raining again! British weather is so unpredictable #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink
(G) @David_Cameron should resign #panamapapers #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink
(H) Damn, it's Monday tomorrow. #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

Overall, the strategy of intra-national adequation correlates significantly with the content category of "Popular Culture" (r=378, p=0.000) and to a lesser extent with the category of "Everyday Life" (r=0.256, p=0.000)[60]. This indicates that unity and sameness are constructed along the lines of a shared culture, hence that belonging is conceptualized via the dimension of *Kulturnation* in terms of everyday culture. Moreover, while most interests and sorrows are voiced with regard to the content category of "Popular Culture", other tweets refer to a shared interest in British politics, such as the repeatedly voiced wish for David Cameron, the former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, to resign. Such an argumentation would be in line with the findings of Wodak et al., who identified the construction of Austrian national identity both in terms of a shared culture and sense of belonging as well as an interest in a shared political presence and future (e.g. *Staatsnation*) (2009, 31). However, no significant correlation has been found between the strategy of intra-national adequation and the content category of "Politics", which might be due to the analyzed sample size but could also indicate that the portrayal of a shared everyday culture has been judged to be more important than a shared political presence and future by the participants in the hashtag.

7.3.1.2 Intra-Group Adequation: Adequation and Distinction

In the 144 tweets included in this category, the identity of British Muslims is constructed via a combination of both the strategy of adequation and distinction. Firstly, shared characteristics,

[60] All significant (p>0.05) correlations (r) between sub-strategies and main content categories can be found in Appendix D. All positive correlations will be discussed throughout this chapter.

sorrows, interests, or activities are mentioned in the tweet. Secondly, those mentioned entities are either explicitly portrayed as particular to or implicitly attributed to the group of British Muslims in contrast to British non-Muslims. Such entities attributed to British Muslims only are present with regard to four different content categories. Firstly, references to elements identified as connected to the tradition of Islam in the respective content category, e.g. religious concepts, rituals, and clothes, are seen as distinct to British Muslims. For instance, worries such as "why can't [sic.] all Subway's be halal?" or "y [sic.] does Ramadan have to come in June when the weather is peng?" are shared only by the distinct group that identifies with Islam.

Secondly, shared worries and sorrows about discrimating treatment experienced by British Muslims in contrast to British non-Muslims are categorized as belonging to this strategy. Tweets with references to such treatments may contain elements that explicitly refer to Islam (tweet A), while in other tweets the discrimination addressed is attributed to British Muslims via the hashtag and its "we-"group (tweet B):

(A) *Am I going to get harassed because of my hijab? #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*
(B) *So worried about how we are being dehumanized & what it is & can lead to if unchecked #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

Thirdly, there are references to other markers explicitly or implicitly attributed to the group of British Muslims, such as beards (tweet C), scarves or veils, as well as the use of the linguistic structures identified above as associated with Muslimness, e.g. the use of the Arab language:

(C) *This whole beard thing lately... that was us right? #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

Lastly, there are 7 tweets, in which Israel and its relation to America or the Israel Palestine Conflict are mentioned. Those tweets either call for solidarity with Palestine or devaluate Israel, e.g. "#FREEPALESTINE #BOYCOTTISRAEL" or "America is Israel's Bitch". This could be interpreted an attempt to construct a shared solidarity and worry that includes the situation of Muslims in Palestine. However, the same user published 5 of those tweets and none of the 7 tweets were retweeted or reacted to (via a visible .@mention) in the hashtag discourse, which may indicate that the success of this unification attempt has been limited.

Overall, a distinct British Muslim identity is constructed mostly along the lines of shared interest in or worries related to issues identified as connected to Islam. Indeed, the strategy of *intra-group adequation* has been found to correlate strongly with the content category of "Religion and Islam" ($r=0.488$, $p=0.000$). Furthermore, the hashtag offers a space to share distinct experiences with regard to everyday activities or worries connected to religious activities or religious dress as well as with regard to discriminatory experiences. While the correlation of the strategy of intra-group adequation with the content category of "Everyday Life" is weak but significant ($r=0.179$, $p=0.000$), the correlation with the content category of "Discrimination" is significant to a lesser extend ($p=0.041$) and very weak ($r=0.093$). This indicates that the unification of the identity group of British Muslims is attempted more via quotidian as well as religious interests and activities than by referring to a shared worry with regard to being discriminated. In this regard, the construction of British Muslims as a distinct "we"-group around the hashtag might be interpreted as offering Twitter users the possibility for positive identification.

7.3.1.3 Authorization

The last sub-strategy that contributes to the strategy construction is that of authorization. Thereby, the strategy of authorization refers to the affirmation of the construction of identity groups by attributing authority to those institutions, entities, or people constructing and (re-)presenting the identity in question (Bucholtz and Hall 2005, 603). In terms of the identity of British Muslim constructed around the hashtag #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink, authority may be attributed to individual people or individual tweets in the discourse, to the media of Twitter itself, or to the hashtag around which the "we"-group is formed. In the data analyzed, those entities are either evaluated positively, by using both language of positive affect (e.g. "love" in tweet B) as well as positive appraisal (e.g. "open" conversation in tweet A), or the quantity of British Muslims tweeting a certain thing is mentioned in order emphasize the significance and meaningfulness of the hashtag discourse and the statements made therein:

(A) *So proud of the hashtag, #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink. It's everything I wanted it to be. A open conversation with British Muslims.*
(B) *I love how all of us are tweeting about food instead of World domination and Sharia Law hmm #WhatBritishMuslimsReally-Think*

Overall, the hashtag discourse is positively evaluated and emphasized as meaningful in 10 tweets. As all tweets that apply the strategy of authorization realized it by reference to the content category of "Twitter", the strong correlation (r=0.534, p=0.000) found was expected.

7.3.2 Dismantling Strategy

While the strategy of construction and its sub-strategies can be seen as indirectly responding to the article and its exclusionary representation of British Muslims, the strategy of dismantling responds to the argumentation of the article in a more direct manner. The goal of the 140 tweets that contain this strategy is to respond to the negative image of British Muslims portrayed in the article as well as in major European and nationalist discourses in general by contesting and dismantling it. In this way, the negative "othering" of British Muslims and their portrayal as different is contested by applying two sub-strategies; *illegitimation* and *denaturalization*.

7.3.2.1 Strategy of Illegitimation

In the first strategy, the construction of British Muslims as different is dismantled by delegitimizing those entities and people that ignored, censored, or actively mis-represented the identity group in the first place. In tweets that contained the hashtag #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink, the primary source of exclusionary portrayal of British Muslims that is contested is the article "An Inconvenient Truth", its author, Trevor Phillips, and all media institutions connected to it, such as the Sunday Times or Channel 4. Those sources of authority were devalued and delegitimized primarily by using evaluative language, as can be seen in the following tweets:

(A) *After ruining the Equality Human Rights Commn, what an Islamophobic wazzock Trevor Phillips turned out to be. #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*
(B) *Trevor Phillips, The Sunday Times and Channel 4 (home of Benefits Street) Toxic mix. #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

Thereby, Trevor Phillips is called an “Islamophobic whazzock” and his political actions are further criticized as having “ruined” the Equality Human Rights Commission. Furthermore, he in relation with the media institutions associated with the article are negatively appraised as “toxic”.

In addition to directly devaluating Trevor Phillips, the Sunday Times, or Channel 4, the scientific value of the poll presented in the article is questioned. In this way, Phillips authorization of his construction of British Muslim identity via the claimed scientific integrity of the results is illegitimized:

> *(C) 1,801 polled. 2,960,000 Muslims in the UK - 4.8% of the population (Pew research) #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*
> *(D) #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink - a poll based on 1,000 people represents over 5,000,000 British Muslims. That's stupid.*

Most tweets that contain criticism of the poll base it on questions about the representativeness of its sample.

Last but not least, media institutions other than those related to the article as well as media or politicians seen as representative of an exclusionary rhetoric towards British Muslims are challenged in the tweets (tweet E). Furthermore, not only the specific poll presented by Phillips but indeed polling itself and the overall questioning of “what British Muslims really think” is questioned, portrayed as repetitive and part of a greater narrative, or judged as outdated or discriminating (tweet F):

> *(E) Can we go a day without a daft scare story about us in the mainstream media #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*
> *(F) Why aren't other groupings of people polled in the UK? Also why slice & dice by religion & not say education? #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

In total, a substantial number of tweets (115) delegitimized one or more of the mentioned sources of authority and their methods. Therefore, the strategy of illegitimation has been used as the principal sub-strategy by Twitter users when contesting negative identity constructions they see as false and as being forced upon them. Thereby, the sub-strategy of illegitimation strongly correlates with the content category of “Discrimination” ($r=0.558$, $p=0.000$). Such a correlation was expected, as the portrayal of behaviors as discriminating can in itself already be seen as a delegitimizing judgment of said behavior. Similarly, a weak but significant

correlation with the content category of "Race and Ethnicity" (r=0.102, p=0.025) could be shown. As most references to the content category of "Race and Ethnicity" were references to racism and overlapped with the content category of "Discrimination", the correlation could have been expected to be higher. However, the weak result might be due to the small sample size of the category of "Race and Ethnicity" with only 9 tweets included. Furthermore, as the correlation between the strategy of illegitimation and the content category of "Media" is significant and medium in strength (r=0.334, p=0,000), the statistical calculations support the suggestion that a significant part of tweets that aimed to delegitimize identity constructions of British Muslims realized this by delegitimizing media entities, both those directly with regard to the article and other media institutions.

7.3.2.2 Strategy of Denaturalization

The second sub-strategy that serves to realize the strategy of dismantling negative identity constructions of British Muslims is *denaturalization.* Tweets that apply this strategy aim to subvert and dismantle homogenizing and essentalising portrayals of British Muslim identity. This is achieved by emphasizing the problematic, fragmented, and socially constructed nature of the identity constructed. For example, in tweets G and H, the argumentation of the article and similar rhetoric are portrayed as false in that the identity category on which the exclusionary argumentation is based is itself deconstructed:

> *(G) Ask 3 Muslims a Question get 4 answers (aka we R not a monolith & we disagree all the time) #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*
> *(H) Do people really know everything about what I think just by asking about my religion? Because I don't #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

While in tweet G the identity group of British Muslims is portrayed as diverse and fragmented, tweet H questions the reliance on the identity category of "religion" in order to make generalizable statements about people.

In addition to denaturalizing identity categories per se, some tweets explicitly questioned the representativeness of the poll sample in terms of the authenticity of the people questioned or otherwise denaturalize the portrayal of British Muslims in the article:

> *(I) Who on earth DID they ask?#WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

(J) *#WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink Why don't these surveys ever ask me or anyone I know for their Muslim Opinion?*

(K) *I've never met a Muslim woman in a Union Jack niqab. Yet they show up in magazines. #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

Tweet I and J question the group polled and thereby imply that the results of the polls are inauthentic and biased, if not even unbelievable, as the question "who on earth DID they ask" implies. If the polled group or the portrayal of British Muslims is criticized as non-authentic, this is often done by simultaneously indicating that the "we"-group of the hashtag or at least the user tweeting and his social circle, as implied by tweet J, is authentic and his or her views would be more representative of British Muslims. If, for example, tweet K above is read to mean that the representation of a Muslim woman in a Union Jack niqab is not realistic and such a representation is hence delegitimized as inauthentic, this can only be done if the "I" who has never seen a Muslim woman in a Union Jack niqab is a valid and authentic source of authority and information. In this way, denaturalization and authentication go hand in hand. Indeed, the overall intention of the hashtag can be interpreted as representing views of British Muslims that are more "real" and "authentic" than those presented in the article by Trevor Phillips. Hence, most tweets that aim at denaturalizing and delegitimizing specific constructions of British Muslim identity are only successful if the hashtag and its users are seen as authentic in the first place. Therefore, the strategy of authentication has not been separately coded.

Last but not least, there are tweets in which the denaturalization of negative identity constructions of British Muslims is achieved implicitly by violating certain expectations the views contested are linked to, for example:

(L) *"I'm the one that's oppressed, I have to ask my wife for permission to go play football" my friend yesterday #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

In this specific tweet, expectations of British Muslims with regard to gender equality and the oppression of women is referred to and violated in that the woman is portrayed not as the oppressed but as the oppressor.

In terms of correlations with content categories, the strategy of denaturalization strongly correlates with the content category of "Discrimination" (r=0.449, p=0.000) and shows a weak, yet still significant, correlation with the content category of "Media" (r=0.092, p=0.043). In this regard, the strategy of denaturalization can be seen as connected to similar contents as the strategy of illegitimation. As both aim at dismantling previous identity constructions presented in the media, such a similarity could be expected. Moreover, the strong correlation with the category of "Discrimination" has been expected, as many tweets that denaturalize identity categories aim at criticizing the discriminating homogenization and naturalization of those categories. Overall, Twitter users apply the strategy of illegitimation as well as the strategy of denaturalization mostly with reference to the content category of "Discrimination" as well as to the content category of the "Media" in order to contest and dismantle identifications of British Muslims by "others".

7.3.3 Strategy of Justification and Perpetuation

Lastly, hashtags can be contested and disrupted by users that do not share the view of the overall "we"-group constructed in the hashtag discourse (Wills 2016, 4). Those tweets aim at goals that are contrary to the ones of the majority of tweets in the hashtag conversation. In case of #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink, disrupting tweets challenge the possibility for positive identification with the British Muslim identity in the hashtag or in general, and re-affirm negative and exclusionary portrayals of British Muslims. In this way, the tweets are in line with the argumentation evident in the article "An Inconvenient Truth", which reproduced the British national identity as necessarily distinct from Muslim identity. Therefore, those tweets have been subsumed under the *macro-strategy of perpetuation and justification*, which aims at justifying the current status quo (De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak 1999, 161).

In the sample analyzed, there are 25 tweets attributed to the three sub-strategies with which the strategy of perpetuation and justification are realized, namely *distinction, authorization,* and *illegitimation.* Thereby, 5 tweets are coded for two of the strategies at the same time. As seen above, the sub-strategies identified in this section are the same that have been applied in the macro-strategy of construction. However, in this small set of tweets, the

sub-strategies are applied differently with regard to the elements mentioned and the attributions made as well as the quality of their appraisal.

7.3.3.1 Strategy of Distinction

The first way in which the *strategy of perpetuation* is achieved is by clearly differentiating between British people on the one side and British Muslims, or rather Muslims, on the other. The 16 tweets coded for the sub-strategy of *distinction* all either implicitly or explicitly portray Muslim identity as distinct from British identity, explicitly exclude Muslims from British identity, or use negative evaluative language to further devaluate the identity category:

> *(A) #whatbritishmuslimsreallythink No one cares because they never have been and never will be. Welcome in the UK.*

Furthermore, there are tweets in which characteristics and views that are attributed to Muslims are explicitly or implicitly evaluated as negative. Similar to the argumentation in Phillips article, the contents ascribed to Muslims in order to differentiate and exclude them from British identity are often referred to in terms of shared values, as can be seen in tweet B and C below:

> *(B) Well 50% think that homosexuality should be banned. #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*
> *(C) 500000 muslims protest Danish cartoons. 500 protest isis Brussels attacks. An inconvenient truth. #WhatBritishMuslims-ReallyThink*

While the argument of this tweet is in line with a demarcation of identity groups along shared values and attitudes towards homosexuality, freedom of speech, as well as violence, there are tweets that refer to moral taboos and access stereotypes that are of a more vulgar and malicious nature:

> *(D) #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink Is it. Now it's time for „sexy time"*

Tweet D above is an example of such a malicious rhetoric. In it, the words "sexy time" in addition to the picture of a goat in a laced type of garment points to the slur "goatfucker", which, according to the urban dictionary, is either "used to describe militant Dutch immigrants from Muslim countries [and] also sometimes […] to describe Muslims in general" or „an extremely negative racial term used to describe anyone from the Middle East as well as Caucasians who have darker, 'Arablike' complexions such as Turks, Armenians, etc."[61] Such a definition further indicates the intersection of religious and racial identity in pejorative utterances towards Muslims. The addition of the picture showing a man with the lewd, derogatory gesture of a raised middle finger further assists what is clearly intended to be an insult towards the British Muslims participating in the hashtag.

In terms of content categories, there is a strong correlation between this use of the strategy of distinction and the content category of "Shared Values" (r=0.426, p=0.000). This supports the suggestion that this sub-strategy of distinction is applied similarly to that used by Trevor Phillips in the article, who has, as outlined above, strongly drawn on the category of "Shared Values" in order to differentiate between British and British Muslim identity. Furthermore, there is a weak but significant correlation with the content category of the "British Nation" (r=0.131, p=0.004). This might be indicative of tweets that explicitly exclude British Muslims from Britain, as seen in tweet A above. Interestingly, both the content category of "Shared Values" as well as "British Nation" do not correlate positively with any other strategies, which implies that both are used more in strategies that differentiate between British national identity and Muslim identity than in the strategies that seek to assimilate the two categories applied in the hashtag discourse. Last but not least, there is another weak yet significant correlation of this sub-strategy of distinction with the content category of "Politics" (r=0.102, p=0.026). This correlation can be interpreted to represent tweets that contain references to terrorism and political actors, such as ISIS, as seen in tweet C, which suggests Muslims should "protest ISIS" more.

7.3.3.2 Strategy of Authorization

The second *sub-strategy of perpetuation* present in the tweet is that of *authorization.* In the 7 tweets that contain this strategy, authority is (re-)attributed to entities that have been delegitimized in the overall hashtag discourse, such as Trevor Phillips, the poll, the media,

[61] "Goatfucker", Urban Dictionary Online, accessed 21.10.2016, <http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=goatfucker>.

etc. One example of an implicit reattribution of authority to the poll can be seen in the tweet B above (section 7.3.3.1), in which the results of the poll are referred to without negating them. Another example is the following tweet (E), in which authority is (re-)attributed to Trevor Phillips:

> *(E) Im pretty interested what Trevor Phillips has to say about muslims, bearing in mind who he is, #WhatBritishMuslims-ReallyThink*

As authority was attributed mostly to entities related to the article, which were coded in the content category "Media", there is a significant correlation between the strategy of authorization and the category of "Media" (r=0.104, p=0.022). The weakness of this correlation could be due to the small sample size (7 tweets).

7.3.3.3 Strategy of Illegitimation

Last but not least, the third sub-strategy of perpetuation, *illegitimation*, aims at delegitimizing the hashtag itself. By this means, the strategy of authorization used with regard to the hashtag is contested. In the 7 tweets in which this strategy is applied, the hashtag is questioned in terms of its authority, significance, and value:

> *(F) @SayeedaWarsi your hashtag #WhatBritishMuslimsReally-Think seems to be ploy. Why not start an open discussion about Islam*
> *(G) #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink another pointless hashtag to make muslims look like nice people instead of the fascists they really are*

Thereby, some of the tweets, such as tweet G, apply both the strategy of distinction as well as the strategy of illegitimation at the same time. Moreover, as illegitimation is aimed at the authority and validity of the hashtag and the discourse surrounding it, most tweets refer to the content category of "Twitter". This is supported by the correlation (r=0.347, p=0.000) found between this particular sub-strategy of illegitimation and the content category of "Twitter".

Overall, tweets coded for the strategy of justification and perpetuation aimed at authorizing and justifying what has been said in the article. Furthermore, they actively engage in differentiation between Muslim and British identity and thereby devaluate and even vilify Islam and Muslimness. Last but not least, there are tweets that directly delegitimize the use of

the hashtag #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink in order to deny the possibility of assimilation present in other tweets and to further counter the critique voiced in the hashtag discourse.

7.3.4 Other Strategies and Unclear Cases

Not all tweets contained clearly identifiable strategies and some were difficult to interpret due to complex sentence structures, unclear abbreviations, or unclear reference points. Tweets that do not contain an identifiable strategy or are unclear with regard to what strategy they contain were sub-sumed in the category "other". In total, 17 tweets could not be categorized in any of the categories above.

The first group of tweets without clear strategies could be coded for content categories but it was unclear how those contents were evaluated and for what purpose. In tweet A for instance, the references to the Sunday Times issue as well as to the headline of the Daily Mail are clear, however there are no indications as to whether those headlines are devaluated or appraised:

(A) *Muslim ghettoes' & 'a nation within a nation' #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

Although it could be argued that in the context of the overall hashtag discourse it is likely that comparing the two articles is meant to delegitimize the portrayal of British Muslims in those media in some way, this would be an inference that cannot be evidenced on the basis of the individual tweet itself. Further examples of tweets which could be read easily but which could be interpreted in more than one way without clear indication on what the intended reading is can be seen in the following two tweets:

(B) *Had Engaging discussions with young 'practicing' & not so practicing Muslims re #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

(C) *#whatbritishmuslimsreallythink how can a British muslim possibly know how a British muslim really thinks!*

While the first tweet could be interpreted as implicitly denaturalizing a homogenous entity of Muslims, as it indicates that there are at least two differentiations that can be made with regard to Muslims, namely "practicing" and "not so practicing", such a purpose of the tweet is not made clear. Furthermore, the "re" at the end of the tweet indicates that the tweet might be unfinished. In either way, the statement itself cannot be attributed to any strategy with certainty but is rather interpreted as an attempt to join in the conversation by a user who themself does not identify as a British Muslim.

In case of the second tweet (C), the difficulty lies in its ambiguity. It is possible that, if the hashtag is seen as referring to the article, the referred to "British Muslims" are those surveyed for the Sunday Times and Channel 4 and the question would hence be interpreted as a rhetoric question that aims to authenticate and re-authorize the results presented by Phillips. However, the British Muslims referred to could also be the ones participating in the hashtag, which would authenticate and authorize the hashtag discourse. When consulting the profile of the Twitter user that published tweet C, the second interpretation becomes more likely, as the user presents himself as a scholar of Islam and a practicing Muslim. However, as the tweet itself does not allow for a certain interpretation, this tweet has not been coded for any strategy.

Other tweets in this group contained unclear sentence structures or were otherwise hard to interpret. In tweet D for example, a number of reference points are listed but the relation between them is hard to infer:

> *(D) Non-Muslim'progressives'argue #WhatBritishMuslimsReally-Think StGeorgeFlag 'offends' &11thCCrusades Burka/Beards fine!NO &2016 ISIS*

Even if all single components are looked at separately a clear meaning could not be established by the author of this thesis. When consulting the profile of the Twitter user and including the other two tweets published by the user that have been included in the sample analyzed, it is likely that the tweet above aimed to devaluate British Muslims in some way. Hence, the reference to ISIS in this instance might be read as intended to show the violent "nature" of Muslims. Furthermore, it could be read as devaluating those political entities that try to achieve a more inclusive concept of Britishness, those who for example identify the St.

George Flag[62] as a racist symbol of England's colonial past and as "offensive". In this view, the "NO" would be interpreted as an active rebuttal of such views. However, such a reading, even though it could possibly be argued for, is based on inferences that are only loosely based on the tweet itself and it was thus refrained from attributing any strategy to the tweet.

Some tweets form conversations and are thus only meaningful with reference to the other tweets included in the conversation. If all references were present, such tweets were coded, as any other tweets, namely according to the content referred to and the strategy applied in the tweet that contains the #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink. An example of this is tweet 5 in the following conversation that started with tweet 1:

Example (E):

(1) User 1: @usernames so a "study" of a 1000+ Muslim folks dictate what 2 million Muslims in Britain think? Makes sense
(2) User 2: @user1 It's a representative survey sample size. There will be deviations but not much. #Statistics
(3) User 1: @user2 so u see the results as representative of 2 million Muslims opinions? #IstudiedStatsToo #ImVeryFarmiliarWithResearchMethods
(4) User 2: @user1 I think what is important to take from this is that Islam has many issues, and as a society we need to help Islam improve.
(5) User 1: Nah bruv, u have many issues. Please help Islam O saviour. #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink [link to tweet 2-5]

The conversation started when user 1 published the first tweet, where he delegitimized the scientific authority of the results reported in the article „An Inconvenient Truth"[63]. With tweet 2, user 2 responded and re-authorized the article and its results by re-attributing scientific authority to the poll. While tweet 3 continued to confirm the initial point made in tweet 1, user 2 replied by explicitly saying that "Islam has many issues" and it needed to be "improved". As a response to this, user 1 published tweet 5, in which he included the reference to the whole conversation as well as the hashtag in question in order to make the whole conversation publicly accessible and mark it as relevant to the issue of the hashtag discourse. As tweet 5 serves to delegitimize user 2, e.g. "u have many issues", and the

[62] An example of an identification of the St. George Flag as racist can be found in the following article: "By George", The Guardian Online, accessed 21.10.2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2002/jun/20/britishidentity.arts>.
[63] Tweet 1 did not include the hashtag in question and would hence not have been included in the sample analysed if the whole conversation was not referenced by tweet 5. This further illustrates that gathering only tweets that contain a hashtag does indeed not grasp all tweets that discuss the issue in question but only those that intentionally include the hashtag.

conversation aimed at delegitimizing the poll and hence the article "An Inconvenient Truth", the tweet was coded for the strategy of illegitimation. In this way, the conversation outlined above was included as a whole, with all references necessary to understand the meaning of the tweet that contained the hashtag.

However, there are tweets in the hashtag discourse that are included in conversations where not all referenced contents are made available in the sample analyzed. Such tweets, as they are only meaningful when all references are established, have been included in the category "other" as no strategy and sometimes not even clear content references could be identified. One example consists of three tweets that all contain the hashtag #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink published by three different users (user 1-3). However, all tweets seem to refer to a specific user (user 4) and something that has been said by that user without including the respective tweet:

Example (G):

(1) User 1: .@user4 #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink is you should step up your grammar game.
(2) User 2: .@user1 Hope Sheikh is thinking of taking his millions and @user4 can go back to cheering on Lee Bradbury #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink
(3) User 3: .@user4 @user1 Thanks for your help with that, JB! (#WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink : is this dude for real??)

In this example, tweet 1 seems to respond to a tweet published by user 4, who is requested to „step up [his] grammar game". The second tweet responds to user 1 and further refers to user 4, who „can go back to cheering on Lee Bradbury". Last but not least, tweet 3 explicitly thanks user 1 for his response to user 4's statement and further devaluates user 4. However, as the original statement (or statements) made by user 4 is not included in the sample analyzed, the contents of that statement can only be guessed at. Therefore, all three tweets could not be interpreted any further.

Last but not least, there were three tweets in which the strategy applied could be identified with reasonable certainty, however, as no other tweets argued in that manner, they were included in the category "other". Two of those tweets, both of which were categorized as image tweets, seem to aim at applying the strategy of illegitimating. However, unlike in the majority of the tweets, the delegitimized and devalued entity is the British government. For example, tweet H portrays the royal family as elitist and condescending, while tweet I devaluates the British parliament by indicating its members to be "pedophiles":

(H) #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink :

(I) #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink:

Interestingly, both tweets were published by the same Twitter user that published 5 of the 7 tweets that contained references to the Israel Palestine conflict as well as calls for solidarity with regard to Palestine (see section 7.3.1.2). In this way, adequation and unification of British Muslims seems to be pursued via a shared disregard for Britain and its government paired with a shared sense of solidarity with Muslims in Palestine. However, this rhetoric has only been present in the tweets published by this user and, as indicated above, none of those tweets were retweeted or responded to in any way. Therefore, this argumentation cannot be seen as representative of the majority of the hashtag discourse and there is no evidence that attempted "pursuit of socially recognized sameness" (Bucholtz and Hall 2003, 383) was successful, as there are no positive responses and no similar attempts of unification.

Overall, 17 tweets were categorized as "other" in one of the ways described above. Those who contained clear references to content categories were coded for the respective categories. However, no significant positive correlation between those tweets that contained other or unclear strategies and any of the content categories was found. Furthermore, although there is a weak negative correlation between the content category of "Everyday Life" ($r=-0.146$, $p=0.001$) as well as "Popular Culture" ($r=-0.092$, $p=0.045$), this only implies that tweets that contained references to everyday life and pop culture were mostly clear in sentence structure and included necessary all references.

8 Conclusion

In the data analyzed for this thesis, a contested and multifaceted portrayal of British national identity as well as British Muslim identity can be witnessed. Both identity categories are constructed and negotiated in relation to each other and via a variety of different elements that determine inclusion or exclusion of belonging from either group. In order to understand how the boundaries of the British nation as well as the boundaries of British Muslim identity have been constructed in the article as well as the Twitter discourse, the contents mentioned, the strategies of identification applied as well as the interrelation between the contents and the strategies have been analyzed (RQ1-RQ3).

This analysis has shown that the article constructs British identity as well as Muslim identity along the lines of values that are shared by members within each group but in which the groups themselves fundamentally differ. Moreover, in Phillips portrayal of British Muslims, diverse dimensions of national identity intersect. Most importantly, religious identity is on the one hand presented both as the basis of shared cultural values (*Kulturnation*) that are distinct from British values both in reference to religiosity per se but more significantly to the religion of Islam. On the other hand, Muslim identity is not only referred to in terms of the religious tradition Muslims share but also with regard to a shared race or ethnicity (*Volksnation*). In this way, British Muslims are portrayed as South-Asian, Arab, and non-white respectively. Furthermore, it can be argued that not only Muslim identity but also religious identity, or at least "a fierce attachment to religiosity", is depicted as coinciding with the racial identity of non-white minorities or "people of colour". In this way, religious and racial identity is closely intertwined and are both drawn upon in order to demarcate the boundaries of the British nation conceived as white and secular. Besides the intersectional construction of racial, religious, and national belonging it is noteworthy to observe that in the article, all those constructions are both realized with regard to gender issues as well gendered portrayals themselves. On the one hand, the marginalization of Muslims is performed via alleged gender related stances and misconducts, such as the submission of women in Islam or even cases of sexual violence and rape attributed to Muslims. On the other hand, the Muslim aggressor is portrayed as a male sexual predator, while Muslim women figure to symbolize distinct cultural behavior as well as "backwardness" of Islam with regard to gender issues. Overall, several axes of differentiation contribute to the construction of British identity in the article, in which an essentialist reading of Muslim identity is advocated in order to expulse Muslims from British national identity.

In the Twitter data, the image drawn is of a different nature. Here, British Muslim identity is constructed along the lines of a shared culture (*Kulturnation*) in the sense of having in common mundane activities and popular reference points. In this way, the majority of tweets portray British Muslims as the same in terms of having quotidian worries and pursuing everyday activities that British people in general are implicitly or explicitly said to share. At the same time British Muslim identity is constructed as distinct from British identity in general with the distinguishing feature of both "Muslimness", in terms of interest in concepts, rules, or rituals connected to Islam, as well as being "othered" based on religious or racial identity. There is no evidence, however, of a portrayal that would exclude British Muslims from British national identity. Rather, the exchange of distinct but shared experiences as British Muslims is aimed at criticizing the exclusionary logic that mal-treatment and discrimination is based on. Indeed, the co-construction of racial and religious identity as coinciding, which is evident in the article, is explicitly criticized and denaturalized in some tweets. In this way, the tweets do not portray religious and national identity as exclusionary but deny such a juxtaposition in that Twitter users align themselves as British Muslims to shared aspects of everyday culture as well as politics and hence show that religious and national identity are indeed compatible.

Not only is there a strong contrast between the way British Muslim and British national identity are portrayed in the article and the tweets but the Twitter data also explicitly responds to and discusses the representations in the article (RQ4). In this way, a substantial part of the tweets published with regard to #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink directly criticize the article, the media entities responsible for its publication, as well as the scientific method it is based on. Moreover, essentialist and homogenizing portrayals of identity categories are themselves criticized in the hashtag discourse. Twitter users that applied the hashtag responded to the article as well as to overall discourses that share the articles main arguments and actively refuted the identity construction therein. Thereby, the hashtag discourse #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink is an example of a discursive event embedded in a contested discursive field and an instance where marginalized people are "talking back". Indeed, the act of tweeting can be seen as an act of agency, of voicing one's own version of the truth and dismissing the one imposed by institutionalized sources of authority. In this way, the hierarchical organization of representation is questioned and bypassed.

Overall, the "othering" experienced by British Muslims both in the article and in current discourses in general, which complicates a self-identification with the British nation for Muslims, is disputed. This allows for a positive identification with both the British nation

as well as with the distinct "we"-group of British Muslims that was built around the hashtag. Hence, the hashtag discourse can be seen not only as a way to contest and refuse negative portrayals but also as a space for unification and affirmative self-identification for British Muslims. Both the ability to "talk back" and have a voice as well as the process of identifying with an available subject-position are "a necessary condition for any notion of agency and subjectivity to exist" (Yuval-Davis 2011, 14). In this way, such a performative discourse enables marginalized people to actively negotiate existing and create novel identity positions (Weedon 2004, 154). In conclusion, the hashtag #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink has enabled British Muslims to negotiate and resist negative and stereotypical identifications of themselves and was used as an instrument to appropriate and identify with the subject-position of British Muslims.

In today's discourses on belonging, especially since 9/11 and other attacks that have been represented in a similar light, national identity and belonging are both intimately tied to notions of security as well as grasped in increasingly conditional terms (Yuval-Davis 2011, 40). Particularly with regard to the way religious and national identities are interrelated in many contemporary nationalist discourses and the rising Islamophobia Muslims that are living in "Western" countries are faced with, such a conditionality and precariousness of belonging may aggravate the disassociation and marginalization experienced. Therefore, it is crucial to investigate discourses that negotiate national and religious belonging and to include not only institutionalized and elite discourses but also everyday constructions of identity and explore the integrative potential of such constructions in future research. The research conducted in this thesis reveals the importance to include Twitter discourses in the analysis of the discursive field in which national and religious identities are constructed, as it sheds light on the contested nature of such identity categories. Furthermore, it illuminates the specific ways in which Twitter is appropriated by socially marginalized people as an opportunity to resist exclusion and to employ strategies of identification that allow for a sense of belonging. In conclusion, I strongly recommend investigating the digital space and social media platforms in future research that aims to analyze the axes along which the boundaries of belonging are debated and the power-relations within they are negotiated.

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Appendix A: Coding Guideline Content Categories

General Question: What contents are present in the tweets?

Coding Rules:

Each category is identified via one or more guiding questions that check for the presence of a general topic or items connected to it.
If one or more of the items mentioned in the questions is present in a tweet, either in its text or in the image included in the tweet, then the respective code applies.
It is possible for more than one code to apply to a given tweet.

All questions are answered with 0=no or 1=yes.

Code A_Ev: Everyday Life
Are subjects and activities of everyday life present in the tweet?

A_Ev_01: Food and Drinks
Are foods, drinks, restaurants, or food-related activities and their consequences, such as eating and gaining weight, mentioned in the tweet?

> *(O) #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink I'm craving Indian cuisine.*
> *(P) *googles* "Can Muslims halalify a haribo if we say 'Bismillah'"? #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

A_Ev_02: Clothes and Style
Are clothes, fashion, shoes, style in general, or hairstyles mentioned in the tweet?

> *Does my hijab match my dress? #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

A_Ev_03: Weather
Are there references to the weather in the tweet?

> *Why is the weather bipolar? #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

A_EV_04: Work and Studies
Are there references to work, job situation, or studies in the tweet or are work or study-related activities or tasks mentioned?

> *#WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink - I actually wanna watch this but I have 2 econ papers to do . Ffs.*

A_Ev_05: Weekend and Weekdays
Are either days in general, the weekend or weekdays in particular mentioned in the tweet?

> *Damn, it's Monday tomorrow. #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

A_Ev_06: Household and Finances
Are household related activities, such as laundry, cleaning, or gardening mentioned in the tweet? Are financial considerations or purchasing goods, e.g. paying bills, shopping, etc. mentioned in the tweet?

#WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink How many times do I need to fix this tap!

A_Ev_07: Dating and Marriage
Are words that refer to dating, relationship status, marriage, or marriage proposal present in the tweet?

Will I be able to get a date every day this coming Ramadan
#WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

A_Ev_08: Travel
Are activities or entities related to travelling and mobility mentioned in the tweets, such as travelling, parking, travel visa, the airport, or border control? Are other leisure activities that involve travelling or holidays or holiday destinations mentioned in the tweet?

(1) *When's the next time I'm going to be stopped and searched at the airport? #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*
(2) *Will I get a seat on my commute to work tomorrow? In fact will the train be on time... #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

A_Ev_09: Language Use
Is language itself or language use addressed in the tweet, e.g. the way things are said and in what languages?

(1) *It's called a muffin! Not a bap or whatever else. #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*
(2) *If only Adele said Salaam instead of Hello... #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

A_Ev_10: Routine Activities
Are everyday routine activities, such as getting up in the morning, relaxing, sleeping, greeting people, or taking a shower mentioned in the tweet? Are there references to habitual activities done as a hobby, such as hiking, dancing, or playing games?

Should I have a shower now or later? Always asking the important questions
#WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

A_Ev_11: other
Are everyday topics other than those identified in codes A_Ev_01 – A_Ev_11 present in the tweet?

Code A_Pop: Popular Culture
Are there references to popular culture present in the tweet?

A_Pop_01: Sports
Are there references to sports in general or to particular teams, individual players, matches, match results, or sport personae?

(1) Unlikely now #Arsenal will win the League. #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink
(2) #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink Will Grigg is on fire

A_Pop_02: Entertainment
Are there references to movies, TV-series, books, music, advertisements, actors or actresses, musicians, or other celebrities and star personae in the tweet?

Note: This Code only applies if the personae mentioned are not primarily known as sports, media, or political figures, which are coded for A_SP, A_Med, and A_Pol respectively.

(1) If only Adele said Salaam instead of Hello... #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink
(2) Rachel and Ross were NOT on a break #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

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Code A_Val: Shared Culture; Values
Are shared values in general or values, attitudes with regard to gender and gender relations, homosexuality, violence, terrorism, bombing, freedom of speech, or other morally evaluated concepts (e.g. pedophilia) explicitly or implicitly referred to in the tweet ?
Are values with regard to a sense of solidarity humanity, empathy, or caring for others mentioned or are activities in relation to such concepts mentioned (e.g. charitable giving)?

(1) #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink is that pedophilia should be legal.
(2) "I'm the one that's oppressed, I have to ask my wife for permission to go play football" my friend yesterday #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

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Code A_Med: Media

A_Med_01: Institutionalized Media; General
Is media, understood as institutionalized media entities, in general or are particular media institutions, personae or their views mentioned in the tweet?
Is vocabulary that refers to institutionalized media, such as newspapers, columns, newspaper headlines, etc. present in the tweet?

Note: If media entities are mentioned directly with regard to the article, such as the Sunday times issue with the respective article, the author of the article, Trevor Phillips, and the specific study presented, the tweet is coded as A_Med_02 and not as A_Med_01.

(1) Can we go a day without a daft scare story about us in the mainstream media #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink
(2) Nice try by @MailOnline to distract #CameronResign with headline of #bigotry below! #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

A_Med_02: Institutionalized Media; Regarding Article in Particular
Is the article "An Inconvenient Truth", its author Trevor Philips, the Sunday Times or its cover with the respective article, the documentary "What British Muslims Really Think", Channel 4, the poll or study itself, its methodology and sample, or its results referred to explicitly in the tweet?

(1) #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink - a poll based on 1,000 people represents over 5,000,000 British Muslims. That's stupid.
(2) was going to ask Muslim friends what they thought of my new haircut but going to ask the Sunday times instead #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink
(3) I think I'll have some crisps. #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

A_Twi: Twitter & Hashtag Discourse
Are Twitter, Twitter activities (e.g. tweeting, retweeting, etc.), the hashtag itself, or the discourse surrounding it mentioned? Is the hashtag, its intention, or the surrounding conversation promoted, explained or otherwise influenced?

(1) That british non muslims must be enjoying this hashtag :-D mine a tea please.. milk.. no sugar #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink
(2) That it's time for Salaat-Ul-Magrhib & I must stop tweeting #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

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Code A_Pol: Politics
Are political personae (e.g. David Cameron), political issues (e.g. Israel Conflict, terrorism, panama papers), political players (e.g. ISIS, political parties), or political affiliations (e.g. liberal) mentioned in the tweet?

@David_Cameron should resign #panamapapers #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

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Code A_Rel: Religion(s)
Are religions in general or particular religions, e.g. Islam, mentioned in the tweet? Are rituals, concepts, clothing, or general vocabulary that refers to specific religions or faith in general mentioned in the tweet?

Note 1: Tweets are only coded for the four codes belonging to A_Rel below, if references to religions, rituals, concepts, etc. are made in addition to the mentioning or mere repetition of "British Muslim" already included in the hashtag.

Note 2: Rituals, holidays, rules, laws, clothing, etc. are coded as connected to the tradition of Islam or other religious traditions only if identified as such in the RGG, the Encyclopedia Islamica, the Encyclopedia of Islam (Version 3), or the Encyclopedia of the Qurān.

A_Rel_01: Religion General
Is the word "religion" used in the tweet? Are particular religions (e.g. Christianity, Islam, Judaism), members of religions, religiosity, faith, or conversion explicitly mentioned in the tweet?
Are words that refer to God, faith, or persons central to a religious tradition, such as prophets, or words such as "Inchallah", or "Bismillah" present in the tweet?

(1) **googles* "Can Muslims halalify a haribo if we say 'Bismillah'"? #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*
(2) *Will Idris Elba convert for me #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

A_Rel_02: Ritual
Are there references to rituals, activities, holidays, or festivities that are connected to the tradition of Islam or other religious traditions mentioned in the tweet (e.g. wudu, Ramadan, Christmas, prayer, etc.)?

Can't remember if I still have wudu or not #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

A_Rel_03: Concepts
Are rules, laws, and concepts connected to the tradition of Islam or other religions mentioned in the tweet (e.g. halal, haram)?

(1) *Is this Nandos Halal? #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*
(2) **googles* "Can Muslims halalify a haribo if we say 'Bismillah'"? #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

A_Rel_04: Clothing
Is clothing that may serve as a marker of a person's religious identity mentioned in the tweet (e.g. hijab, veil/scarf, abaya, etc.)?

Rule: The tweets that contained references to such clothing items are coded both as A_Ev_02 and A_Rel_04.

Am I going to get harassed because of my hijab?
#WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

Code A_Dis: Discrimination
Are discriminating practices, such as different treatment, stereotypcial media portrayal, etc. mentioned in the tweet?

A_Dis_01: Mal-treatment
Is "Islamophobia", "racism", or "discrimination" explicitly mentioned in the tweet?
Are behaviors towards British Muslims, e.g. different treatment, mal-treatment (e.g. harassment) on the basis of religion and/or race mentioned or problematized? Are stereotypes as such mentioned or are stereotypical representations of Muslims questioned?

(1) *Am I going to get harassed because of my hijab? #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*
(2) *When's the next time I'm going to stopped and searched at the airport? #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*
(3) *@WritersofColour #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink is stop stereotyping us & using images that suit u rather than being representative of us*

A_Dis_02: Study Question
Is the question "what do British Muslims really think" itself object of the tweet?
a) Does the tweet ask why the question (of the article) is raised?
b) Is the question challenged and its sensibility (e.g. denaturalization of identities in question) or relevance questioned or refused (e.g. not caring about the question)?
c) Is the question of the article presented as repetitive, part of a greater narrative?

(1) *#WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink But why do you care?*
(2) *#WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink doesn't make any sense. The only thing every muslim has in common is that they call themselves muslim.*
(3) *#whatbritishmuslimsreallythink why are we forever discussing Muslims wallah I'm bored of myself now*

A_Dis_03: Voice
Does the tweet answer or raise questions of representation and voice, both in general and with regard to the article in particular, e.g. who is asked by this specific poll or polls in general? Who is represented and who is represented? Who is allowed to talk? Who is talked for?

(1) *That hashtag should've been #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink - Ask a non Muslim to conduct a survey for us.*
(2) *@WritersofColour #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink is stop stereotyping us & using images that suit u rather than being representative of us*
(3) *was going to ask Muslim friends what they thought of my new haircut but going to ask the Sunday times instead #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*

Code A_Race
Is vocabulary with regard to race and ethnicity, skin color, or racism present in the tweet (e.g. race, racialized, racism, white, brown, black, etc.)?

> *#WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink Bin Laden was light skinned so why did so many black and brown men become victims of stop and search*

Code A_Nat: British Nation
Is British identity, Britain as an entity, a country, e.g. UK, country, Britain, etc., or are people or symbols that stand for the nation, e.g. the queen or the flag, mentioned in the tweet?
Is the nation itself or its geography mentioned, e.g. are British places, regions in Britain referred to in the tweet?

Note: Tweets are only coded for A_Nat, if references to nationality are made in addition to the mentioning or mere repetition of "British Muslim" already in the hashtag.

> *#WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink That they are trying their best to do every good for their United Kingdom (UK).*

Appendix B: Coding Guideline Strategies of Identification

Code guideline B: Strategies
Guiding Question: What strategies of identification are present in the tweets?

Coding Rules:

Each category is identified via one or more guiding questions that check for the presence of a strategy of identification.
If one of the questions is answered with yes, the tweet is coded as containing the respective strategy.
It is possible for more than one code to apply to a given tweet.

All questions are answered with 0=no or 1=yes.

Code B_Con: Macro-Strategy of Identity Construction

Is a group identity constructed by emphasizing unification, identification and solidarity, and/or differentiation?

B_Con_01: Intra-national Adequation

In the sub-category "intra-national adequation", British Muslims are portrayed as a unified group that is the same as British people and/or people in general.

This strategy is applied when an aspect of the identity group of British Muslims is portrayed as shared by all its members and implicitly or explicitly attributed to either British non-Muslims, British people in general, Christians, or people in general.

Note: As the hashtag refers to the plural of British Muslims, tweets that use the hashtag as a semantic element of their sentence, e.g. "What British Muslims really think [is that] sunny Sunday afternoons are great for a nap" (tweet 3) imply that the thought, interest, or worry expressed in the tweet is shared by all members of the category British Muslims. Furthermore, the inclusion of a first person singular pronoun "I", "my", etc. in the tweet can be seen as a *particularizing synecdoche* (Wodak et al. 2009, 44), in which a semantically wider term, e.g. "British Muslims", is replaced by a narrower term, e.g. "I" (as a British Muslim). In this way, a singular can stand for a plural and the worry expressed by the individual is attributed to what the entirety of British Muslims really thinks or portrayed as a typical thought of British Muslims.

Guiding questions:
Are aspects shared by the identity group of British Muslims portrayed, such as:

1) Shared sorrows and problems, both in terms of political problems and everyday worries?
2) Shared interests, same everyday activities, same hobbies, same taste?
3) A sense of solidarity, cohesion?

And are those sorrows, interests, or activities at the same time implicitly or explicitly attributed to either British non-Muslims, British people in general (tweet 1, 2), Christians (tweet 3), or people in general (tweet 4, 5).

(1) @David_Cameron should resign #panamapapers #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink
(2) It's raining again! British weather is so unpredictable #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink
(3) Do Christians know that we really love Jesus (1) *(peace be upon him) as well* (2) ☺ *#WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*
(4) Ross and Rachel were on a break #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink
(5) Sunny Sunday afternoons are great for a nap #whatBritishmuslimsreallythink

B_Con_02: Intra-group Adequation

In the sub-category "intra-group adequation", British Muslims are portrayed as a unified group that is distinct from British non-Muslims. In this category, tweets that apply the strategy of adequation, e.g. "the pursuit of socially recognized sameness" (Bucholtz and Hall 2003, 383) as well as the strategy of distinction, which emphasizes difference between identity groups, are included.
This strategy is applied when an aspect of the identity group of British Muslims is portrayed as shared by all its members but not by either British non-Muslims, British identity in general, Christians, or people in general.

Guiding Questions:
Are aspects shared by the identity group of British Muslims portrayed, such as:
1) Shared sorrows and problems, both in terms of political problems and everyday worries?
2) Shared interests, same everyday activities, same hobbies, same taste?
3) A sense of solidarity, cohesion?

And are those sorrows, interests, or activities at the same time implicitly or explicitly attributed to British Muslims only, such as in the case of worries about ritual or concepts connected to Islam, discriminatory experiences as Muslims, etc.?

(1) Am I going to get harassed because of my hijab? #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink
(2) So worried about how we are being dehumanized & what it is & can lead to if unchecked #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink
(3) Can't remember if I still have wudu or not #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

B_Con_03: Construction of identity group through authorization

The strategy of authorization refers to the affirmation of the construction of identity groups by attributing authority to those institutions, entities, or people constructing and (re-)presenting the identity in question. In this sub-category, the "we"-group surrounding the hashtag and its portrayal is verified by attributing authority to those that (re-)present it.

Guiding Questions:
Is authority attributed to individual people in the hashtag discourse, to the media of Twitter itself, to the hashtag around which the „we"-group is formed, e.g. are these entities evaluated positively or otherwise explicitly / implicitly as authoritative? Is the hashtag conversation

promoted, e.g. is there an attempt to get more participants in the discourse and get it heard by a wider audience (for example in getting the hashtag trending)?

> *(1) So proud of the hashtag, #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink. It's everything I wanted it to be. A open conversation with British Muslims.*
> *(2) Start the conversation #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*
> *It's a beautiful sunny day today so no excuse for the husband to avoid mowing the lawn*

Code B_Dis: Macro-Strategy of Dismantling or Destructing Identity Categories

Are certain identity categories and their elements dismantled or questioned in the tweets?

B_Dis_01: Illegitimation

The strategy of illegitimation addresses the ways in which structures, institutions, and other authority figures dismiss, censor, ignore or mis-represent identity categories.

Guiding Questions:

1) Are sources of authority with regard to the article "An Inconvenient Truth" (e.g. Trevor Phillips, the Sunday Times, etc.) or institutionalized sources of authority in general, (e.g. the media, politicians, etc.) devaluated or delegitimized?
2) Is the poll and its science questioned?
3) Is the polling itself questioned, judged as discriminating, or devaluated? Is the question "what do British Muslims really think" portrayed as repetitive (part of a greater narrative), outdated, or discriminating?

> *(1) After ruining the Equality Human Rights Commn, what an Islamophobic wazzock Trevor Phillips turned out to be. #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink*
> *(2) #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink - a poll based on 1,000 people represents over 5,000,000 British Muslims. That's stupid.*
> *(3) #whatbritishmuslimsreallythink why are we forever discussing Muslims wallah I'm bored of myself now*

B_Dis_02: Denaturalization

The strategy of denaturalization aims to subvert and dismantle homogenizing and essentialising portrayals of identity, for example by emphasizing the problematic, fragmented, and socially constructed nature of identity or by violating certain expectations essentialist views of a specific identity group are linked to.

Guiding Questions:

1) Are identity groups denaturalized, e.g. portrayed as fragmented, not a monolithic unit, as heterogeneous?
2) Is the naturalized portrayal of the identity group as described by the poll / article questioned, e.g. the polled group seen as non-authentic?

3) Are expectations, which have been explicitly or implicitly attributed to the category of British Muslims in the article "An Inconvenient Truth" or in the broader discourse on Islam in Europe, violated (e.g. British Muslims do not oppress women)?

(1) #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink is that we don't have a single communal brain. We don't even have a community leader.

(2) I've never met a Muslim woman in a Union Jack niqab. Yet they show up in magazines. #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

(3) was going to ask Muslim friends what they thought of my new haircut but going to ask the Sunday times instead #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

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Code B_Per: Perpetuation, Justification

Is the British national identity reproduced and its continuity accentuated?
Is the current status quo justified or are British Muslims portrayed as a threat?

B_Per_01: Perpetuation, Justification through distinction

Guiding Questions:
Is there a distinction, juxtaposition between identity groups? Is Muslim identity devalued, evaluated negatively, or excluded from British identity, or are Muslims attributed to values that are implicitly or explicitly devaluated and excluded from Britishness?

(1) Well 50% think that homosexuality should be banned. #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

(2) #whatbritishmuslimsreallythink No one cares because they never have been and never will be. Welcome in the UK. (URL image)

B_Per_02: Perpetuation, Justification through authorization

Guiding Questions:

Is authority (re)-attributed to Trevor Phillips, the poll, the Sunday Times, the media, etc., e.g. are such entities mentioned as authorities or legitimate basis of knowledge?

I'm pretty interested what Trevor Phillips has to say about muslims, bearing in mind who he is, #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

B_Per_03: Perpetuation, Justification through illegitimation

Guiding Questions:

Is the hashtag itself, e.g. the authority, voice, validity of hashtag and its users questioned?

Goodness, this performance is a joke. #WhatBritishMuslimsReallyThink

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B_other

Is tweet ambiguous, e.g. the strategy applied unclear or not identifiable?
Is there a strategy other than those outlined above present in the tweet?

Note: This code applies to tweets with no identifiable or clear strategy or to tweets that contain strategies applied 3 times or less in the sample analyzed.

Appendix C: Inter-Coder Agreement

Table C1: Inter-Coder Agreement Content (Sub-)Categories

Code	*Percent Agreement*	*Cohen's Kappa**
A_Ev_01	95.9%	0.851
A_Ev_02	98%	0.657
A_Ev_03	100%	undefined**
A_Ev_04	100%	1
A_Ev_05	100%	1
A_Ev_06	98%	0.79
A_Ev_07	100%	undefined
A_Ev_08	100%	1
A_Ev_09	100%	1
A_Ev_10	100%	1
A_Ev_11	98%	0.656
A_Pop_01	100%	1
A_Pop_02	98%	0.898
A_Val	100%	1
A_Med_01	98%	0.657
A_Med_02	95.9%	0.81
A_Twi	100%	1
A_Pol	100%	1
A_Rel_01	100%	1
A_Rel_02	100%	1
A_Rel_03	98%	0.846
A_Rel_04	100%	1
A_Dis_01	95.9%	0.851
A_Dis_02	98%	0.656
A_Dis_03	98%	0.789
A_Race	100%	undefined
A_Nat	100%	1

*Cohen's Kappa has been interpreted according to Landis and Koch (1977, 165), who determined the following levels: A Kappa value of 0.41-0.60 equals moderate strength of agreement, 0.61-0.80 equals substantial strength of agreement and 0.81-1.00 equals almost perfect strength of agreement.
**Cohen's Kappa is undefined for this variable due to invariant values.

Table C2: Inter-Coder Agreement Strategies of Identification

Code	*Percent Agreement*	*Cohen's Kappa*
B_Con_01	87.8%	0.755
B_Con_02	83.7%	0.635
B_Con_03	100%	undefined
B_Dis_01	89.8%	0.644
B_Dis_02	95.9%	0.777
B_Per_01	100%	1
B_Per_02	100%	1
B_Per_03	100%	1
B_other	100%	undefined

Appendix D: Correlation Sub-Strategies and Main Content Categories

	Adequation A	Adequation B	Authorisation	Illegitimation	Denaturalise	Distinction	Authorisation	Illegitimation	Other
Everyday Life	r*=0.256 p**=0.000	r=0.179 p=0.000	-	r=−0.251 p=0.000	r=−0.178 p=0.000	r=−0.135 p= 0.003	-	r=−0.104 p=0.023	r=−0.146 p= 0.001
Religion / Islam	r=−0.339 p=0.000	r=0.478 p=0.000	-	r=−0.108 p=0.018	-	-	-	-	-
Discrimination	r=−0.403 p=0.000	r=0.093 p=0.041	-	r=0.558 p=0.000	r=0.449 p=0.000	-	-	-	-
Pop Culture	r=0.378 p=0.000	r=−0.125 p=0.006	-	r=−0.235 p=0.000	r=−0.126 p=0.006	-	-	-	r=−0.092 p=0.045
Media	r=−0.263 p=0.000	r=−0.193 p=0.000	-	r=0.334 p=0.000	r=0.092 p=0.043	-	r=0.104 p=0.022	-	-
Politics	-	-	-	r=0.126 p=0.006	-	r=0.102 p=0.026	-	-	-
Twitter	r=−0.135 p=0.003	-	r=0.534 p=0.000	-	-	-	-	r=0.347 p=0.000	-
Nation	-	-	-	-	-	r=0.131 p=0.004	-	-	-
Shared Values	r=−0.114 p=0.012	-	-	-	-	r=0.426 p=0.000	-	-	-
Race	-	-	-	r=0.102 p=0.025	- -	-	-	-	-

Only correlations that are statistically significant ($p<0.05$) are given in the table.

* Correlation was calculated using the Spearman coefficient.
**Significance was calculated using a two-tailed t-test.

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Ort und Datum:

Zürich 08.11.2016

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